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This dissertation examines the online discourses and semiotic resources employed by the 
Tunisian Amazigh community in their language and identity revitalization efforts on Facebook in 
wake of the 2011 Tunisian Revolution.  Drawing on insights from discourse-centered online 
ethnography (Androutsopoulos, 2008), the frameworks of language iconization, fractal 
recursivity, and erasure (Irvine and Gal, 2000), and the tactics of intersubjectvity proposed by 
Bucholtz and Hall (2004), I argue that Tunisian Imazighen (sing. Amazigh) use Facebook to 
challenge hegemonic language ideologies that erase Tamazight. I propose the notion of counter-
erasure as an ideological process used by Amazigh activists to contest Arabo-Islamic ideology, 
pan-Arabism, and Arabicization policies that pushed Tunisian Tamazight to a status of 
endangerment. Counter-erasure is also a means to reproduce an oppositional-ideological 
language discourse that corresponds to the hegemonic discourses of linguistic and cultural 
exclusiveness.  
The analysis is based on longitudinal observations of the Facebook accounts of nine 
Tunisian Amazigh activists collected between 2016 and 2018, and is supplemented by 23 
interviews and an online quantitative language survey among Tunisians. The analysis shows how 




semiotically to construct Amazigh identity and to assert the legitimacy and vitality of Tamazight. 
By examining these semiotic practices, this dissertation demonstrates how computer-mediated 
discourse (CMD) on Facebook provides a space for language ideologies to be disputed, 
reproduced and reversed - even in the face of very low rates of language proficiency and the 
endangered status of the language. 
The dissertation adds to an existing body of research on the sociolinguistics of digital 
communication with emphasis on the impact of Facebook interactions on language revitalization 
(Paricio-Martín & Martínez-Cortés, 2010), language activism (Feliciano-Santos 2011, Davis 
2013), identity construction (Georgalou 2015), bi/multilingualism (Androutsopoulos 2008, 2013; 
Cutler & Røyneland 2018), and minority languages (Jones & Uribe-Jongbloed, 2013). Facebook 
is shown to be a key factor in the emergence of an indigenous Amazigh discourse in the years 
since the 2010-2011 Tunisian Revolution. In the process of identity negotiation, Facebook offers 
huge semiotic potential for triggering ideological shifts in how language and identity are 
conceived by Tunisians. The dissertation concludes that computer mediated discourse on 
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We (Tunisians) we think in Tamazight but we speak in Arabic. We express our sadness and 
happiness in Tamazight.  
 
 
1.1 Research Motivations  
I was at a Christmas dinner with my uncle and his wife in their house where they used to 
live in Atlanta, Georgia talking about linguistics and potential research areas that I would be 
interested in for a Ph.D. degree.  Describing the grammar of the colloquial Tunisian was among 
the options we discussed most. A turning point in the conversation was when my uncle asked, ―If 
you are going to focus on Tunisian dialect, which variety you will be interested in most? You 
know, your grandmother, referring to his mother, speaks an interesting one‖. I paused at first, as 
I did not understand why my grandmother‘s variety would be interesting when it was highly 
stereotyped and a subject of social stigma for being spoken mostly in rural regions by 
uneducated farmers.  I asked my uncle for clarification to understand his point.   He responded, 
―It is indeed an interesting one. She uses many words you won‘t find anywhere but in Berber 
language.‖  It was such a surprising moment for me to know that my grandma still uses Berber 
when I was taught at school that the language has been long extinct within the context of Tunisia.  




words that my grandma would use in the variety she speaks.  With no hesitation, my uncle 
started listing the following terms: ghofa for ‗hair‘; ghonja for ‗spoon‘; kruma for ‗neck‘; fakrun 
for ‗turtle‘; sqontri for ‗freezing cold‘; darrig for ‗to hide‘.‖  ―I can find more if you want to, you 
just need to give me some time to think about that‖, he added.  
This conversation evoked memories of my first history lesson at fifth grade. The title of 
the lesson was ―Amazigh Inhabitants of North Africa‖.
 1
 It was the first time for me to hear the 
term Amazigh and the only time for the teacher to use it as he strictly used the term Berber(s) in 
the rest of the lesson. He called them ―first inhabitants of Tunisia, but never used words such as 
―indigenous‖, ―autochthones‖, ―natives‖, or ―ancestors‖ to refer to them.  I recall the lesson was 
not too long and the teacher ended it emphasizing that the Berber language and people faced 
mass extinction thousands of years ago, leaving no linguistic nor cultural trace behind.  
One year later since the Christmas dinner, I came across a shared article on a Facebook 
page entitled ―Tunisia‟s Berbers test the limits of country‟s newfound freedoms‖ published on the 
Global Post, April 26, 2011. At that time, I came to realize that not only Berber words continue 
to exist in some Tunisian regional varieties, but people who identify themselves as Berbers do 
exist too. It was another eye-opening moment on an essential constituent of Tunisian historical, 
cultural, and linguistic identity that has been subject of a systematic and institutionalized 
censorship. In the interview given to the Global Post, a seventy-six-year-old Berber resident of 
the mountains near Matmata stated: ―I've always wanted my kids to learn Tamazight (Berber 
language), but the government has never allowed it to be taught. We have never had any choice 
other than to teach it at our own homes.‖ Then there was the following line from the same article 
which drew my attention: ―Tunisia‘s ethnic minority population of Berbers, who live in these 
                                                 
1
 Amazigh is to the singular masculine form. Imazighen is the plural from Amazigh. Tamazight refers to the name of 
the language. The morpheme –en is the plural marker in Tamazight. The feminine marker in Tamazight is –t or the 




remote southern deserts known more for aging Star Wars locales than anything else, continue to 
battle decades of state restrictions over their cultural identity.‖ In fact, as many other Tunisians, I 
also knew that many memorable scenes in the film ―Star Wars‖ (1977) were filmed in the region 
of Matmata and that the planet Tatooine was named after the governorate of Tataouine. 
Nevertheless, as most Tunisians, I had no idea that that region is Berber and continues to be 
inhabited by Berber speakers.  All the realization I mentioned earlier were validated when I came 
cross the Facebook page of Gildo, a thirty-five-year Tunisian man who identified himself as 
Berber and seemed to be so active about Tunisian Berber. The images below (Figures 1-4) 
represent some of his postings at that time. Gildo‘s postings were not only performative acts of 
identity with pictures of himself or his communities, but also very discursive. They involved 
ideological practices and had the express purpose of promoting Amazigh identity and revitalizing 
the Tamazight language. Finding such images alluded to the existence of an unprecedented 
discursive-semiotic and linguistic practices taking place during the Tunisian Amazigh identity 
construction on the digital space of Facebook.   
 
Figure 1.1:  Gildo_Cultural_st_image1 




                     
Figure 1.2: Gildo_Cultural_st_image2 
Gildo performing his indigeneity by sharing a native American child‘s picture 
 
   
Figure 1.3: Gildo_Cultural_st_image3:  
Gildo‘s debunking the myth of Tamazight extinction through pictures of younger 







Figure 1.4: Gildo_Cultural_st_image4: 
[Gildo‘s comment] The biggest lie that has ever been believed by people in 
history is: North African inhabitants are Arabs 
 
Since then, I have been able to navigate many open Facebook pages of other Amazigh 
users and explore a plethora of Facebook activities that varied from performances, displays, and 
representations of Amazigh identity and cultural engagement to discussing the importance of 
Tamazight language and the best ways of revitalizing it within their community and the entire 
country. Following these Facebook pages daily made me rethink my own identity being a 
Tunisian who spent the first three decades of her life believing she was ―purely‖ Arab.  
Motivated by more than the desire to redefine my ethnolinguistic background, I decided to 
participate in the linguistic revitalization work of the language. While I am still involved in doing 
descriptive work for the grammar of the language along with recording interviews, songs, and 
poetry with the speakers, observing how the Amazigh community employs the online discourse 




identity called for more research on the language ideologies they express. Accordingly, I decided 
to focus my doctoral dissertation on the analysis of these ideological practices while examining 
Imazighen‘s Facebook interactions during the post-revolutionary period that are dramatically 
reshaping the social realities within the context of Tunisia.  
1.2 Background 
Tunisian Imazighen (sing. Amazigh), commonly known as Berbers or Shleuh, represent a 
conspicuous example of Indigenous people who have been systematically denied their identity 
and pushed into a perilous and disenfranchised socio-political position by a pseudo-homogenous 
nation-state (Janon, 2014) operating with a strong Arab-Islamic ideology since the Independence 
of Tunisia from French colonial rule in 1956. Because the term ―Berber‖ is believed to have no 
basis in the Berber language and culture, many Berber speakers and scholars prefer the use of the 
terms ―Amazigh‖ or ―Tamazight‖ to refer to the Berbers and their language (Boukous 1995, 
Ennaji 1997). ―Amazigh‖ is believed to mean ―free man‖ or ―noble man‖. Similar to many 
Indigenous peoples in the world, the Tunisian Tamazight faced discriminatory treatment for 
centuries: first during the rise and spread of Islam beginning in the 7
th
 century; then during the 
later invasions of Beni Helel tribes from Egypt in the 11
th





 century; subsequently under French colonial rule from1881-1956; and finally 
under the spread of Pan-Arabism and the growth of Arabic nationalism beginning in the 1960‘s. 
A radical decrease in the number of Tamazight speakers has been the result, pushing the 
Tamazight language into endangerment. Alternatively, hegemonic languages, particularly 
Arabic, have been favored by state policies and ideologies. The imposition of the Arabic 
language through educational institutions entailed the gradual recession of Tamazight-speaking 




was entirely Berberophone. Today, it is very difficult to find even one monolingual Tamazight 
speaker, never mind a bilingual individual who can speak Tamazight as natively as the local 
Tunisian dialect of Arabic. Finding native speakers of Tamazight in the few remaining 
Tamazight villages is a daunting task, made even more difficult because of the longevity of 
language contact: Tunisians had Imazighen ancestors who converted early (7
th
 century) in history 
to Islam as their faith and to Arabic as their language. Moreover, calling the language spoken in 
the mountainous villages of the south ―Tamazight‖ or ―Berber‖ is very uncommon in Tunisia.  
Gabsi (2009, p.33) states that ―the Berber dialects of the south, though known to be vastly 
different from Arabic, are vaguely classified by the state as ‗dialectes montagnards‖ without any 
reference to their possible non-Arabic and hence politically subversive origin.‖  
The Tunisian Imazighen were able to garner some international attention at the 59
th
 
Session of the United Nations‘ Committee for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
in 2016 in Geneva in the form of a report submitted by the World Amazigh Congress, an 
international organization defending Amazigh people‘s rights. Speaking about the discrimination 
against the linguistic and cultural rights of Tunisian Imazighen to the CESCR incited 
denouncement of the politics of Arabization and its role in negating Tunisian Amazigheity and 
denying the ancestral values and primary identity of Berbers. The report attested that for the 
pursuit of a pseudo-homogenous identity, toleration of socio-ethnic diversity and a pluralistic 
society were considered taboo topics in Tunisia post-Independence, which exacerbated the 
endangerment of the Tamazight language and culture. 
The endorsement of Tunisian Imazighen linguistic and cultural rights by the CESCR was 
the result of intensive activism of Tunisian Imazighen during the last five years.  It was not until 




discourse on Tamazight linguistic and cultural identity to the table for negotiation. After the 
Revolution and more than ever, Tunisian Imazighen wanted to seize the opportunity provided by 
the sudden political and social transition to become engaged in the huge and complex work of 
Tunisian Amazigh identity construction and reconstruction. Performing this work has frequently 
forced many Tunisian Imazighen to confront a plethora of questions about their Indigenous 
authenticity (Bucholtz & Hall 2005), their minority status vis-à-vis the majority population, and 
their alignment versus disalignment and disassociation versus accommodation with Arab-centric 
Tunisian society. These questions generally have been raised due to a pervasive socio-cultural 
ideology continuously aimed at erasing Tunisian Tamazight linguistic input in Tunisian Arabic, 
cultural products, identity, and expressions of ethnicity, rendering them invisible in the Tunisian 
linguistic and cultural landscape (Gal and Irvine 1995: 974). In response to those questions, 
Tunisian Imazighen have adopted a number of linguistic strategies to disclose and index the 
erasure processes imposed on their language and identity in which social media, and Facebook in 
particular, have been playing a critical role. Using the same online platform, Tunisian Imazighen 
employ discourses and semiotic resources that take the form of ―counter-erasure‖ processes as 
means of reclaiming their identity and revitalizing their language.  
Amazigh interaction on Facebook reflects an awareness of social media as a valid 
medium of identity construction and exploration. It has become a very popular platform to 
discuss Amazigh identity and experience. Engaging in online interactions through Facebook 
allows Imazighen to define themselves by more than just the name ―Amazigh.‖ Indeed, it has 
provided them with the opportunity to engage in self-authentication (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004) by 
creating linguistic content, imagery, signs, and symbolic representations to project an identity 




erasure and attempting to reverse its effects through counter-erasure or reversed erasure 
processes, characterizes much of the semiotic work that the Tunisian Imazighen have been 
carrying out through their Facebook interactions.  
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze processes of erasure along with those of 
iconization and fractal recursivity of the Tamazight language and culture exercised by the 
Imazighen in the context of the nascent movement of Tunisian Imazighen in the post-2011 
Tunisian Revolution. It is hoped that disclosing the erasure imposed on Tunisian Tamazight will 
be a first step in revitalizing the language, recognizing the Amazigh identity and language in the 
Constitution, and educating Tunisians about their Amazigh cultural and linguistic heritage. The 
goal of revitalizing a language in general is a very long and painstaking one. Although few 
efforts of language revitalization and maintenance have been effective and achieved complete 
success, Tunisian Tamazight seems to present a unique case; language shift started at very early 
point in history around the 7
th
 century, and yet now, there are signs that it could be successfully 
revived and could gain a potential position in the linguistic market (Bourdieu 1991). The current 
work examines ongoing efforts to revive Tunisian Tamazight and provides a useful case-study of 
counter-erasure and language revitalization enacted through grass-roots efforts and social media 
campaigns. 
Accordingly, this study seeks to find answers to the following research questions: 
1) What role is social media (Facebook) playing in the spread of pro-Tamazight ideologies 
since the 2010-2011 Tunisian Revolution? 
2) How are Imazighen using Facebook to reconstruct their language and culture in the face 
of Arab Nationalism? (E.g. counter-erasure). 




4) How have language ideologies shifted since the 2011 Revolution and what role has 
Facebook played in disseminating them? 
The discourse of language and identity construction of endangered language communities is 
usually analyzed in relation to a number of forces including but not limited to culture contact, 
historical immigration, nationalism, globalization, and modernization. Contemporary 
transformations brought on by computer-mediated communication (CMC) and social media 
represents a new force that has amplified and enriched language and identity discourse of the 
endangered language communities (Lafkioui, 2013). Nevertheless, the growing role of CMC and 
social media in shaping the endangered language discourse, particularly that of indigenous 
languages, has not received enough attention in sociolinguistics. This study aims at making a 
contribution to our understanding of how social media plays a role in language revitalization 
while examining the situation of the Indigenous Tunisian Tamazight language through a 
sociolinguistic lens. This study is also unique in offering new perspectives on the impact of 
social media on building, displaying and performing the indigenous identity in North Africa, 
especially the one of endangered languages, such as Tunisian Tamazight.  
While CMC has a tremendous impact on shortening distances, increasing contacts, 
facilitating interactions, and reducing isolation, connecting members of indigenous languages, 
especially endangered languages, seem to fulfill the same functions as offline mechanisms that 
serve to maintain boundaries and differences to create an online group identity. It is through 
these mechanisms that they either construct alignments with some and distinguish themselves 
from others, authorize or delegitimize themselves or others, and authenticate or denaturalize their 
actions and practices versus those of the ―other‖ (Bucholtz and Hall, 2005). The use of 




and ideologies that these linguistic forms take, represent examples of the mechanisms recruited 
by Tunisian Imazighen to develop their identity project.  Irvine and Gal (2000) present erasure, 
iconization, and fractal recursivity as semiotic resources that a language community uses to 
attain linguistic and identity differentiation and normalize and rationalize those differences. 
Tunisian Imazighen seem to engage in an ideological discourse that corresponds in its outcome 
to the one of erasure, iconization, and fractal recursivity. This is what I call ―counter-erasure‖. 
Accordingly, my dissertation does not only contribute to endangered language-focused-CMC 
studies, but also to studies of reversing language shift.  
The emergence of such a discursive strategy among Tunisian Imazighen is very much 
connected to the rise of the use of Facebook which has become an everyday activity for many of 
them since the 2010-2011 Tunisian Revolution.  Thus, in addition to the survey and the 23 semi-
structured interviews, the data used to examine the ideological forces of erasure and mainly 
counter-erasure in this dissertation come from Tunisian Amazigh Facebook pages containing a 
considerable number of multimodal texts. The remainder of this introduction will describe the 
outline of this dissertation.  
Chapter 2 is an analysis of the etymological and typological background of Tamazight 
language along with a typological classification of Tunisian Tamazight and an overview of the 
villages where it is still spoken in Tunisia. This chapter also provides a description of the 
different languages spoken in Tunisia across history (from 1200 B.C.E-present) and the historical 
forces that have triggered the endangerment of Tamazight language.  
Chapter 3 will outline the theoretical framework with which to approach the analysis of 
linguistic and identity erasure, and endangered language reversal shift. This present study is 




studies. In relation to the first, the semiotic processes of iconization, fractal recursivity, and 
erasure as proposed by Irvine and Gal (2000) will provide a solid basis to examine the data. This 
study will also use Bucholtz and Hall‘s (2004) model of tactics if intersubjectivity, which 
demonstrates how identity can be analyzed as an outcome of three pairs of inter-relational 
contrasts: distinction versus adequation, authentication versus denaturalization processes, and 
authorization versus illegitimation. In relation to language-focused CMC research, the study will 
provide a sketch of the development of CMC in language studies with a focus on the use of 
Facebook in identity construction and reconstruction in the context of endangered languages, and 
indigenous ones in particular.  This section will also discuss the growth of Facebook in the 
context of Tunisian Imazighen during the last seven years since the 2010-2011 Tunisian 
Revolution and finish by addressing linguistic online ethnography as a new approach to language 
and identity studies. 
 Chapter 4 will offer a description of the methodology for data collection and the data 
itself. The data includes survey responses from 198 subjects, 23 semi-structured interviews with 
Imazighen activists, and longitudinal participant observation over two years of nine Facebook 
pages. Chapter 4 also describes the use of two methods of data analysis: qualitative content 
analysis (QCA) and discourse analysis (DA).  A brief description of the two approaches to the 
study of textual data whether information taken from individuals‘ profiles, interactions among 
participants, or multimodal texts will make up a third section in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 contains an analysis of the survey data in which the participants describe their 
experiences using Tamazight in different settings, learning other languages based on their 
symbolic and economic value, language policies in Tunisia, the ideologies generated by these 




Tamazight in the linguistic landscape of Tunisia, and attitudes about the future of Tunisian 
Tamazight. The second section in this chapter is devoted to analyzing the Facebook data with 
more focus on Facebook profile pages. That includes background and cover pictures, 
introduction section features on the left side of the profile pages, and status. This section will 
also examine some of the wall posts involving meta-commentaries about the language and 
identity performance. The section will also investigate some of the interviews to illustrate the 
Facebook data analysis. Using Irvine and Gal‘s framework of language ideology and the three 
process of iconization, fractal recursively and erasure along with the tactics of inter-subjectivity 
proposed by Bucholtz and Hall (2004), this chapter shows how ‗counter–erasure‘ is exercised 
and in other moments, counteracted, through Facebook semiotic multimodalities.  
Chapter 6 will be divided into two sections. The first focuses on the multilingual 
practices on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook. More specifically, it will examine how Tunisian 
Imazighen position themselves regarding the multilingual repertoires available to them. In doing 
so, the analysis will focus on the ideological associations embedded in the language choices that 
participants make. The second section is devoted to examining the script choices and the 
meaning-making that arises from these choices. In both sections of the chapter the analysis will 
be centered around Tunisian Imazighen re-creating and re-shaping the semiotic connections 
between specific national signs, the linguistic resources and their various indexical and symbolic 
links. 
Chapter 7 synthesizes the findings of the previous chapters and evaluates the extent to 
which this study can contribute to the revitalization of Tunisian Tamazight. The chapter also lists 
some of the implications that the study aims to have achieved regarding the efforts of reversing 




Chapter Two  
 




When an Arab defends his Arabism, they call him nationalist, yet, when an 
Amazigh defends his Amazigheity they call him racist (kateb Yaicne) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The present chapter presents etymological, typological, and historical contextualization for 
the research question at hand. The interest in examining these three areas will enable a better 
grasp of the process of minoritization of Tamazight, which has led to its endangered status. Any 
form of language use in the context of Tunisian Tamazight is very bound up with issues of 
identity starting from the names used to refer to the people and language. Therefore, it is 
important to include some etymological analysis to understand how naming practices play a role 
in the erasure of Amazigh language and identity.  
The typological affiliation of Tamazight has been debated through at least three contentious 
hypotheses. The existence of a controversy over the origin of Tamazight is often motivated by 
ideological intent. Hence, addressing these theories while presenting the most plausible one from 
the perspective of linguistic research will be of great interest to the analysis of this study.  
Language contact and language conflicts go hand in hand in characterizing the 




nations, societies, or communities with prestigious languages and weak nations, societies, or 
communities with less prestigious ones. Regarding indigenous languages context, and 
endangered languages in particular, the notion of prestige often contributes to the expansion and 
promotion of the major language whereas the less prestigious ones usually end up facing one of 
these two scenarios or both: bilingualism and linguistic nationalism (Sayahi 2014). While the 
former refers to the co-existence of the majority and minority languages, the latter is consistent 
with leveling identities and forcing linguistic assimilation. Therefore, reexamining the history of 
Tunisian Tamazight in contact with other languages is significantly pertinent to understanding 
the dominance of Arabic over Tamazight in the region, therefore, erasure of this language. 
2.2 Etymology 
 
The term ―Berber‖ is historically presumed to have negative connotations. 
Etymologically, it is derived from the root ―barbar,‖ which exists in many Indo-European 
languages and Arabic. The use of this term is usually related to the Greek term ―barbaros,‖ which 
initially referred to anyone who seemed foreign or had a different language and culture than 
Greek (Ennaji 2005). The Romans attributed additional negative meanings to the term such as 
‗uncivilized‘ or ‗savage,‘ which led to the use of the word ‗barbarian‘ in modern English and 
other European languages. Yet, the term was not recorded as being used to refer to North African 
inhabitants either by the Greeks or the Romans. Rather, they were called other names, such as 
Numidians, Mauris, Moors, Libyans, and Mauritanians. Arabs used the term ‗El-Barbar‘ initially 
to refer to any African who did not speak Arabic in the medieval Islamic era. To illustrate, Ibn 
Battuta (1304- 1368), an Arabic speaking Muslim traveler and writer, frequently used variations 
of the Arabic term ‗El-Barbar‘ to refer to inhabitants of East and Central Africa: ―I traveled from 




the blacks…‖ (Ibn Battuta 1325 - 1368). Some historical sources argue that the Europeans were 
the first to equate the modern term Berber with the Indigenous people of North Africa. This 
argument is based on evidence found in literature and on maps from the sixteenth century 
throughout Western Europe (Prichard 1837). The term ‗Berberie‘ was later used by the French 
when they took over North Africa in 1830‘s. In the aftermath, the word Berber gained broader 
usage to refer to the Tamazight speakers in North Africa in particular, and English dictionaries 
defined this term accordingly since then. For example, in the Imperial Dictionary of the English 
Language by John Olgive (1885: 6), a Berber is defined as ―a person who inhabits the mountains 
of Barbary and portions of the Sahara; the language spoken by Berbers has affinities with the 
Semitic language.‖ As noted above, Berber speakers and scholars prefer the use of the terms 
‗Amazigh‘ or ‗Tamazight‘ to refer to the Berbers and their language (Boukous 1995, Ennaji 
2005).  
Contrary to these attested sources for the term, some blogs on Berber/Tamazight show 
evidence that the term could have roots in the language itself. The Tuareg tribes who are also 
considered Berbers, for instance, would use the term iber-iber to describe nomads roaming the 
Sahara (Josh 2012). In Kabyle, the Berber language of Alegria, the word sberber exists to refer 
to the clouds covering the sky or to anything that protects the body as a covering. In addition, 
there is a village located in the M'Chedellah district of the Bouïra province in Algeria, called 
Iberbaren; but even more interesting, there is another village in Algeria called Tizi N'Berber, a 
Kabyle place name predating any modern usage of ―Berber‖, meaning roughly ―The Pass of the 
Covered Land‖ (Josh 2012). Kabyle use of ―Berber‖ to refer to the status of covered sky or land 




origin of the term as a local place name is a plausible alternative to the historical interpretations 
that attribute the origin of the term to the Roman or Greek usage of ‗barbaros.‘.  
In addition to the term having a meaning in the Berber/Tamazight language, several 
ethnographers who conducted fieldwork among the Berber/Amazigh such as Ernest Gellner 
(1972) reported that many groups living in the mountains and deserts refer to themselves as 
―Berber‖. Based on the previous findings, the notion that the term ―Berber‖ has a pejorative 
connotation when it refers to the people may not always be true. Berbers have been always told 
that the term ―Berber‖ was given to them by Arabs who use it in the sense of ―savage‖ and 
―unrefined.‖  Nevertheless, Berbers do not seem aware of the Berber/Tamazight etymological 
roots for this term. Thus, rejecting this term or finding it offensive could be simply viewed as a 
reactionary attitude based on whatever people are routinely told, not necessarily because the term 
has derogatory connotations. In the following sections of this study and in the dissertation, the 
emic terms ‗Amazigh‘ (pl. Imazighen) as an ethnic designation and ‗Tamazight‘ for the language 
of the Imazighen will be used. This is not because these terms are more accurate, but because 
they represent preferences of most of Amazigh people who have become involved in the current 
linguistic and cultural revival movements of Tamazight.  
2.3  Typology 
2.3.1  Tamazight Afro-Asiatic origin 
Tamazight is a branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family, previously known as the 
Hamito-Semitic language family (See Figure 5 below). When Greenberg (1966) developed his 
approach to language typology, he challenged binary terminologies such as Hamito-Semitic 
because it seemed ideologically loaded; suggesting that the Semitic branch is in a relation of 




―Afroasiatic‖ has become the name of the language family in which we also find languages such 
as Chadic, Cushitic, Ancient Egyptian and Semitic. According to Kossmann (2013) the split 
between Tamazight and other languages, the Semitic ones in particular, occurred at least 6500 
years ago. Today, the distance between modern Tamazight and Modern Arabic is similar to that 
between Modern English and Modern Hindi (Kossmann 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Afro-Asiatic language family tree. 
 Similarities between Tamazight and Arabic, however, are substantial and are the reason 
why some historians and anthropologists, such Othmane Saadi (2007) believe that Tamazight is a 
dialect of Arabic. To support this hypothesis, which has strong advocacy particularly among 
Afro-Asiatic 


















Pan-Arabists and nationalists, Saadi (2007) argues that Europe and North Africa were covered 
with ice before 1800 BCE, whereas the Arabian Peninsula enjoyed a climate close to that of 
southern Europe now. The ice melted in the former and drought hit the latter, so people 
eventually left the Arabian Peninsula and settled North Africa and southern Europe. He adds that 
Berber princes often claimed Yemenite origins(cf. Souag 2009).  
Both arguments on which Saadi (2007) bases his hypothesis can be questioned for many 
reasons. First, North Africa was never covered with ice. According to Souag (2009), North 
Africa was more habitable before 1800 BCE than it is now. Recent archeological findings of 
animal skeletons and hunting tools made of flint stones from prehistoric times discovered in the 
region of Nafta in southern Tunisia prove that the  existence of human in the region could date as 
far back as 80,000 years ago (Kapitalis 2016). The originally matrilineal traditions of many 
Imazighen and the lack of pre-Islamic attestations also provide evidence against the Yemenite 
origin claim (Souag 2009). The fact that people change their languages all the time also proves 
nothing about the origin of the language. The linguistic evidence shows that Semitic languages 
are spoken in Arabia and in the Middle East, but the common ancestor of Tamazight, Egyptian, 
and Semitic was likely located in Africa. As mentioned above, these three language families are 
quite closely related to Chadic (spoken in Nigeria and Chad) and Cushitic (spoken around the 
Horn of Africa). Based on the linguistic migration theory (Campbell 1998), when a language 
family splits up, it is more likely for the various daughter languages to stay close to where they 
started out and it is less likely for them to move very far or very frequently. This theory provides 
support for the interpretation that it is more likely that one branch left Africa, than those four 
branches each separately followed the same narrow path across Sinai or crossed the Red Sea 




as a supportive argument to the claim that Tamazight descends from Arabic not only lacks 
validity, it also represents an example of erasure ideology (Irvine and Gal 2000). Assuming that 
any common word in Tamazight and Arabic comes from Arabic erases the role of Tamazight in 
influencing several aspects of the Arabic dialects spoken in North Africa.  
                
Figure 2.2: Afro-Asiatic languages distribution 
In sum, Tamazight and Arabic are both Afroasiatic languages and it is not the case that 
one descended from the other. Both historical and typological approaches since Greenberg‘s 
(1960, 1966) work seem to recognize the existence of a phylum called Afroasiatic and to agree 
on the division between Semitic and Tamazight as two distinct families within it (Diakonoff 
1998; Ehret 1995).    
2.3.2 Tamazight languages: classifications 
Tamazight constitute a separate language family with no less than twenty-five languages 
and numerous regional dialects (Ethnologue 2009).  Classifying the Tamazight family into 
different varieties, however, has proved problematic. Kossmann (2013) attributes parts of the 
difficulty to the fact that most of Tamazight is constituted of discontinuous varieties that are 




(1988:19-20) divided Tamazight into four main branches. The Northern branch includes 
Tamazight varieties spoken in Morocco and Algeria, such as Tashelhyt, Tamazight, Kabyle and 
Chaouia. The Eastern branch includes varieties that are spoken in Libya and Siwa Egypt. In the 
Sahara of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso we find the Tuareg Tamazight branch. The fourth 
branch is called Zenega and is found in Mauritania and possibly Senegal (See Figure 2.2).  
Kossmann (2013) suggested a division of the Tamazight family into ten blocks based on 
geographical and linguistic grounds in which some of the blocks consist of languages while 
others do not (See Figure 2.3). The first block consists of Zenega Tamazight of Mauritania and 
Tetserret in Niger; the second of Tuareg of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger; The third is made up 
of Tamazight spoken in the south-central Morocco, such Tashelhyt, Central Moroccan Tamazight 
(the language in this block has been always called Tamazight, even before the modern political 
usage of this name to refer to Berber in general). The fourth block consists of the Northwestern 
Moroccan Tamazight, such as Ghomara and Senhadja; the fifth block is the one of Kabyle 
spoken basically in Algeria. The sixth is Nefusa Tamazight spoken in the western mountains of 
Libya, the seventh is the Libyan-Egyptian Oases Tamazight spoken near the Northwestern parts 
in Libya and in Siwa oasis in Egypt. The eighth is the one of Ghadames spoken on the Libyan-
Algerian borders, and the ninth is Awdjila block in eastern Libya. The tenth block, Zenatic, is 
highly diversified (Kossmann 1999, 2013) with multiple Tamazight varieties. Among the most 
known are Tariffit Tamazight in North-eastern Morocco and Chaouia of the Auras spoken in the 





Figure 2.3: Tamazight Blocks  
2.3.3 Tunisian Tamazight sub-classifications 
Tunisian Tamazight is classified as belonging to the Northern branch using Diakonoff‘s 
model (1988) and the Zenatic block using Kossmann‘s (2013). Nevertheless, lexical and 
phonological comparisons between two Tamazight villages in Tunisia, Douiret and Zrawa in 
pilot studies I conducted (Bahri, 2016), reveal that while the former presents many similarities 
with the Auras variety in Algeria, the latter seemed to be closer to Nefusa in Libya. Therefore, it 
seems that Tunisian Tamazight takes an intermediate position between the blocks of Nefusa and 
Zenatic. This does not mean the two village varieties belong to two different languages of 
Tamazight. Rather, they form a continuum of varieties that overlap with each other across the 
borders of each village. Hamza (2007) supports this interpretation to a large extent arguing that 
Tunisian Tamazight varieties, despite some differentiation, all make up one language. When 
Tunisian Tamazight is compared to other Tamazight languages in the other countries of North 
Tamazight 
Zenega of Mauritania and Tetserret in Niger  
Toureg of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger 
Tashelhyt and Tamazight  
Ghomara and Senhadja in NorthWest of Morocco   
Kabyle  
Nefusa in the western mountains of Libya   
Siwa Oasis in Egypt  
Ghadames in Libyan-Algerian Boarders  
Awdjila in East Libya   




Africa, mainly Algeria and Morocco, it stands out as one language on its own. The percentage of 
mutual intelligibility between Tunisian Tamazight and other Tamazight languages is in the region 
of 63–72% (Hamza 2007). However, when Tunisian Tamazight varieties were compared with 
each other, they cluster around 83-98% in mutual intelligibility (Hamza 2007). Accordingly, 
Hamza (2007) concluded that Tunisian Tamazight can be considered one language, on the same 
level as the other main languages of the Tamazight.  
               
Figure 2.4: Villages where Tamazight is still spoken in Tunisia (Joshua Project, 2017) 
In an attempt to sketch a classification of Tunisian Tamazight dialects, Gabsi (2009) 
relied on two factors, their mutual intelligibility and geographical distribution. Each dialect was 
referred to by the name of the village where it is spoken (See Figure 2.5).  In his model, he 
divided Tunisian Tamazight dialects into continental and Insular (spoken in the island of Jerba). 
The former group comprises Tamazight spoken in the village of Chninni, Douiret, and 
Guermessa. The three villages are located in the governorate of Tatouine, in the south of Tunisia.  




inhabitants of Tataouine speak Tamazight with various levels of proficiency but do not write 
Tifinagh proficiently. Some of them use Arabic or Latin script to write Tamazight (personal 
communication with local informants).  
  
Figure 2.5: Tatouine in Tunisia (Joshua Project, 2017) 
The continental group also includes Tamazight spoken in the villages of Tamazret, 
Taoujout, Zrawa or Azrou, and Sned. They are located in the city of Matmata in the governorate 
of Gabes, in the south of Tunisia. There are nearly 5,500 Amazigh in Matmata (Joshua 2017). 
Based on my communications with local inhabitants, the Zrawa, Tamezret, and Taoujout people 
are harmoniously united. They are very like one another in their customs and traditions. The 
Amazigh inhabitants of Zrawa are well-off economically as they have a large overseas 
population, mainly in France and Italy. They also hold employment in government jobs, private 
professions, and in privately owned projects in neighboring cities.  The village of Zrawa also has 
a relatively known association to revitalize Tamazight language and culture. It is called Azrou 






. The Amazigh of Tamezret rely heavily on tourism.  This has resulted in hardship and 
increasing poverty since tourism decreased dramatically following the 2010–2011 revolution and 
subsequent terrorist attacks against foreign tourists. The inhabitants of Tamazret speak 
Tamazight with variable proficiency (Joshua 20017). Taoujout is another village where 
Tamazight is still spoken. It is more likely to find native speakers in this village than in the rest 
of the villages (personal informant). It is about 7 kilometers away from Tamezret. The city 
contains one of the oldest Amazigh populations, which enhances its tourist appeal. My contacts 
inform me that the inhabitants also rely on farming and cattle herding. The Amazigh of Taoujout 
would also be described as economically marginal.  
 
Figure 2.6:  Matmata in Tunisia (Joshua Project, 2017) 
The insular group refers to Tamazight spoken in the few villages in the island of Jerba, 
which is also located just off the coastline in the southeastern region of Tunisia. There are 15,000 
Amazigh in Djerba, divided between four different towns on the island. Guallela (10,000), Tlet 
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(500), Ajim (500), and nearly 4,000 in Sedouikech, including an Amazigh village called 
Oursighen, where 3,000 Amazigh live (Joshua, 2017).  In general, many appear to have lost 
aspects of their traditional Amazigh identity. Amazigh clothing has changed due to integration 
with the Arabs of Djerba. Many now wear modern clothes making it difficult to distinguish 
Amazigh from other ethnic groups merely on outward appearances.  
 
Figure 2.7: The Island of Jerba (Joshua Project, 2017) 
According to my local sources, the Amazigh of Guallela and a minority of those from 
Sedouikech, especially within the village of Oursighen, have held on to their Amazigh identity 
and are proud of it. They are culturally and religiously conservative. Amazigh people in the 
Island of Djerba follow Ibadi school of Islam, unlike the general population in Tunisia and 
Imazighen in the other villages who are Sunni. There is a strong and close relationship between 
the Amazigh of Djerba and the Jews of Djerba. In the season of Jewish pilgrimage in Djerba, the 




trustworthy people and interact with them commercially. The Amazigh of Guallela are potters 
and this profession has been passed on for generations. It is considered the profession of their 
ancestors and, therefore, not to be abandoned. With the passing of time, evolving material needs, 
and the difficulty of the profession, however, the youth have begun to search out work in 
industrial and commercial locations (Joshua 2017). The Amazigh inhabitants of Sedouikech 
work in agricultural commerce. They farm olive trees and produce olive oil. The inhabitants of 
the village of Oursighen are considered well-off.  Members of the family may live abroad, often 
in Europe, sending back money to their families.  All of the Amazigh groups in Djerba speak the 
Tamazight language with variable proficiency, but very few can write Tifinagh. The viability of 
the Tamazight language in the villages of Tlat and Ajim is tenuous with each passing generation. 
Only the elderly among these groups still speak it, however more fieldwork is needed in order to 
ascertain its true status.  
2.4  Tunisian linguistic landscapes across history: Tamazight in contact 
Before moving further in discussing the aims of the present study, it is important to have 
a grasp of who Tunisian Imazighen are and how their history has shaped their current reality and 
identity. Throughout mainstream recorded history, the Imazighen have repeatedly encountered 
powerful invasions to which their responses have ranged from resistance and retreat to 
embracing and assimilating in the new order (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, p.112). Such a context has 
perpetuated a historical narrative that exclusively retells the conquerors‘ acts, and portrays 
Amazigh populations as almost a-historic actors, their role as ―protagonists in their own history‖ 
is lost in the process (Brett and Fentress 1996, p. 7). Negative stigma attached to Imazighen has 
been exacerbated by the hegemony of the ideology of Arabism during the post-colonial period 




Efforts to shift the negative discourse regarding the Imazighen are perceived as threatening to the 
national order.  
The hostility towards the Imazighen in North Africa in general and in Tunisia in 
particular has been shaped over three important historical periods: the pre-Islamic conquest in 
the 7
th
 century, the post-Islamic and pre-French occupation, and post-French occupation (Gabsi 
2009). The 2010-2011 Tunisian revolution marks the fourth and most recent catalyst for 
reshaping Imazighen identity.  
The overview of the four periods of history will not only help develop a good grasp of the 
linguistic situation in Tunisia, but also illustrate the history of contact between Tamazight, being 
the language of the autochthonous inhabitants and the successive new settlers of different 
ethnicities. Linguistically, contact between different ethnic groups often leads to language 
conflict (Nelde 1987). Language contact and conflict are seen as interdependently related 
processes, applicable both to individuals and to language communities. Therefore, it is necessary 
to understand how both are manifested and intertwined in the sociopolitical history of Imazighen 
in Tunisia.  
Tunisia is known for its strategic geographical position between the eastern and the 
western basins of the Mediterranean. Its pivotal location has made it very appealing for many 
civilizations and cultures, which led to a great deal of linguistic complexity (Hamza 2007).  
2.4.1 The Pre-Islamic history: Tamazight first contact with other languages 
The Phoenicians appear to be the first people to have a contact with the indigenous 
people of Tunisia around 1200 B.C.E. While settling in Tunisia and building Carthage in 814 
B.C. they brought with them their culture and language (Phoenician) and so Tunisia entered its 




existing Afro-Asiatic language, which is Libyc. When the Greeks invaded Carthage as early as 
the 7
th
 century B.C.E. and achieved multiple victories over the Carthaginians, their arrival did 
not have an impact on the balanced interaction of Libyc and Punic (Phoenician of Carthage) in a 
stable bilingual context. Presumably, Libyc was the language used by the masses and Punic was 
the official language and language of the elite (Hamza 2007). By the 2
nd
 century B.C.E., the 
Punic wars had started between Rome and Carthage, and the latter was destroyed in 146 B.C.E. 
Libyc and Punic coexisted until this part of North Africa (some parts of Algeria and Libya, 
together with modem Tunisia) became a Roman colony from 146 BC to 5th century (Hamza 
2007).  
According to Hamza (2007), the linguistic situation in Tunisia entered its second phase 
sometime in the 1
st
 century B.C.E. With the re-founding of Carthage in 44 B.C.E., Latin replaced 
Punic as the official language for several more centuries until the arrival of Arabs in the 7
th
 
century. Hamza (2007) notes that even though the Vandals occupied North Africa in the 3
rd
 
century, Latin and Tamazight bilingualism remained unchanged. A detailed description of how 
Tamazight, Punic and Latin interacted (what Diakonoff 1988 refers to as Libyco-Punic or the 
Berbero-Libyan) is unfortunately lacking in the literature. The little that is known about the 
cultural and linguistic interaction that occurred between Imazighen and the newcomers during 
this period (pre-Islamic) can be summed up in the following quote from Hamza‘s (2007):  
 Punic deities adopted by the Imazighen continue to be honored to this day, though in 
other forms. In the time of the Roman Empire, the religious cults of Baal, Thanit and other 
divinities became those of Saturn and Caelestis (Yver, 1937). Under the Romans, the power of 
some of these deities was transferred to the cult of living individuals. Emperors such as Augustus 
were celebrated every year on a certain fixed date and Tunisians still celebrate a festival bearing 
the name Awassu 'August' (Brugnatelli, 1998). A priest such as ajlamen presided over religious 
ceremonies, and games such as gladiatorial combats were a necessary complement to the 
festivals. In today's Tunisia, this has been replaced by games known as alfantasia involving 





2.4.2 Post-Islamic History: Tamazight contact with Arabic 
The arrival of Muslim-Arabs in the mid-7
th
 C.E. and the introduction of Arabic, a Semitic 
language, marked the beginning of new period of language contact in Tunisia. The history of 
Arabic in Tunisia could be divided into two periods, in what is known in the literature as the pre-
Hilalian and the Hilalian invasions (Barakat 2000). During the first invasion in the second half of 
the 7
th
 century, Arabs came to North Africa from the Arab Peninsula as preachers of Islam. 
Hence the history of Arabic in Tunisia can be easily related to the history of Islam. Arabs first 
inhabited the already existing urban areas, such as Kairouan in Tunisia which represented the 
first Muslim settlement in the Maghreb (Sayahi 2014). This contributed to the development of 
vernacular forms similar to the ones spoken in the cities, also called ‗sedentary‘ in Arabic 
dialectology (Versteegh 1997). During this period, only urban areas were Arabized. Rural areas 
where a large majority of Amazighophones resided were not Arabized till the start of the second 




 centuries. Hence, local dialects first took the form of what is 
now known as sedentary Arabic or pre-Hilalian Arabic (Sayahi 2014; Versteegh 1997).  During 





centuries, the Arabic tribes of Beni Hilal and Beni Sulaym came to Tunisia from Egypt. 
Consequently, Arabic extended its contact with more territories influencing both the rural 
sedentary populations and nomadic groups living in the desert (Sayahi 2014; Versteegh 1997). 
The linguistic features that developed during the second wave of Arabization had ‗nomadic‘ 
characteristics (Versteegh 1997). Accordingly, the two processes of Arabization led to the 
emergence of two different types of Arabic dialects: sedentary and nomadic.  In parallel with this 
linguistic change, the total conversion of Imazighen to Islam was accompanied by linguistic 




The religious and cultural factors favoring Arabic were strongly embedded within 
Tunisian society; by the time the Turks made Tunisia one of their regencies among other Arabic-
speaking countries in the mid-14th century (Hamza 2007), Tamazight had been superseded by 
Arabic as the majority language. The importance of Turkish now must be considered within this 
complex linguistic context. Under Turkish rule, Turkish became the language of the court and 
the ruling class. Although an occupier language fulfilled the specific purpose of facilitating the 
rule of the country, Turkish was eventually given up by the Turkish Beys of Tunisia in favor of 
Arabic, the language of their subjects (Hamza 2007). It is important to note that during the time 
of the Turkish rule from the 14
th
 century until the 'proclamation' of Tunisia as an independent 
Kingdom by the Hussainit dynasty of Beys
3
 in the early 18
th
 century, the practice of the Ottoman 
Empire favored a policy of multiculturalism. Thus, except among the ruling class, knowledge of 
Turkish was not expected. Minorities such as Imazighen, Jews and Europeans were left to 
conduct their private and business affairs in their own languages.  However, education and 
religious matters were the domain of Arabic as the ruling class at the time of the arrival of the 
Turks were of Arab origin or were Arabic speakers (Hamza 2007). In addition, most of the 
Turkish ruling class were themselves Muslim (Mansel, 1995). Thus, over many centuries, Arabic 
became the majority language at the expense of Tamazight. The Turks also facilitated the 
absorption of another ethnic element of Amazigh-Arabic origin from Andalusia into the 




Muslims and Jews of Spanish origin were added to the ethnic landscape of North Africa. 
According to Hamza (2007), the Bey of Tunis gave fertile lands to some of these immigrants and 
to others, governmental posts in return for their expertise in administrative organizations or their 
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technical knowledge. Toponymical research shows that towns such as Kalaat el-Andalous and 
el-Batan bear names of their Andalusian founders (Ben Jaafer 1985) 
From the year 1705 until the independence of Tunisia in 1956, the formulation of a 
Tunisian national identity began around the building of a modern nation known as Tunisia. The 
linguistic situation was relatively stable and the newly formed Tunisian government under the 
Hussainit Bey looked to the West for a style of government. The Beys ruled for about two 
centuries and a half. During the French colonial between 1881 until 1956, the Beys tried to 
construct a modern Tunisia while seeking advice from France regarding the modernization of the 
country (Hamza 2007). Thus, an element of western civilization was added to the existing 
components of Tunisian social identity.  
2.4.3 Post- French occupation: Arabization continues 
By the time the French made Tunisia a Protectorate following their occupation of Algeria 
in 1830, what was left of the Amazigh community in Tunisia had taken refuge in the remote and 
isolated regions of the country. The French language was a real competitor to the dominance of 
Arabic, since it brought with it a prestigious culture and was associated with advanced 
technology. It was considered a link to the more modern European and Western civilizations. 
Two languages (Arabic and French) and two civilizations (Arabo-Islamic and Franco-Western) 
shaped the linguistic topography of Tunisia for the next century (Hamza 2007). This language 
situation was and still is saliently apparent in the country's education system and cultural life. In 
between the two World Wars and after a period of a more or less stable bilingualism of French 
and Arabic in the educational establishments of colonial Tunisia, French culture and language 
replaced Arabic in both the secondary and higher education systems to become the main subject 




Stable bilingualism of Arabic and French was maintained in institutions and educational 
establishments for many years during and after the Protectorate. However, the rise of Arab 
Nationalism in the 1950s was a turning point for Tunisia following the line taken by the other 
Arab and North African countries in making Arabic the sole national and official language. 
Arabization rapidly extended to the executive and governing bodies of the Maghrebi countries 
following Algeria's independence in 1962, and the revival of Islam in the 1960s relegated French 
to second place status in Tunisia as well. An interesting linguistic situation developed in the new 
political context in which Arabic was given a much wider range than the one to which it was 
originally confined, namely the teaching of Arabic literature and Islamic principles. 
Consequently, French civilization and, to a certain extent, the French language, slowly declined 
in influence during the 1960s. With Pan-Arabism taking over, Pan-Arabic unity was realized and 
understood early in the form of a religious unity (Islam) (Daoud 1991). In other words, the 
Arabic speaking countries see themselves as one nation with one religion (Islam) reinforced by 
one language (Arabic). The major component of ethnic identity according to this ideology is 
religious identity.  
The national goals of Arabization were successfully achieved in about a decade and a half 
after independence. This view is illustrated in the following statement, from the news magazine 
Dialogue, the mouthpiece of the ruling Destour Party in Tunisia:  
―While the first two decades of independence were devoted to the spread of education 
[1960s] then to Arabization and Tunisification [1970s], the present decade is that of making 
choices for the future. The key issue is how to form the generation of the year 2000‖ (Hechmi, 
1984, p. 16; author's translation from the original French).  
 
The statement is made not only to describe the success of the Arabization policy in 
Tunisia, but also to imply that it was no longer a topic of public debate (Daoud 1991).  What 




sacred language, Tunisians believe that Classical Arabic (CA) is their native language while 
Tunisian Arabic (TA) also called Darija
4
 is believed to be a degraded form of Arabic (Al-
Baccouche 1990).  In reality, CA has never served as the native language of Tunisians. It is used 
only for formal education and religious sermons. TA, in contrast, is the native language of the 
majority of the population. Despite the similarities, TA and CA still exhibit tremendous 
differences phonologically, morphologically, syntactically, lexically as well as in terms of their 
domains of use. While TA is a lingua franca used by all the Tunisians including Tunisian 
Imazighen, CA is limited to governmental, educational and religious domains. According to 
Garmadi (1968), contact between CA and TA led to the emergence of an intermediate variety 
called Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), that is influenced by French in style and structure while 
its oral form is an intermediate register between CA and TA. It is used more in mass media, 
literary magazine, lectures, and political speeches (cf. Al-Shalabi, 1984; Benikhalef, 1987).  
MSA in this context refers to the new variety practiced in Tunisia as opposed to the cover term 
for the ―literary‖ or ―educated‖ MSA. More recently, the label Lahja Baydaa ―White accent‖ or 
―White‖ dialect of Arabic (O‘Neill 2017) is coined to refer to this new variety of Arabic arising 
out from contact between the local spoken variety and CA.  This new form of Arabic is 
understandable in the Middle East and Gulf countries, view that Maghrebi dialects are 
unintelligible to these regions.   
Accordingly, the Tunisian linguistic situation during the post-colonial era and under the 
emphasis of the Arabization project encompassed CA, MSA and TA as main language varieties. 
Hence, Tunisia now sees itself primarily as an Islamic country, followed by an Arab country, and 
thirdly, as part of the North African Arabic-speaking region. The prevailing national discourse in 
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Tunisia has been that Islam and Arabic are the sole binding components of Tunisian national 
identity, negating the primary component of Amazigh identity in which the Tunisian national 
identity is embedded. 
French was accepted as an official language in Tunisia after independence in 1956 and 
bilingualism in the education system was promoted. Institutions were left more or less to use the 
language that suited their affairs without interference from the state. In the post-colonial period, 
however, the Arab League's language policy of Arabization gained more support from the policy 
makers within the governments of North Africa; hence the balance was tipped in favor of Arabic 
as the sole national and official language of the North African countries. The Arabization policy 
and the creation of the Arab League of Nations anchored Arabic as the official and only national 
language of North Africa. French in the administration and government was slowly replaced by 
Arabic in the 1970-80s, further marginalizing the already disadvantaged Imazighen and their 
language. Nearly fifty years after Tunisia's independence, the country's language planners are 
still in a dilemma regarding Arabization, since much of higher education, particularly, scientific 
and technological subjects, are still conducted in French. Thus, these language strategists are left 
wondering what to do with regard to the remaining domains occupied by French and the 
influence of French culture (Daoud 1991). They cannot afford to totally Arabize all domains of 
life nor can they return to the 'stable bilingualism' that was seen during the years of the 
Protectorate (1881-1956). It seems no one in the political arena is willing to abandon the 
respective linguistic advantages of Arabic or of French. In the discussion of language planning 
and polices, and debate between Arabophone and Francophone groups, Tamazight has been 
ignored and has declined even further in favor of Arabic and to a certain extent French and other 




2.4.4 Post-revolution 2010-2011 
Prior to the uprising in 2010-2011, Tunisia had witnessed high levels of corruption and 
unemployment among young, often well-educated Tunisians. Simultaneously, political 
oppositions, media, and minority groups were all under strict state control and harshly 
suppressed. Any attempts to form a social movement or to criticize the government were 
regarded as divisive and threatening to the national unity and territorial integrity. This long-
standing situation suddenly changed on December 17, 2010 when a street vendor named 
Muhammed El-Bouzizi from Sidi Bouzid, an economically disadvantaged city, immolated 
himself in symbolic reaction against the political corruption and oppression. Bouzizi‘z self-
immolation sparked the Tunisian revolution. 
  The 2010-2011 Tunisian Revolution brought about unprecedented political movements 
and activism among the Amazigh communities urging for the defense, protection and recognition 
of Amazigh linguistic and cultural rights. As previously mentioned, Tunisian Imazighen 
throughout mainstream recorded history, have repeatedly encountered more powerful invading 
forces to which they ether resisted or assimilated (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, p. 112). 
Subsequently, any discussion in relation to Tunisian Imazighen was extremely sensitive, to the 
point of being perceived as divisive and threatening to the national balance of power. Moreover, 
an Arab-centered nationalist agenda has been the main focus of the Tunisian nation-state since 
independence from France. According to Pouessel (2012, L‟Année du Maghreb), in the 1970s, 
national leaders obliged school teachers to ―de-Berberize‖ students, and the Arabophone pressure 
reduced Amazighophones from a majority to a minority in villages of the south. Because of these 
anti-Amazigh sentiments and the desire to extinguish Berber/Amazigh culture, getting an official 




estimates that calculate that only 1% of the populations are Tamazight speakers (Torres de Janon 
2014).  
Under post-independence Arabization, the undeniably Amazigh origins of Tunisia and its 
people were transformed into a remote and folkloric past, an unimportant fabrication of the 
national identity overpowered by the state-promoted Arabism. A study on official Tunisian 
educational textbooks by researcher Driss Abbassi (2008) relates how in schools, since 
independence, the country‘s Amazigh roots have been continuously pushed aside for the 
supposed essential Arabness of North Africa, with only a short recognition of Tunisia‟s 
Amazigheity in textbooks in the 1980s. References to this Amazigheity, however, almost 
completely disappeared once again starting in the 1990s with the rise of Pan-Arabism
5
. More 
recently, contemporary scholarship has continued to play with the very political and misleading 
ideology that presents Tunisian Imazighen as a minority descending, most likely, from Arabs, 
through publishing or republishing books such as ―The Berber minority in Tunisia‖ by Salem 
Labyath (2016), or ―The Arabness of the Berbers: un introduction to the Arabness of Imazighen 
through their tongue‖ by Muhammed Boulouz (2012).  
The marginalized situation of Tunisian Tamazight persisted until the uprising of 2010-
2011 that shook Tunisia, North Africa and the Middle East. Since then, Tunisian Imazighen feel 
more empowered than any time before to demand greater rights and even argue for official 
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 According to Antonius (1986) Pan-Arabism was closely tied with Arab Nationalism, which basically wanted a 
unified Arab country with lesser western political intervention. Pan-Arabism or Arabism started as a movement on 
its own. The movement found official expression after World War II in the Arab League and in such unification, 
attempts as the Arab Federation (1958) of Iraq and Jordan, the United Arab Republic, the Arab Union (1958), the 
United Arab Emirates, and the Arab Maghreb Union (see under Maghreb). The principal instrument of Pan-Arabism 
in the early 1960s was the Ba'ath party, which was active in most Arab states, notably Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who was not a Ba'athist, expressed similar ideals of 
Arab unity and socialism. The decline of the movement started since the death of the Egyptian Leader. Nevertheless, 
its ideological principles continued to influence the social, political and linguistic orientations in North Africa and 
Middle East. It was till the 90s when issues of national identity had increasingly become very important, particularly 





recognition in the constitution. The quick and spontaneous appearance of their activism reveals 
the artificial nature of Tunisia‘s imagined homogeneity, the injustice these communities have 
witnessed under government suppression, and their willingness to speak up. In fact, it took only 
six months after the fall of the Tunisian‘s dictatorship to establish the first ever Amazigh 
association in the capital of Tunis on July 30, 2011 - the Tunisian Association for Amazigh 
Culture (l‟Association Tunisienne de la Culture Amazigh). The main objectives of the association 
are to constitutionalize the cultural rights of the Tunisian Amazigh in order to protect the 
disappearing patrimony, safeguard the language, and assert Amazigh identity. Since then several 
other associations have been established such as the Twiza Association for Patrimony, Solidarity, 
and Development on October 31, 2011, The Amazigh Association of Djerba on July 12, 2013, 
The Tunisian Association of Tamazight Woman, September 23, 2015, and the A‟arbata 
Association of Gafsa, September 14, 2016. 
2.5 Conclusive remarks  
Despite the explosion of activism in the post-revolutionary context, Tunisian Amazigheity 
continues to represent a controversial and uncomfortable subject in Tunisia. The new Tunisian 
constitution drafted on January 26, 2014 fails at inclusiveness by completely ignoring the rights 
of the indigenous Imazighen of Tunisia. Ignoring Amazigh rights is no coincidence; the new 
constitution, though not Islamist, is clearly written from the perspective of a pan-Arabist 
ideology (Mahjar Barducci 2014). In fact, even though Amazigh culture and language are rooted 
in the country's history, the constitution stresses only Tunisia's Arab heritage, noting that Tunisia 
is part of the "Arab Maghreb" (Al-Maghreb Al-Arabi) and that it is working towards achieving 
national unity. Post-revolutionary Tunisia remains insensitive to its Amazigh roots. Mahjar-




This is disheartening! It is almost grotesque... turning its back on [adopting] a 
truly modern constitution that would be respectful of international law. There is 
no doubt that Tunisia has much to gain from the recognition of the Amazigh 
people as an indigenous people, and to render official its millenary language. The 
new constitution should be in tune with the international instruments, namely the 
United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous people, which explicitly 
states, in its Article 3, indigenous peoples' right to self-determination (p. 3). 
 
Alongside these negative public and governmental responses, the Tunisian Amazigh 
cause has been further hindered by other internal challenges, mainly significant fragmentation 
between Tamazight-speaking activists (who were born in Amazigh communities and claim to be 
factually ‗ethnically Amazigh‘) and active Tunisians who do not speak Tamazight. While the 
former believe that member of the Amazigh movement must learn the language to be a part of it, 
the latter claim their Amazigheity by referring to the history of the country (Torres de Janon 
2014). The split also relates to the aforementioned division between activists who want to 
politicize the Amazigh movements and those that want to focus on the cultural part and language 
maintenance.  Pouessel (2012, L‘Année du Maghreb) states that Tunisian Amazigh mobilization, 
despite its young age, is already fragmented because of these reasons.  
While holding different and contradictory approaches on the best strategies to revive 
Tamazight, Tunisian Imazighen agree on refusing to be referred to as a ―minority group‖. They 
argue that calling Tunisia‘s Amazigheity a ―minority‖ is illogical, perpetuates misleading ideas of 
Arab/Islamic ideology, and most dangerously pushes for an erasure of the true essence of the 
Tunisian Amazigheity (Suarez Collado 2013). Similar discourses of identity renaissance and 
resistance have been greatly empowered and facilitated by online platforms, Facebook in 
particular.  According to Torres de Janon (2014), Tunisian Amazigh movement was not only 
limited to the virtual platform.  Since February 2011, it quickly moved to the field by spreading 




public support was not unexpected back then as Tunisian Imazighen found themselves forced to 
walk on eggshells when using the term Amazigh in public discourse. ―They ask us if we want to 
change the religion of our country; to change the language; to distance the people of their 
religion [Islam]‖ said Anis Mokni, a Tunisian Amazigh activist and one of the interviewees in 
Torres de Janon‘s (2014) paper: Post-Revolutionary Civil Society Activism for the Invisible 
Tunisian Amazigh‖.  In sum, Tamazight language and identity owes much of its visibility in the 
public discourse in the context of Tunisia to Facebook.  The following chapter will focus on the 
relationship between language, ideologies, and online discourse with emphasis on Facebook by 
incorporating and reviewing some of the literature that examined and expanded upon this 




















An Amazigh good morning for the ethos of those who do not speak Tamazight: “language is the 
source of identity and cultural belonging for the individual” quoted from Prof. Khadija Saed.  
 
3.1  Introduction  
This chapter presents the relevant theoretical frameworks and models on indigenous identity 
formation in the online social networking platform Facebook. The goal is to understand how 
Facebook turned into a key location for Tunisian Imazighen to perform most of the linguistic and 
ethnic identity work to revitalize Tamazight language and repair a long-erased Amazigh identity. 
Drawing on sociolinguistically informed studies of social media sites (SMS), language, identity, 
and semiotics, this chapter will provide a discussion of all these notions and highlight the thread 
that ties all of them to the research question at hand. This includes investigating the role of social 
media in the spread of pro-Tamazight ideologies since the 2010-2011 Revolution and that of 
Facebook in specific in assisting with the construction and reconstruction of Tamazight language 
and culture in the face of Arab Nationalism. To this end, the major analysis will focus on 
examining the linguistic, discursive, and semiotic resources they are using along with their 
impact on language ideologies shift since the 2011 Revolution in the context of Tunisia.  
The chapter explores the relationship between the linguistic constructions of identity on 




this part is to show how Facebook has become a key-representational tool not only for inter-
personal and intra-group communication, but also as a key site for acts of linguistic and identity 
differentiation.  Research on the ideology of differentiation calls attention to the role of semiotics 
and to processes of erasure, iconization, and fractal recursivity (Irvine and Gal, 2000) in allowing 
members of a group to distinguish their ethnolinguistic identity from others. Overviews and 
descriptions of how these processes are re-appropriated on Facebook and even reversed in the 
context of language revitalization will be discussed in an attempt to provide a conceptual and 
theoretical approach for the data analysis in this dissertation.   
To address these points, I begin by an ‗avant-goût‘ example of Tamazight language and 
identity erasure through a Facebook discussion between one of my participants and a famous 
Tunisian historian. Then, I will examine linguistic situations where erasure and silencing are 
applicable to the situation of Tunisian Tamazight.  I will focus mainly on examples of situations 
of other Tamazight languages as the ones spoken in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya.  I follow with 
a brief review of the key notions of identity, language and its shift.  I specifically address the 
impact of the linguistic ideologies on language shift and their implications for ethnolinguistic 
minorities. The overall implication is that language contact often leads to language conflict (Jahr 
1993) which consequently can develop into language shift or loss. Tunisian Tamazight represents 
an example of language contact leading to critical language endangerment (Bittenburgh 1999, 
Gabsi 2007). To better understand how this has happened, I will draw on work on the 
intersection between language ideologies and the semiotic practices of erasure. Irvine and Gal 
(2000:38) argue that erasure is the process in which ideology, in simplifying the sociolinguistics 
field, renders some persons or activities invisible. The discourse of language revitalization is 




fostering the actual use. In such cases, members of the dominated linguistic communities join 
language mobilization movements under certain ideological conditions and engage in their own 
form of erasure in constructing narratives that reverse the narratives that led to the endangerment 
of their language. Hence, these responsive erasure processes will be employed under the form of 
what this dissertation calls ―counter-erasure‖.  It is within this framework that I will analyze how 
Tunisian Imazighen employ various semiotic practices on Facebook to construct and reconstruct 
their language and identity.   
The second section of this chapter addresses the development of the sociolinguistics of 
social media discourse and how identity work and linguistic practices have been researched 
through various approaches to CMC. Since the social network site Facebook is a major data 
resource in this study, reexamining some of the literature on the growth of this site and its usage 
in language-focused research will make up part of this section as well. The role of Facebook in 
catalyzing social mobilization and influencing change in the context of Tunisia has been 
extensively studied in academia (Marzouki et al. 2012, Nur-Muhammad et al. 2013, Prevett 
2017). There is a general agreement that Facebook has provided an unprecedented platform for 
politically controlled minority groups to communicate their voices, among which we find the 
Tunisia black community, the Tunisian Jewish community, and especially the Tunisian Amazigh 
community (Pouessel, 2012). The last part of this chapter will present a brief survey of some of 
these studies.   
3.2   Section one: Language ideologies 
3.2.1 Tunisian Tamazight language and erasure: an avant-goût 
Questions of who can claim to be Amazigh are highly controversial in the context of 




debatable. The idea that many Tunisians have ethnolinguistic roots in Amazigh culture continues 
to be a subject of widespread denial. As mentioned in earlier chapters, pan-Arabists argue that 
Tunisian identity is essentially ethnically Arab. If they had to describe how this identity was first 
shaped, they would consider the Carthaginian (Phoenician) component as the beginning. 
According to many pan-Arabists, the new Amazigh movement and claims to an Amazigh 
identity are emergent of either over-romanticized or imagined interpretations of Tunisia‘s ethno-
genetic and linguistic history. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 from a Facebook conversation between a 
famous historian in Tunisia and one of the participants in this study (Firmus) illustrate some of 
the complexities surrounding Amazigh identity in present-day Tunisia. The conversation was 
shared on Firmus‘ wall. In Figure 3.1, the historian states that Lybic (ancient term for Tamazight) 
is not a language, but a group of local dialects that are weak and inefficient. He adds that the size 
of the Tamazight lexicon is so small that it can barely express the simple ideas of primitive life.  
In contrast, the historian privileges the existence of what he calls ―Carthaginian language‖ in 
Tunisia‘s history. He argues that it was spoken all over North Africa as demonstrated in several 
inscriptions found in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Even though the Carthaginian (Phoenician) 
language is totally dead within the context of Tunisia, he still calls for some governmental 
support for this language while remaining completely silent on Tamazight.  The content of the 
post includes more than one semiotic mode. To foreground the Carthaginian element and erase 
the Amazigh one in the process of crafting Tunisian identity, the visual pictures of 
Punic/Carthaginian inscriptions are added to complete the verbal meaning, and also to legitimize 






Figure 3.1 Firmus_lt_image 5 
Language of Carthage 
 
The Phoenicians came into contact with the Libyc regions and those were tribal regions in North 
African extending from behind The Great Sirt to the Atlantic Ocean encompassing territories 
shared by Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. This region -Luba- was mentioned in the Illiad 
and Odyssey along with the Lybic tribes, their rituals and traditions. There was also information 
about the dialects spoken by these tribes. They were numerous but weak and limited in use; and 
could barely describe the aspects of primitive life. That‘s why it was easy for the language of 
those who came from the east on their boats…to establish Carthage [and] to dominate. They 
also, built bridges between Canaan, Lybic regions and the Middle East which helped the ancient 
eastern knowledge travel to the western parts of the Mediterranean and North Africa. The Lybic 
dialects remained stagnant and undeveloped as it is nowadays despite several attempts to revive 
them […] As for the Carthaginian language, it spread everywhere in North Africa from the 
western parts of the territory to the far end in Morocco, passing by Tunisia and Algeria. This is 




many specialists who continue to do so. I wonder how it is not among the duties of the Tunisian 
government to pay more attention to this language and train more people to write on this 




Figure 3.2 shows a verbal comment by Firmus (one of the participants in this study) in response 
to the historian‘s post (Figure 3.1) about Amazigh identity being nothing but a product of an 
over-romanticized history.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Firmus_comment12 
Firmus‘ response to the historian‘s post in Fig. 3.1 
 
Amazigh participant responding to Historian: With all my respect Dr., you don‘t know the 
ancient Lybic nor the changes it has undergone which continue to date. When you say that it is a 
poor language that cannot express abstract meanings and that its vocabulary is limited to 
household expressions and nothing more we should question whoever pushed the language to a 
status of impoverishment. There is no a doubt that those are the consequences of the long erasure 
and suppression that this language has encountered; and yet its richness is beyond what you can 
imagine. I am saying this because of I am a son of the language and because it is hard to 
construct an identity for North Africa based on foreign identities no matter how you try. Take the 




for as long as the Phoenicians in Carthage. I am sorry that the ideas you are trying to disseminate 
are the same as the ones that El-Baa‘th (Arab Socialist Party found in 1947 in Iraq used in this 
context as a generic name of Arab Nationalists) employed to suppress, attack, and humiliate our 
language. Both Punic and Latin languages disappeared. The only language that remained in our 
country is our historical Tamazight.  Can you tell us where is your Punic today? Have a nice day! 
 
Historian: Your response is highly sentimentalized, I respect that but I don‘t accept it.  
 
  
Claims that Amazigh identity is a fundamental component of Tunisian ethnolinguistic 
identity are often contested as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 from Facebook.  Contested claims to 
being indigenous are studied in a large body of literature on ethnic group situations similar or 
close enough to the one of Tunisian Imazighen (Clifford 2013; Feliciano-Santos 2011; Haley 
2007; and Cornel 2003).  In studies of Latin America indigenous activism, Feliciano-Santos 
(2013) reports there are several emic approaches to indigeneity that differ from the ones of the 
ethnographers studying those communities. She adds that ―the circumstance of ethnic formations 
and practices of different indigenous movements varies in terms of agendas, circumstances, 
tactics, associations, practices, demography, among other things‖ (p.9). These studies help 
explain the emic approach that this dissertation adopts by relying on the insiders‘ understanding 
of terms, such as indigeneity and ethnicity rather than on the outsiders‘ - researchers and 
anthropologists- definitions of these terms.    
In studying several ethnic groups on China, Hathaway (2010) states that indigeneity 
among these groups  is not viewed as a natural category, but a political and social category that is 
often in a continuing process of emergence (p.302).  Hence, all ethnic groups in China could be 
considered indigenous.  In proposing a dynamic definition of indigeneity, ethnic groups who face 
racism, discrimination, will be permitted to reposition themselves ―out of domestic and local 
struggles, and into a position of transnational solidarities, rights, and participation in dynamic 




definitional restrictiveness of the term. Being indigenous for Tunisian Imazighen constitute only 





retained by and large their own languages, and/or all Tunisians who speak Ettounsi – commonly 
known as Tunisian Arabic, which is believed to be influenced by Tamazight (see Chapter 6).  
Other ethnicities are deemed non-indigenous if they have no history of conflicts with the first 
Arab comers.   
In her  studies of Taíno, an indigenous population of the Caribbean, Feliciano-Santos 
(2017) defined at least five ideological positions framing their ethnic and indigenous claims. 
With respect to Tunisian Tamazight, the position described by the author below is very helpful in 
understanding how Tunisian Imazighen engage in reclaiming their indigenous identity on 
Facebook platform:  
           They privileged an ideology of Taíno language as a collection of words and scripts that 
performatively, indexically, and iconically linked past Taíno to current Taíno social 
actors, where using these words was understood to establish a Taíno discursive 
space…  The act of reclamation here was to access Taíno language and worldviews 
through lexical items and to demarcate these from Spanish through the use of separate 
scripts (p. 15).  
 
Chapter 5 and 6 will elaborate further on how the use of Tamazight lexical items or script 
choices, their production, and use can semiotically accentuate linguistic differentiation and 
alignment.  
3.2.2 Languages under erasure and comparable situations to Tunisian 
Tamazight 
To understand the complexities of current discursive approaches to Amazigh language 
and identity, it is important to address some of the literature relevant to the issue of similar 
identity, particularly in indigenous and minority communities.  Linguistic hegemony imposed by 




main factors that cause language endangerment. Hegemony as defined in the literature refers to 
the ideological process by which state institutions produce and reproduce ideological consensus 
to legitimize language dominance (Gal 1998; Phillips 1998; Woolard 2009). Kirschen (2013) 
cites two examples of nations where propagating hegemonic language ideologies among 
speakers of minority languages, such as Judeo-Spanish, became a fundamental requirement to fit 
it within the broader national linguistic profile. Therefore, to be Israeli for instance, once should 
speak Hebrew and to be Turkish, one should speak Turkish. The last example is a good segue 
into sketching out conditions of resistance to linguistic hegemony in the case of Kurdish 
language and/or other Tamazight varieties spoken in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya.  
3.2.2.1 Kurdish language 
In Turkey, the relationship of Turkish to minority languages such as Kurdish is worth 
elaborating on further for the striking similarities it holds to Arabic linguistic nationalism and its 
implications for Tunisia‘s ethnolinguistic minorities. Indeed, since the 19
th
 century, Turkish 
linguistic polices have been based on a project that puts language under the state control and 
circulates the same standardized language to the public as a means of keeping a homogenous 
nation. Establishing Turkish language as a primary referent of identity and deploying it as means 
to produce a sense of the nation has become a central objective of the state since 1930‘s (Aslan 
2007). The extension to produce a state language forced the assimilation of the Anatolian‘s local 
languages and dialects. Only Kurdish has been able to resist the state suppression for the past 
century. The pressure on the Kurdish citizens to assimilate was exacerbated in 1980 when 
Turkish was constitutionally declared as the official state language and the publishing and 
spreading of written materials in any other native language was banned. Attempts to deny 




identity and consequently a Kurdish future. As Turkey had ambitions to join the European Union 
(EU), several reforms were made that seemed on the surface to be in favor of minority languages 
such as allowing TV programs in minority languages and facilitating the learning by Turkish 
citizens of minority languages (Aslan 2007). Nevertheless, the decision to allow these programs 
were accepted only on the condition that ―there would be no children‘s programs, no minority 
languages teaching programs, and that the all programs would be subtitled or simultaneously 
translated into Turkish‖ (Aslan 2007).  This implies that the learning of Kurdish by children was 
perceived as a threat to the nation‘s linguistic homogeneity. Turkish nationalist rhetoric has 
become much more direct then ever after the coup attempt of July 15
th
, 2017. Based on a blog 
published on Identity Hunters by Uygar Baspehlivan (2018), the state of emergency in Turkey 
saw many Kurdish language TV channels and newspapers shut down restricting the public‘s 
access to the language.  These acts were taken under the pretext that these institutions were 
linked to what is called the terrorist group of Kurdistan Workers‘ party (PKK). Accordingly, by 
establishing a link between Kurdish language and terrorism, an indexical relationship between 
this language and its speakers is being shaped. In this context, the entire Kurdish linguistic group 
is associated with terrorism, which produces the perfect conditions for a total domination of the 
linguistic territory by the state. State efforts to delineate the capacity of Kurdish to be learned as 
mother tongue continue with the return of Kamal Atatürk‘s linguistic nationalism and the 
promotion of only one identity in Turkey today.  
3.2.2.2 Tamazight in Morocco 
Comparably, to be a Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian has been and continues to be 
associated with speaking Arabic. Institutional and national attempts to acknowledge the Amazigh 




heritage across all stages of each of these countries‘ histories and civilizations have repeatedly 
shown that they are simply state strategies to sabotage the Amazigh movement and turn living 
Amazigh culture into static folklore (Silverstein & Crawford, 2017).  
In Morocco, Tamazight speakers are estimated to make 40% of the population and yet, 
since the 1950‘s Amazigh cultural identity and language have been viewed as divisive forces 
within Moroccan nation. Not only that but they have also been framed as a threat to the Islamic 
religiosity of the people and the holiness of Arabic language as Arabic is regarded as not only the 
language of nationhood, but also of ―paradise‖.  Amazigh opposition to the imagined Moroccan 
homogeneity took several forms over the years, pushing the king in his 1994 Throne Day speech 
to acknowledge that Amazigh ―dialects‖ are among the components of Moroccan history and 
they should be taught at school. Despite the radical acknowledgement by the king in favor of a 
pre-colonial and pre-Islamic Amazigh heritage, Tamazight was still portrayed as dialect not a 
language in his speech, which stems from nationalist ideologies that portray Tamazight as 
inferior to Arabic. On October 17, 2001 more reforms took place regarding the three major 
Tamazight languages spoken in Morocco: Tashelhyt, Tarifit, and Tamazight. This was embodied 
in the establishment of the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture (IRCAM).  This seemed as a 
promising policy to shift the discrimination against Imazighen and their language since 
Tamazight would no longer be treated as a challenge to national unity, but as evidence of the 
democratic and modernist Moroccan society that the king was trying to propagate to his western 
allies. The institute incorporates several research centers charged with linguistic standardization, 
pedagogical development, artistic expression, anthropological analysis, historical preservation, 




Teaching Tamazight at public schools was in practice as planned by the king upon his 
inauguration as the new monarch of the kingdom of Morocco in 2003. In 2011, Tamazight was 
recognized as one of the official languages in Morocco. Despite all these policies, Tamazight has 
remained a marginalized language in the kingdom for it has been all controlled by ideologies that 
delimit real empowerment of the language. According to Silverstein & Crawford (2017), the 
decision to include Tamazight in the curriculum is important symbolically but ―there is a gap 
between the symbolic value of Tamazight and the pragmatic way in which Tamazight will be 
functionally important for people‖ (p. 5). For example, when IRCAM‘s researchers thought 
about standardizing the writing system of Tamazight, they were forced to select an innovated 
form of Tifinagh when most of the Amazighophones use Arabic and the Roman alphabet to write 
in Tamazight. The decision was derived in part from the fear of the threatened Islamist 
retaliations should the Roman alphabet be adopted. Hence, the choice of Tifinagh was motivated 
by political compromise rather than a genuine recognition of its cultural value.  The introduction 
of Tamazight in Morocco also failed due to the poor training of teachers, the creation of 
standardized Tamazight that does not correspond to any spoken language, and to confining 
Tamazight teaching mainly to rural areas and exclusively to the Amazigh community (Silverstein 
2004).  
In sum, Moroccan political reforms to maintain the Tamazight language and identity have 
engendered counter results that exacerbate a long standing urban-rural divide, further 
marginalization of rural Amazighophones and increasing dominance of what Tamazight linguists 
and militants call ―Arabo-Islamic Imperialism‖ (Chaker 1989; Thomas 2010; Maddy-Weitzman 
2014). The creation of IRCAM and several other associations has not changed nor lessened the 




system. In this sense,  policies and planning made in this context have served as only a visible 
symbol of an emerging, state sanctioned society intended to please international observers 
(Silverstein & Crawford, 2004). On a local level, however, the IRCAM has led to only more 
divisiveness and separatism, which will only help the agenda of the monarchy gain more power 
over two opposite Ethnolinguistic groups: Imazighen and Arab nationalists. The state of 
Moroccan Tamazight is better described in Silverstein (2013, 2012): ―Amazigh identity and 
language are more recognized than ever before in the country‘s history, but this recognition is 
unlikely to stem the language‘s decline‖ (p. 15).  
3.2.2.3 Tamazight in Algeria 
The status of Moroccan Tamazight is not very different from that of  Tamazight varieties 
spoken in Algeria, particularly, Takabylt. As soon as Algeria obtained independence in 1962, the 
Arabo-Nationalist regimes have made it clear that no other identity, language or culture other 
than Arab would be given official recognition. The main objective at that time was to erase 
Tamazight language and culture (Achab, 2012). The politically hostile stance against Tamazight 
was stated directly in the presidential election campaign in 1999 by Abdul-Aziz Bouteflika: 
―Never, ever, will Tamazight be recognized as official in Algeria‖ (Achab, 2012).  This political 
plan continues to represent a major ideological reference that always frames any reform 
regarding the Tamazight question and identity. Thus, when Tamazight was officially recognized 
as a national language alongside Arabic in the revised 2002 constitution, Arabic and Islam have 
remained the primary identifiers of the Algerian people in terms of ethnicity, language, and 
religion. Tamazight teaching was encouraged only in the Amazighophone regions, such as Tizi-
Ouzou and Bejaya.  In a second revised version of the constitution in 2016, Tamazight teaching 




(Souag 2018).  Moreover, it was introduced starting from the fourth grade while education in 
earlier years has remained in Arabic (Achab 2012).   
By attempting to expose the ideological tendencies underlying this policy, it is possible to 
argue that the Algerian education policy makers do not really care for teaching Amazigh children 
in their mother tongue as much as they care for Arabizing them linguistically and culturally 
(during the first four years) before they get introduced to Tamazight.  Language policies that 
explicitly or implicitly marginalize and suppress certain linguistic varieties, as in the case of 
North African language policies versus Tamazight, will always have an influence on the local 
discourses produced and reproduced about this language (Groff 2018).  This conforms to the 
definition of language ideologies definition given by Irvine and Gal (2000, p. 402) as ―the ideas 
with which participants and observers frame their understanding of linguistic varieties and map 
those understandings onto people, events, and activities that are significant to them‖.   
In this regard, the following paragraph is a translation of a video made by Naima Salhi, 
an Algerian MP on February 2018, upon the dissemination of the Kabyles‘ demand that 
Tamazight should be a required school subject in the context of Algeria. The video continues to 
spread on different social media outlets as it sums up various inferiorizing, downgrading, and 
stigmatized attitudes that Tamazight has faced over the centuries. The video was translated from 
Arabic to English by Lameen Souag on his blog ―Jabal Elloghat‖ on February 17, 2018. 
 
So, don't impose on me a language - it's not a language anyway - don't impose on 
me a language that isn't a vehicle of science; don't impose on me a language that 
isn't recognized, isn't understood by people outside; what good is it to me? Study 
science with it? It doesn't have - it isn't a vehicle of science. Study technology 
with it? It isn't a vehicle of technology. Go abroad with it, to speak to people 
abroad? They don't know it and don't understand it. For God's sake, what good is 
it to us?  
 




world language, which more than a billion people speak, they say we won't study 
it; a language which has billions of books, and billions of manuscripts, and 
billions of - everything - you say you won't study it and don't need it. Then you 
bring me a dead language, which doesn't have letters, and doesn't have meanings, 
and doesn't have words - you want to hold me back with it so you can make 
progress - and you go off, and eventually you get to the point, and you tell me: 
Me, I'm studying English, and I'm studying German, and Spanish, and Turkish, 
and you all don't know them. You're going to hold me back with this?  
 
My little daughter was studying in a private school where most of them were 
Kabyles. She naturally learned the language with them, because her classmates' 
parents taught them to speak Kabyle so it would continue and spread. So, my 
daughter, with the best of intentions, learned with them. She'd come and speak it, 
and I never asked her "Why?" I didn't shut her up; I left her free to do as she likes. 
But now that we've gotten to the point where it's obligatory, I told her: Say 
another word in Kabyle (Berber) and I'll kill you, I'll discipline you if you say 
another word.  
 
And I'm saying it plainly and challenging everyone: When we were going by 
intentions,  innocently, we didn't say a thing; now that it's become "push me and 
I'll step on you", don't push me and I won't step on you. Now we're going to make 
it about who's stronger. And the stronger wins. The majority is stronger. You'd 
have been better off leaving it down to intentions. Now that you think you're so 
smart and coming out with insults against us, now I'll insult you.  
 
People like me, and people who are real men, and those who don't accept 
humiliation and aren't used to it, and whose families aren't used to it, won't accept 
from you something like this. And I now forbid my children from pronouncing a 
single word in Tamazight. I mean the Frenchified Kabyle made by the MAK [the 
Movement for the Autonomy of Kabyle] and the treasonous terrorist MAK 
movement. And we need to demand that the MAK is a terrorist movement. 
(Author‘s translation). 
 
Salhi‘s discourse is very reflective of common assumptions about Tamazight. In examining how 
languages or languages ideologies are understood locally in the regions where they are found, 
understandings and language ideologies embedded in the discourse choice of human agents that 
relate in a way or another to that language, become visible and help define the linguistic ecology 
of a region (Makoni and Pennycook 2007). Erasure of Tamazight has been the result of the 




in Morocco and Algeria may seem generous in their acknowledgement of linguistic diversity 
from international perspective, but are restrictive considering local diversity. 
3.2.2.4 Tamazight in Libya 
 Looking at the situation of Tamazight in Libya, the language was viewed as an inferior 
dialect of Arabic and even an invention of the colonizers. Gaddafi, the former president of Libya 
went even further to the point of calling it a ―poison du colonialisme‖ (Brent, 2013). To illustrate 
how these linguistic ideologies were reproduced institutionally, Gaddafi launched a ―Cultural 
Revolution‖ in 1973 under which any publications not in accordance with the principles 
espoused in his ―Green Book‖ were destroyed. Accordingly, registration of non-Arab names was 
forbidden, Libya's first Amazigh organization was banned and anyone involved in their cultural 
revival prosecuted (Buzakhar, 2017). The Libyan example resembles to some extent the situation 
of Tunisian Tamazight. The existence of Tamazight was excluded even from the history books 
taught in schools. Besides, speaking Tamazight (more commonly known as Berber or Shilha
6
), is 
often not interpreted as speaking a distinct language, but rather an unintelligible or a stigmatized 
dialect of Arabic (Sayahi 2014). For more on the erasure strategies of Tunisian Tamazight see 
Chapter 5.    
3.2.3  Language, identity, and ideologies in literature 
Bucholtz and Hall (2005) argue that identity as a social category needs to be understood 
as an interactional achievement that can mark particular practices and people as similar to some 
and differentiated from others.  With respect to the interactional aspect of identity, they propose 
that:   
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Identity relations emerge in interaction through several related indexical 
processes, including: (a) overt mention of identity categories and labels; (b) 
implicatures and presuppositions regarding one‘s own or others‘ identity position; 
(c) displayed evaluative and epistemic orientations to ongoing talk, as well as 
interactional footings and participant roles; and (d) the use of linguistic structures 
and systems that are ideologically associated with specific personas and groups. 
 
This is achieved through what they call the interpersonal tactics of identity, a series of 
meaningful practices and processes that serve to either establish resemblances or distinctions, to 
authenticate or denaturalize and to authorize or make illegitimate forms of social action. Through 
this focus identity is understood as an element of interactional situations rather than of 
individuals.  Thus, a fundamental principle of identity formation relies on the relationality or 
intersubjectivity as called in Bucholtz‘ and Hall‘s framework where most of the interactions-
Amazigh Facebook interactions in this study- and linguistic practices are involved in a discourse 
of relatedness. To better understand how patterns of resemblances or distinctions, authentication 
or denaturalization, and authorization or illegitimation can be used by the Tunisian Amazigh 
community to create, construct, and define their identity at different levels of contract with 
―other‖ identities, it is important to revisit the role of language ideologies in producing these 
patterns.  This perspective informs much of my study in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Language ideology offers a significant account to the analysis of language viewed as a 
social phenomenon or a system of linguistic structures. In studies of ethnicity, identity, and 
language revitalization, as in the one at hand, language ideologies do not only give background 
to the investigation of these issues, but become a central topic of investigation.  
Ideologies about languages often form notions that intervene in structuring social 
hierarchies.  For example, ideologies about the Arabic language in pre-Revolutionary (2010) 
Tunisia, often normalized speaking Arabic as the standard or the unmarked language, whereas 




language of the colonizer), and minority languages such as Tamazight with illiteracy, ignorance, 
and even paganism, leading the feeling that it should be eliminated (Al-Masude, 2014). 
Perceptions as such serve to legitimize the growth of power of the privileged group and enhance 
the material resources of preferred varieties while rationalizing the subordination of other 
language varieties (Leeman, 2009; Schmidt, 2002; Urciuoli, 1996). Daoud (1991) further states 
that Arabists of the 1960s, for instance, including Arab nationalists, Muslim activists, Arabic 
linguists, and teachers all shared the view that Tunisian Arabic (TA) and French – and obviously, 
Tamazight – represented a ―permanent threat to the purity of Classic Arabic (CA).  Such concern 
may be seen as a form of resistance and more likely an effort on the part of the pan-Arabists to 
retain their social prestige and privileges.  
While Arabists as described above explicitly articulate the ideology they subscribe to, it 
is not always the case that individuals are aware of the ideology they advocate. In other words, 
speakers may not be able to articulate the ideologies to which they subscribe, nor be aware of the 
underlying assumptions and values (Leeman, 2009). Therefore, it is very common that speakers 
of stigmatized language varieties sometimes internalize dominant norms about the inadequacy of 
their own speech. Part of the power of language ideologies derives from the fact that they are 
naturalized and come to be understood as common sense, rather than a limited or one-sided way 
of seeing the world. Arabic in the context of Tunisia and North Africa in general, for example, 
became the language of hegemonic institutions not only because it is the language of the 
dominant group but also because as in Bourdieu‘s (1977, 1991) words, it is ―misrecognized‖ by 
the subordinated group as a superior language as well. Woolard (1998) explains further that ―the 
misrecognition or revalorization of the indexical character of language may make discrimination 




language themselves. ―Why do you bother coming to study our language? Our language is ugly‖, 
commented a Tamazight woman from the village of Douiret interviewed by Gabsi (2011).  
Once language ideologies and the interests they serve are rendered invisible or 
symbolically powerful (Bourdieu 1991), those who are negatively impacted by this power 
conspire unconsciously in exercising it: ―symbolic power is that invisible power which can be 
exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or 
even that they themselves exercise it‖ (Bourdieu 1991, p.164). In order to understand the work of 
ideologies in these situations, it is important to look at Gal & Irvine (1995). In their work, they 
highlight the striking similarities in the ways ideologies cause people to misrecognize differences 
between linguistic practices. Gal & Irvine (1995) note that when identifying linguistic varieties 
with ‗typical‘ persons, the linguistic behaviors of others become oversimplified. They become 
viewed as the cause of speakers‘ moral virtues and character rather than deriving from historical 
accident. Gal & Irvine offer the example of nineteenth-century Macedonia, which was unusually 
multilingual, with language use not falling within expected ethnic boundaries. Subsequently, 
outsiders positioned Macedonians as untrustworthy, as apparently shifting linguistic allegiances 
were construed as shifting political allegiances and unreliable moral commitments (Blackledge 
2000). Gal (1993) points out that the symbolic association between a language and a social group 
cannot be natural nor a condition. A simple equation of ―one language to one cultural, ethnic, 
national, class, generational, gendered or other identity‖ is clearly an oversimplification (Irwin 
2009, p. 22).  
Nevertheless, the formula that a ―language equates an identity‖ has remained prominent 
in the case of Tunisia. To be Tunisian implies speaking Arabic as a mother tongue. Notice that 




is just a ―low‖, ―rusty‖ and ―unrefined‖ form of Arabic (Bassiouney 2015, Eltouhami 2015). 
Ironically, this formula seems to continue to gain ground even within Tunisian Imazighen in 
their counter-erasure practices. In other words, while the formula that language equates identity 
represents one type of erasure that Tunisian Imazighen have been dealing with, they ironically 
rely on the same equation in their ―counter erasure‖ practices; for many, to be Amazigh means 
that one should speak Tamazight. The concept of counter-erasure in this study and in the context 
of Tunisian Tamazight could be defined as a strategy used by Imazighen to free themselves from 
any influence of the dominant Arabic identity. It could also refer to linguistic and cultural 
practices of a linguistic group to challenge the hegemonic and dominant representations through 
constructing positive and equally essentialist images of their community (Phyak 2015).  To fully 
comprehend this, Irvine and Gal (2000) identify three ideological processes that are central to the 
assigning of social meaning to linguistic variation: iconization, factual recursivity and erasure. 
The coming chapters draw on this framework to analyze the ideologies that led to Tunisian 
Tamazight linguistic shift and the attempts to reverse this language shift.  
In iconization, ‗linguistic features that index social groups or activities appear to be 
iconic representations of them, as if a linguistic feature somehow depicted or displayed a social 
group‘s inherent nature or essence‘‘ (Irvine and Gal 2000, p. 37). This is shown in the example 
of Galician being depicted as archaic or conservative while Spanish is portrayed as innovative 
and progressive. As López (2007) shows, these representations are not objective descriptions but 
instead reflect and reproduce a larger ideological project to elevate Castile and naturalize both its 
political and linguistic dominance. Similarly, Urdu in the context of India was described as a 
Semitic language despite its Indo-Aryan origins during the nineteenth century.  Advocates of 




script, which is ‗semi-Persian‘ being loaded with Persian loanwords, because ‗the Persian of our 
day is half-Arabic‘, and because of the presence of Arabic loanwords, they concluded that Urdu 
should be Semitic in its essence‖ (Ahmad, 2008). Defining Urdu in terms of its borrowed 
vocabulary while ignoring the linguistic structures that it shares with Hindi is not only an 
example of iconization whereby linguistic forms such as script and words are linked with social 
categories of ―foreignness‖, but also an example of erasure, which will be defined further in the 
coming paragraphs. 
Irvine and Gal define fractal recursivity as ‗‗the projection of an opposition, salient at 
some level of relationship, onto some other level‖ (p. 38). Thus, the same features that 
distinguish one group from another can also be used to discriminate within groups and subgroups 
recursively. For example, Zamudio (2014, p. 138) examined how  Purepecha heritage speakers 
subtly differentiate themselves from other Purepecha, by strongly identifying as Purepecha in 
some respects, but distancing themselves from ―Purepecha‖ traits they consider undesirable in 
other ways. They also differentiate themselves from other ―real‖ Purepecha, in terms of higher 
proficiency in the language. Recursive distinctions are also apparent in the ideological 
construction of languages in the United States. While all non-English languages are seen as 
suspect, there is still distinction among foreign languages spoken in the United States, with 
Spanish viewed as the most dangerous because of its associations with low status immigrants. 
Similarly, just as French has been treated as better suited than Spanish for intellectual pursuits, 
we find European Spanish is favored over American Spanish varieties (Beaudrie & Fairclough, 
2012).    
Finally, erasure is the process whereby information that is inconsistent with a particular 




example of the United States being portrayed as a monolingual, English-speaking nation, while it 
has always had a complex history of multilingualism. The status of indigenous Mexican 
languages in the US school bilingual programs, such as the one of Purepecha, represents another 
example of erasure since it is widely assumed that immigrants from Mexico and other parts in 
Latin America speak only Spanish, with no regard to the indigenous varieties spoken by many of 
them (Zamudio 2014).  
3.3 .  Section Two: Discourse-Centered Online Ethnography and Facebook 
3.3.1 Computer-mediated communication (CMC) 
 
In this section, I first provide a sketch of the development of language-focused CMC 
studies and then address the notions of language in contemporary societies and in relation to new 
digital technologies such as social media. Secondly, I discuss the choice of an online 
ethnography framework and Computer-Mediated Communication approach to study identity and 
linguistic erasure of Tunisian Tamazight. Lastly, I address Facebook as new arena of identity 
construction and address its role a main catalyst of the emergent Tamazight identity within the 
context of Tunisia in a post-revolutionary era.  
The use of internet-based technologies as a tool of research has changed the scenario of 
research methodologies since the 1990‘s. The computer-mediated construction of self, other, and 
social structure started to emerge as a new phenomenon for study. Now, communication does not 
simply refer to the transfer of information from a source of information to a receiver. Its 
functions are no longer limited to being expressive, connotative, or metalinguistic to establish the 
intentionality for the communicative act (Waugh, 1997: pp. 102-103). And it does not depend 
only on an immediate social context to structure the performance of the verbal interaction 




definition as the co-construction of a reality using systems of signs and rules (Ghiglione, 1986). 
The reality in CMC is asymmetrically co-constructed between participants who control when to 
terminate or continue the interaction depending on how ―the receiver interprets the situation, 
what his aims are and the social rules that govern his behavior (Ghiglione, 1986). Consequently, 
CMC can be defined as a process by which a group of social actors in a given situation 
negotiates the meaning of the various situations that occur between them (Stasser, 1992). This 
means that CMC has changed the nature of social interaction. Individuals in an online setting 
must negotiate how to connect with others online, and find the social group to which they 
belong. When one‘s group identity is found and established, the online connections become 
easier because a user is controlled by group norms as opposed to societal and individual norms 
(McLaugh & Vitak, 2011; Carr, 2011). A shift from focusing on self-presentation to focusing on 
achieving a deep immersion into the online group, such as Facebook is the consequence.  
Androutsopoulos (2013) divides CMC changes into three stages. Until the 1990‘s CMC 
was restricted to interpersonal exchanges carried out on applications or modes, such as emails, 
mailing lists, and Internet Relay Chat (IRC). The early web era from the mid 1990‘s to mid-
2000s was marked by the emergence of the World Wide Web which introduced the personal 
webpages and personal blogs. These early types of CMC focused on linguistic features and 
strategies which were regarded as unique to the media. Central to this strand of research was that 
communication technologies and their affordances were prioritized in favor of other contextual 
and social factors when studying online language use. Furthermore, CMC data were often 
randomly collected and analyzed as detached from their discursive and social contexts.  
From the mid-2000‘s onward, we have entered the participatory web era in which people 




blogs and social media sites (Androutsopoulos 2013).  The approaches to CMC during this (still 
emerging era) are informed by pragmatics, sociolinguistics and discourse studies 
(Androutsopoulos 2008:1). These more critical approaches do not only focus on analysis of the 
micro level features of online language, but instead emphasize situated language, linguistic 
diversity, how ways of communication are shaped by social ideologies, and how such ideologies 
are constructed in new media communication (Barton & Lee 2013:6).  CMC development as 
described above has shaped what being called ―the internet language‖, what can be used as 
research material, and what counts as adequate resource for online data (Androutsopoulos, 
2013).  CMC studies now can focus on topics such as language variation and style, processes of 
innovation and change, language and social identities, multilingualism and code-switching as 
well as globalization. An important development from the early to the contemporary studies of 
CMC is the need to shift from a medium-related to a more ethnographically based user-related 
approach (Androutsopoulos 2006:421). A consequence of this shift of focus is that the search for 
features thought of as belonging to specific genres of CMC has been replaced by what 
Androutsopoulos (2006:421) calls contextual and particularistic analysis. Such analysis 
highlights the relation between the social contexts and online language use and how the social 
context is represented in the discourses in various types of CMC.  
How language should be approached online using a Computer Mediated Discourse 
Analysis (CMDA) framework in (socio)-linguistics research poses some challenges that are 
worth discussing.  These are related to the questions of anonymity and to whether CMC should 
be viewed as a text or place (Androutsopoulos, 2013). Anonymity is probably one of the most 
striking differences between the offline and online self-presentation as an individual or collective 




direct contact with others, identity construction in online environments is more deliberate and 
conscious (Markham, 2003). When factors, such age, race, gender, and class, which are usually 
used to divide people in face-to-face interactions are removed, people have equal status. 
Subsequently, individuals develop a sense of group identity (Lee, 2014).  When individuals have 
a strong sense of group identity, it eases the need to establish strong connection to various 
members of a social group (Wang et al. 2008).  
 The first step towards producing an online identity involves the production of discourse, 
whether in the form of words, graphic images, or sounds. But as many scholars have discussed 
we understand ourselves only in concert with others (e.g., Bakhtin, 1981; Markham 2003, Zhao, 
2008). In this sense, identity formation constitutes a public process that starts with the ―identity 
announcement‖ made by the individual claiming an identity and the ―identity placement‖ made 
by others who validate the claimed identity or refute it (Zhao, 2008). An identity is established 
when there is a ―coincidence of placements and announcements‖ (Stone, 1981, p. 188). 
Therefore, in most computer-mediated environments, this process requires a more exhaustive, 
and yet cautiously chosen information to exchange or project in the online space; particularly 
because the ‗other‘ is not co-present in the same physical space.  In addition, the nonverbal clues 
(body language, voice quality, speaking style, prosody …etc.) of the process are, for the most 
part, missing.  The lack of socio-demographic information and spoken language data in the 
online space force the researcher to ponder whether to approach CMC data as text or space.  
3.3.2  Online Ethnography 
According to Androutsopoulos (2013), digital data  could be adapted to sociolinguistics 
research when treated as written language that can be analytically examined as various other 




the CMC environment as discursively created space of human interaction which are dramatically 
related to the offline activities (Androutsopoulos, 2013).   
This implies that in doing online ethnography, researchers can still use the offline space 
as well. Many online ethnographers have tried to blend them together (Baym, 2000; Kendall, 
2002). Androutsopoulos (2008) defines online ethnography as ―combination of the systematic 
observation of selected sites of online discourse with direct contact with its social actors‘ (p. 2). 
In his discourse-centered online ethnography (DCOE) framework, Androutsopoulos (2008) 
defines two types of the online ethnography.  The first type focuses on the observation of use of 
the online space in everyday life and screen data collection, then on doing offline ethnography by 
establishing contact with selected participants, such as through door-to door survey and 
interviews. Blended-data as such can be collected in parallel and simultaneously.  The second 
type is concerned strictly with the everyday life online. In this type of online ethnography, the 
internet becomes the only site ―where culture and community are formed‖ (Androutsopoulos 
2008). Direct contact with the participants in this type of virtual ethnography becomes minimal.  
Methods such as online ethnography (Androutsopoulos 2008) and computer mediated 
discourse analysis (Herring 2004) are useful methodological frameworks for studies of online 
language use, online discourse and specific media related phenomena. Yet, studies of peoples‘ 
everyday language use of which CMC has become a central part calls for more holistic 
approaches allowing us to discover the connections between various linguistic and social aspects 
of peoples‘ lives (Staehr 2014).  My dissertation meets this call for a holistic approach by not 
examining social media as detached from other areas of life even though it is used as an essential 
part of the counter-erasure processes and Tamazight revitalization efforts. The social contexts 




communication. To do this I draw on a combination of online ethnography and offline interviews 
and conversations. My data collection in Androutsopoulos‘ (2013:241) terms can be 
characterized as blended data as I carry out ethnography that bridges online and offline 
situations. Finally, the data collection is informed by sociolinguistic methodology involving 
various sound recordings (i.e. interviews and recorded conversations) and principles from 
ethnographic methodology such as (online and offline) participant observation. This 
methodology, also called discourse-centered online ethnography (Gerogalou 2014), is more 
relevant for the present study particularly because the data collection constitutes longitudinal 
observation of Tunisian Imazighen Facebook pages while establishing contact with some of their 
owners. This approach was be used in combination with content analysis approach (Hine, 2000; 
Herring, 2004).  
3.3.3. Facebook: A review of its growth in research and number 
3.3.3.1 Facebook in literature 
One of the top social networking websites since 2004 has been Facebook. We see how 
Facebook has evolved and gained tremendous presence in people‘s life with the development 
and availability of the Internet. Peluchette and Karl (2010) explain that ―Facebook provides an 
identity profiling platform that displays different kinds of personal information that can be 
posted on it such as favorite quotations, political affiliation, favorite music and education; and 
users have considerable freedom to provide such information or not and to post any other 
information or pictures of their choice‖ (p. 24). Hence, Facebook can function as a personal 
Website where individuals use their creativity to define themselves through ―digital collages 




Nowadays, Facebook is also used as a platform for online communities that share interests in 
many fields, such as political, educational, scientific, commercial, or entertainment.  
As for the research carried out on Facebook, most scholars have used it in sociological 
studies, often to identify the sense of community in the relationship between participants in 
social networking (Ellison et al., 2006; Baron, 2008). As Facebook has become one of the most 
widely used online social network sites, 71% of adults who use the internet, connect via 
Facebook according to the Pew Research Center survey report of 2015. Its use in (socio) linguistics 
research is subsequently growing (Zhao, 2008; Chen, 2013; Bolander & Locher 2015; 
Georgalou, 2017). One common area of research is on language and identity as ―multifaceted‖ 
and ―multilayered‖ performance and as emergent online when individuals use language and other 
modes of communication to engage in interaction (Bolander, 2016).   
Through content analysis of Facebook personal profiles and status updates, Zhao et al 
(2008), for example showed that self-presentation was more explicit in the profile while more 
implicit identity construction was recognized in the status updates. Bazarova et al (2012) 
revealed that language style is employed and adapted by Facebook users depending on context 
and structure of interaction. The conclusion was that language style seemed to be influencing 
receivers‘ interpretation of users ‗self-presentation. Bolander and Locher (2010) found that 
language use on Facebook was influenced by the medium and social context of interaction. They 
also found that facebookers often follow a linguistic strategy called ―creative language usage‖, 
especially when the message they leave on the so-called ―wall‖ is ―a status update‖ action type 
(Bolander and Locher, 2010).   
Individuals are seen as ―social actors‖ who write longer and employ language creatively 




productive as possible so she can actually go out and have some fun tonight!‖, there are at least 
three actions detected: specification of location (the facebooker is in the office), reference to 
actions in progress (trying to be as productive as possible), and reference to future actions (so she 
can actually go out and have some fun tonight). In view of these actions, the participant is 
constructing her identity as an employee and as someone who enjoys going out (p.182). Bolander 
and Locher (2010) concluded identity performance work in status updates is more often achieved 
implicitly than explicitly. The creative use of language allows people to construct their identities 
by sharing ―snippets of their lives‖ without being limited to restricted options to choose from (p. 
179).  
Being one of the most popular social network sites (SNSs) globally, Facebook has been 
regarded as ―the world‘s most frequently visited website‖ claiming over 1.4 billion active users 
globally as of April 2015 (Facebook statistics, 2015). Its popularity and recognition as the leader 
among all other social media tools in the web space makes it worth for investigation. Among 
scholars, Facebook is popularly known as a platform that offers endless opportunities for 
individuals to engage in self-presentation and impression management (SPIM) acts (Wang et al., 
2010; Waggoner, Smith, & Collins, 2009). Other studies focus on the effects of self-presentation 
in both online and offline worlds (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007).  Users communicate their 
identity by profiting from various applications offered by Facebook. Users manage their self-
presentation through images that entails the uploading of photos, videos or audio and the 
changing of profile photos. Posts include creating profile with details of the user, updating status 
with information that gives a glimpse into the users‘ mind, and engaging in conversations on 




The growing popularity of Facebook nowadays has sometimes made it even more 
important than any other communication methods. Research on the use of Facebook in the 
university for example, is more and more important; while emails are the most popular online 
genre for academics and administration, students now prefer to use social networking websites to 
communicate with their fellow students.  Between 80% to 90% of the students on American 
campuses had Facebook accounts in 2006 (Baron 2008). Pérez-Sabater (2012) points out that 
Facebook was the most popular social networking site in their survey carried out at the 
University of Illinois, Chicago, during 2006–2007, where 79% of the students interviewed used 
it. Recently, Facebook has undergone a spectacular increase in users along with tremendous 
influence on changing people‘s political and social life all over the world.  
According to Arab Social Media Report (2011), Facebook is the most popular social 
networking tool in the Arab-speaking regions and has continued to grow in popularity in recent 
years. According to the Arab social media report of 2015, it is the top preferred social media 
channel in the Arab region. Figure 3.3 illustrated the statistics of Facebook usage in the Arab 





Figure 3.3: Statistics of Facebook usage in the Arab World (Arab Social Media Report, 2015) 
3.3.3.2 Facebook in Tunisia 
In Tunisia, Facebook has become an important forum of discussion and dissemination of 
information and opinions relating to a range of issues since the 2011 Revolution.  According to 
Marzouki (2012), there were 3.6 million internet users out of an entire population of 11 million, 
during the political unrest in the country, of which 850,000 were active on Facebook. According 
to Wamda Newsletter on statistics of how Tunisians use social media, the number of Tunisian 
Facebook users reached 3.4 million with a penetration of 33% making Tunisia the 47
th
 country in 
the world in terms of Facebook users in 2013. The growing numbers of Tunisian ―Facebookers‖ 
during and after the revolution have transformed the online social networking platform into an 
alternative medium of real-world activism. Within days or even hours, governmental decisions, 
movements, causes or all kinds of news go viral throughout the online platform, gaining support, 




On the perception by Tunisian Facebook users of its usefulness to the whole ongoing 
revolutionary process, 80% of Marzouki‘s participants agreed that Facebook plays the role of 
‗catalyst‘ that has accelerated the political, social, and cultural changes in the Tunisian society. 
In a survey conducted by the Dubai School of Government in March 2011 on the goals of using 
Facebook during the political uprising in Tunisia (shown in Figure 3.4), 31% of the respondents 
agreed that Facebook had been primarily used to raise awareness within their countries. One-
third or 33% of Tunisians found it to be an efficient tool for spreading information to the world. 
Nearly a quarter (22%) of Tunisians stated that Facebook should be used to organize activists 
and actions. Less than 11% believed that Facebook is a means of entertainment. 
 
Figure 3.4: The main Usage of Facebook during the Tunisian Civil Uprising and events 
in 2011 –   Arab Social Media Report, 2015) 
 
The use of Facebook among Tunisian Imazighen to discuss issues related to their identity 
is a great example of post-revolutionary change. Hence, in designing a content analysis, the 
current study aims at examining the online communication that directly pertains to erasure of 




images, and videos) will be treated as textual content which makes them appropriate resources 
for the purpose of this study.  
To generate a dataset of postings on Facebook, the author followed the Facebook 
accounts of nine Tunisian Imazighen who were using Facebook regularly during the core data 
collection period (spring 2016-fall 2018). All the posts and comments were accessible to friends 
of the profile owners and to the author of this study.  None of the pages is devoted precisely to 
promoting a business, religious teaching, sports, or education. All the Facebook participants 
selected publish posts for general purposes and Tunisian Tamazight issues. The data were 
obtained via screen shots of three types of Facebook postings: 1) wall posts either on the page of 
the owner or on a friend‘s Facebook page or ―wall‖; 2) discussion threads and those involve 
either comments on photos and images, or comments on wall posts; 3) ―Articles‖ or long texts, 
which are longer posts like a blog.   
3.3.4. Conclusive remarks 
To sum up, the chapter offered a review of some of the research on language, identity, and 
ideology. These are the three major concepts that will appear repeatedly throughout the analysis 
of the data. To better understand how Tunisian Tamazight language and identity are constructed 
and reconstructed, two theoretical frameworks were highlighted. Irvine‘s and Gal‘s (2000) model 
of iconization, fractal recursivity, and erasure represents one of the highly influential models for 
how language ideologies operate during the work of identity formation and performance. Since 
identification work often generates various relations between concepts of agency, power, culture, 
and other issues, it was important to revisit tactics of intersubjectivity model, proposed by 
Bucholtz‘ and Hall‘s (2005).  This model offers valuable perspectives to examine how Tunisian 




they deploy on Facebook.  To develop a grasp of how Tamazight identity is constructed 
discursively and how language ideologies are instantiated within Facebook, required 
reconsidering some of the research on the growth of CMC and Facebook in general and in the 
context of Tunisia, in specific. The chapter also looked at some of the studies on the 
transformation of Facebook into a discursive site in which language ideologies and identity 
issues can be investigated using a discourse-centered online ethnographic approach, as proposed 




















Chapter Four  
METHODOLOGY  
 
There are no Arabs in North Africa; there are Imazighen who have been Arabized at gradable 
levels, Quoted form Safi Moemin, a researcher in Amazigh history and culture.  
 
4.1  Introduction 
In this chapter I present the methodological steps and research strategies I used to design 
and conduct my study. The data of this study draw on two types of research methods. First, I 
approach my study as online ethnographic research. For that I use discourse-centered 
ethnography as proposed by Androutsopoulos (2008). According to this approach, data is 
collected through two sites: one is screen-based and the other is user-based. The former is done 
through longitudinal and systematic observations of the discourse practices and patterns of 
language use on online sites while the latter refers to material collected through contact with the 
users of those sites and the offline communication. A blend of the two sources of data by ―going 
beyond the screen to include material over and above the log file data‖, is a key component of 




Following their lead, my data is collected through a combination of systematic 
observations of selected Tunisian Amazigh Facebook sites and semi-structured interviews with 
the users of those sites. In addition to interviews with the Facebook users I observed for this 
study, I also conducted more interviews with other members of the Tunisian Amazigh 
community. The extra interviews serve the purpose of better understanding and illustrating the 
discursive practices of the Facebook subjects.  
The second research method is qualitative content analysis. Specifically, content analysis 
is a method that aims to elicit concepts or categories to describe a phenomenon (Elo   Kyng s 
2008).  The main feature of content analysis is to classify words or text into smaller content 
categories (Weber 1990). In other words, it is based on adopting a thematic approach when 
categorizing the data. In this study, four thematic units are generated across the nine research 
participants and through their interviews: historical, cultural, social, and linguistic.  The four 
themes were identified based on discourses and ideologies expressed by the nine participants 
were on their Facebook accounts.  
In section 4.2, I describe the sampling procedures I used for the online ethnographic 
observations. Then, I give a brief description of the demographics and background of the nine 
participants who I followed through Facebook. In section 4.3, I describe the semi-structured 
interview procedures. In addition to Facebook and interview data, I also conducted an online 
survey to generate current Tunisians‘ attitudes towards Tamazight. In section 4.4, I briefly 
describe the procedures and motivation for this survey. I move on the ethical considerations in 






4.2   Sampling and participants 
4.2.1 Sampling 
To collect a representative list of Facebook sites designed by Tunisian Imazighen, I made 
connections with potential subjects by ―friending,‖ (sending friendship requests and being added 
as a friend), following links, and gaining access to profiles; the profile connected me to 
additional participants indirectly through Facebook‘s ―people you may know‖ function which 
lists individuals who are already connected with several of a user‘s friends.  Initially, I identified 
32 Facebook pages related to Tunisians who identify themselves as Amazigh.  These sites were 
narrowed down later to include only pages created by individuals and not groups. During the 
elimination process, several criteria were considered. Firstly, pages were used if the information 
in their ―about‖ section shows that the person is from Tunisia.  Massive interactions and 
Facebook communications occur daily between Imazighen people from different regions in 
North Africa. Therefore, it was necessary to verify the nationalities of the participants since this 
study is strictly limited to Tunisian Imazighen. 
Secondly, the selection was based on the extent to which the uploaded postings are 
related to Tamazight language and culture. This was decided by looking at what the postings 
were about. Thirdly, only participants who have nonymous profiles were chosen. To protect the 
privacy of the participants I undertook a few steps. First, I deleted and encoded all identifying 
information immediately after the data was collected. I replaced profile names of each of the 
participant with Tamazight names of historical figures and kings. Other identifiers, such as the 
village where they come from, current city where they live, or work place have all been 




 Goffman (1959) described the nonymous offline world as space where deviance from 
established social norms will be punished or ridiculed and where the mask people wear in 
everyday life becomes their real or known identities. In a fully anonymous online environment, 
however, the masks that people wear get thrown away and their true-selves come out of hiding 
along with other suppressed identities (Zhao 2008). The nonymous online world emerges as a 
third type for environment where people may tend to express what has been called the ―hoped-
for possible selves‖ (Yurchisin, 2005). In other words, it is an environment where people tend to 
show images of the self that are currently not known to others (Markus and Nurius, 1986). This 
was a basic motivation behind selecting nonymous Amazigh profiles particularly that the focus 
of this study will be on discussing the erasure and counteracting erasure of Amazigh language 
and identity. 
 Additionally, pages created by the same person were also eliminated and so were the 
ones which were not updated regularly or were deactivated during the first two months of 
systematic observation (cf. Androutsopoulos, 2008). As a result, the number of the sites was 
narrowed down to fifteen. ―Friending‖ these pages was simultaneously highly informative and 
entertaining. Nevertheless, it was also very overwhelming to follow them assiduously, given how 
active they are on a daily basis. Therefore, it was necessary to go through a third stage of 
narrowing down the number of the profiles. Since it would not help generate good amount of 
data if the Facebook profiles were not known to most members of the community, popularity 
were also considered as parameters for selection. The number of friends, likes, comments along 
with regular activities and the themes of the postings were used to estimate the popularity of the 
individuals analyzed in this study.  Nine pages were left as a result of these stages of elimination. 




Coding Data selection Bases of selection 
Profile 
information  
Who is the admin of 
the profile? 
Examine whether it is individual or group page; 
Examine country of origin; Do not include village or 
work place names.  
Anonymity  What‘s the name of 
the profile page 
Examine if the admin uses a proper name and whether 
it is fake or real; Give pass to pseudo-names if they 
are followed by a real name. 
Popularity  Is the profile known  Examine if there are at least 200 friends; if the 
postings can reach up to 50 likes and if they often 
trigger long threads.  
Frequency 
of activities 
Is the page owner 
active on a regular a 
basis?  
Examine whether the administrator is active, 
occasionally active, rarely active, or deactivated his 
page; estimate the number of postings per day, every 
two to three days, and per week.  
Themes 
discussed  
What‘s the purpose of 
the Facebook page?  
Dismiss pages that are devoted to promoting a 
business, religion, or sports; examine if the page raises 
Amazigh issues on regular basis.  
 
Table 4.1: Overview of the first five steps of data selection 
 
Of the nine profile owners, two were female and seven were male. Their ages ranged 
between 33 and 57 years. As noted above, although they used their real names on their pages, for 
ethical purposes of this research, their names were substituted with names of Imazighen 
historical figures, such as Massinissa (king), Juba (king), Aksil (war leader), etc.  I chose not to 
reveal real names in this study despite the agreement of all the participants to take part in this 
research to protect them from any possible politically motivated targeting. Below, I outline their 
demographics and background information. Table 2 below sums up the demographic information 
of the participants along with chart summary of my data corpus in number; that includes the 





Aksil is a fifty-seven-year-old born and raised in Tunisia. He is originally from the city of 
Gafsa, originally called Capsa which lends its name to the Mesolithic Capsian Culture (10.000 
to 6000 BC), the origin of the proto-Amazigh tribes (Wikipedia 2018). He is a public-school 
teacher and he speaks Arabic and some French. When he visited Morocco in the 80‘s, he learned 
Tashelhyt. Upon his return to Tunisia after the 2011 revolution he founded the Tunisian 
Association of Tamazight Culture with other Amazigh members. He is a quite popular figure 
among the Amazigh communities. He was invited by several TV channels to debate the Amazigh 
element of Tunisian identity. Aksil is a very active member of the Amazigh community in 
Tunisia. It is hard not to find a picture of him in all the cultural and political events that has been 
organized by Tunisian Imazighen since the revolution. In 2014, he was among the few pioneers 
to march to the parliament in objection of the ongoing marginalization of the Amazigh rights in 
the constitution. He visits, posts or comment on Facebook almost on daily basis. The first time I 
sent him a Facebook message to introduce myself was in 2012. When I explained to him the 
purpose of my study in 2015, he did not hesitate to participate both on Facebook and an 
interview.  
Juba is fifty-three years old from one of the Tamazight villages in the governorate of 
Gabes. He has a university degree and works in a finance company. Although he is not a native 
speaker of Tamazight, he is a very well-known activist in the community. He has been a member 
of several associations, but never in a leadership position. He was among the pioneers to lead the 
wake-up movement of the Amazigh community in Tunisia. Like Aksil, he has been invited 
several times by media channels to speak about Amazigh identity, culture, and events.  He 




Rather, his major focus is rather on acknowledging the Amazigh element in the Tunisian identity 
by the people of Tunisia first. He is a very active Facebooker. His postings range between two to 
three times a day.  I was introduced to Juba through Aksil in 2012 at first. He has become a 
major connection between me and many other Amazigh activists, not only from Tunisia, but also 
from Algeria and Morocco since then. Juba has played major role in connecting me to most of 
the participants in this study as well.  
Yughurtha is forty-six years old from a Tamazight village in the governorate of 
Tatouine. He lives in the capital, Tunis, where he runs his own business with most of his family 
members. He visits Douiret occasionally. He is the holder of a university degree in Business and 
Management.  He speaks three languages natively: Tamazight, Arabic, and French. Yughurtha is 
a well-educated person and probably the most knowledgeable of the history, culture and even of 
linguistic properties of Tamazight language compared with the rest of the participants. He does 
not consider himself an activist and he refrains from participating in any cultural or associative 
work.  I was introduced to Yughurtha by Juba on Facebook. He was very active on the site until 
mid-2017, however, I haven‘t seen him posting anything for about one year. Attempts to reach 
him again were also in vain even though we used to chat quite often about Tamazight. He helped 
me tremendously with data for my qualitative research papers. He also agreed on using his 
Facebook postings for my dissertation and I had an interesting interview with him.  
Massinissa is also fifty-three years old from a Tamazight village in Gabes. Like 
Yughurtha, he also lives in the capital of Tunis with his family where he also works as self-
employed. He is also a near-native speaker of Tamazight besides Arabic and French. I describe 
Massinissa and Yughurtha as native speakers of French because they lived in France most of 




and literature. He even writes poetry in Tunisian Tamazight and organizes poetry readings events  
and is an active member in few cultural associations as well as on Facebook. He visits his profile 
regularly and he is often interested in posting Tamazight proverbs. I was introduced to 
Massinissa of Facebook through Juba in 2014. Since then we chatted on the phone and Skype 
couple of times. He was very collaborative when I explained my research to him and he continue 
to be so to date.  
Firmus was fifty-six years old at the time of the interview. He is originally from a 
Tamazight village in Tatouine Governorate. He lives in the capital of Tunis with his family like 
Yughurtha and Massinissa. He is also well-educated and speaks Arabic and French fluently. He 
also lived most of his life in France before he went back to Tunisia where he started his own 
business and founded a Tamazight Association prior to the 2011-revolution. His association does 
not exist anymore, but he continues his activism on Facebook. Firmus does not seem to speak 
Tamazight very well though he claims he does.  Most of his interactions and interviews including 
the ones he sometimes does on Amazigh TV channels are always in French. I assume he uses 
French for the Amazigh TV hosts who tend to be more francophone than Arabophone, especially 
if they are Kabyle speakers from Algeria.  He is a strong adherent for the idea of revitalizing 
Tamazight culture and identity without politicizing it, which has caused an ideological split in 
the Amazigh community into two camps. One is supporting the cultural revival while the second 
advocates for politicizing the cause. I was introduced to Firmus through Juba and Yughurtha on 
Facebook in 2015 when I was about to start the online ethnographic observations. On Facebook, 
Firmus is sometimes very active to an extent that he would publish up to five or six postings per 




research he showed a lot of support and did not hesitate to allow me to use his Facebook material 
and to sit for an interview.   
Gildo is the youngest participant I followed on Facebook. He is thirty-four years old 
from a Tamazight village in the governorate of Gabes. However, he is the most important one for 
all the research work I have done about Tunisian Tamazight. Gildo did not finish high school. He 
works for a small carpentry shop in the city of Gabes, but he visits his home village very often. 
In addition to Arabic, Gildo speaks Tamazight natively. He cannot visit his Facebook profile 
very often for two main reasons. First, he doesn‘t have a computer. Second, he doesn‘t always 
have access to the internet when he uses his phone. However, he has been posting quite 
extensively about Tamazight language and identity. I was first introduced to him by Juba, but he 
is known by most of the other participants. This is not because he is an activist but rather because 
he is considered an ―authentic‖ native speaker of the language. I was referred to Gildo by almost 
every Amazigh I contacted whenever I was looking for linguistic information. Gildo speaks only 
Arabic in addition to his mother tongue Tamazight. He is also the only participant who can write 
in Tifinagh (Tamazight alphabetic system). He was a main informant for two of my pilot studies 
and he accepted to continue participate in my dissertation research.  
Takfirinas is a forty-nine-year-old from the governorate of Gafsa. He is married with 
two children who are trying hard to learn Tamazight based on their father‘s wish. He is a holder 
of a high school degree. He works in an electricity company. He speaks only Arabic and he is in 
the process of learning Tamazight. He likes to be called an activist and he established a new 
Tamazight association in 2017. Nevertheless, its activities did not last for a long time. He visits 




introduced to him through Yuba. He agreed to participate in my research since I contacted him 
on the first time.  
Dyhia is a woman in her fifties who is originally from a Tamazight village in Gabes. She 
lives with her family in Tunis where she works in a governmental institution. She is fluent in 
Arabic and French, but doesn‘t speak Tamazight. She became engaged in the Tamazight cause in 
2013 as a member in several associations and organizer of cultural events, workshops, and 
conferences pertinent to Tunisian Tamazight revitalization project at the local and international 
level.  She likes to travel and to take pictures. She has become very active on Facebook during 
the last three years. I found out about her by myself. When I contacted her via the Facebook 
message tool she was so excited that academic work is taking place about the language and 
identity of her ancestors. She is also very happy to be a participant in this research study. Dyhia 
is a friend of Yuba only on Facebook even though they are from the same village.  
Teziri is a thirty-seven-year-old originally from a Tamazight village in the governorate of 
Tatouine, but lives in Tunis where she works in a governmental institution. She has a university 
degree in Sociology. She doesn‘t speak Tamazight but her parents do. She also speaks Arabic 
and understands French. She is an active member in an Amazigh association and she travels a lot 
around the country to attend cultural events and activities. She advocates for politicizing 
Tunisian Tamazight.  She visits her Facebook profile regularly, but posts every two to three days 
once or twice. I knew about Teziri through couple of Amazigh people who did not seem to agree 
with her political approach. I contacted her by myself through a Facebook message. She was 





The nine participants in this research are seen as representative of a larger community 
that share common goals and intercommunication mechanisms; and reports its activities, work, 
activism, views, and approaches discursively. Dayter (2016) calls this a ―discourse community‖. 
The importance of this community in the lives of my participants can be illustrated through their 
Facebook intensive connections. Using Dayter‘s model of Twitter subjects‘ connections, Figure 
4.1 illustrates mutual Facebook connections among the participants in this study. Solid lines 
indicate that the participants follow each while dotted lines show that the participants do not 
communicate, and yet they at least know of each other as members of the Amazigh community.  
 
Figure 4.1: Participants connections of Facebook 
4.2.3 Data 
I met the participants at different points. Though I followed each of them since I was 
introduced starting in 2012, I did not begin my ethnographic observations until February 2016. 
My observations lasted for two years, ending in January 2018. My Facebook data includes short 




photos or images taken elsewhere from the internet, their comments, thread comments on their 
wall, and videos. The data also comprised of interview excepts. This will be better described in a 
following section below. Table 4.2 gives a summary of the data corpus in number. As shown in 
the table, there are differences in the amount of data collected from each of the participants. This 
is contingent on the fact that they are not similarly active on Facebook. Moreover, they show 
various preferences in terms of their Facebook practices. For example, Teziri seldom makes 
comments on others‘ status.  She marks her presence by rather posting on her timeline than on 
others. Aksil, however, is seen frequently seen making comments on other members of the 
Amazigh community including the participants in this study. Besides the data shown in Table 
4.2, I took copious notes through this online ethnographic journey with Tunisian Imazighen‘s 
Facebook profiles and during our personal interactions. They are not shown in the Table, but I 
will include them in the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
 
Table 4.2: Demographic Summary of the nine Facebook profiles 
 
The data was collected using the snipping tool, a screenshot utility  in Windows Vista 
that can take screenshots of an open window and store them as image files (Wikipedia). The 
Profile 
name 




Images  videos Threads Comments 
Dyhia F 51 3.937 63 8 23 2 31 2 
Takfirinas M 49 3.313 27 7 17 1 19 9 
Teziri F 33 2.345 13 3 22 3 13 0 
Aksil M 57 833 73 0 24 2 23 13 
Juba  M 53 513 110 14 20 3 31 23 
Gildo M 34 422 33 1 25 2 22 15 
Yugurtha M 46 365 27 34 23 7 33 2 
Firmus M 56 350 17 10 9 4 11 31 
Massinissa M 54 318 110 4 19 0 21 0 
        




screenshots involve textual wall posts, visual wall posts, and textual and visual wall posts. 
Semiotics is the study of how signs operate in society or ―the study of the social production of 
meaning‖ generated from sign systems (O‘Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders, Montgomery and Fiske, 
1994, p. 281). Applying semiotics, a critical instrument for decoding meanings behind signs, 
images and symbols can help reveal ideological foundations. This methodology can be 
particularly useful for the data analysis in this study Tunisian Imazighen linguistic and cultural 
identity erasure and reversal erasure. Prior to data processing and analysis, it was important to 
think about how to categorize the data. Creating coding categories in content analysis research 
methodology is an important first step.   
Content analysis of this data not only provides an overall view of the nature, composition 
and extent of Facebook use by Tunisian Imazighen, but also offers some understanding of 
identity representation of Tunisian Imazighen identity. This first stage was an essential step for 
providing a sample frame from which groups were selected for qualitative content analysis for 
the second stage. In the second stage, content analysis of messages and discussions of selected 
Facebook pages was conducted. Message components here refer to uploaded postings on 
Facebook walls, including textual messages, images, videos, and audio. Data from this stage 
provided deep insights into how the linguistic and cultural identity erasure is being interpreted 
and communicated online. As previously mentioned, this research adopted a screen-based online 
ethnography proposed by Androutsopoulos (2008) where there is no interaction between the 
researcher and the participants during the observation and data collection stage. Avoiding 
involvement with participants was purposefully designed so that participants‘ behavior is ―not 




These online observations, do not target individual people, but the content of the 
communication already existing online. This method can work in concert with content analysis 
approach in which researchers are enabled in ―finding research materials where they naturally 
occurred, retrieving routinely accumulated record, and capturing human behavior through 
passive observation‖ (Corti   Fielding, 2016). Facebook sites provide a ready source of rich 
content available for the research and do not necessarily need the researcher‘s participation. 
Collecting naturally occurring user-generated data on the Internet as texts for content analysis is 
similar to the way in which newspaper letters were used in previous communication research 
(Hine, 2000). 
Following a thematic approach proved to be very useful for dealing with a verity of data, 
such Facebook, Twitter, Interviews, notes, etc. and theorizing across number of cases (Georgalou 
2017). It was quite challenging and time consuming looking for categories and patterns to 
systemize the data.  At first, I identified specific themes, such as identity purification, identity 
indigenization, otherness of non-Amazigh, and language iconization. Classifying data under 
these codes was a challenging task because posts sometimes overlap. I thought it would be better 
if I come up with broader themes. I went back and forth between profiles several times, revisited 
older posts, and compared the profiles to each to other. In doing so, several themes emerged in 
the process. Some of my participants‘ profiles were more specific in focus than other, which 
eventually provided a few hints on how to categorize the data thematically. For instance, 
Yughurtha would post more often about history than any other theme. The threads on his wall, 
however, can deviate to several other themes. Similarly, Massinissa was more focused on posting 
Tamazight proverbs and idioms.  Subsequently, I developed a coding system based on these 




linguistic.  Identifying the themes helped to rearrange the data more systematically. Each entry 
which took the form of an image was assigned and ID that contains the following features: the 
name of the author, theme category, image type whether small text, long text, image…etc. and a 
number. Each image entry is saved in a separate file with its translation if required. Examples 1 
and 2 are annotation examples for two entries from Yuba and Firmus.  
 
Example 1: Yuba_Linguistic_st_image9 
 




Most of these texts were written in Tunisian Arabic or standard Arabic. A good number 
of these texts were posted in Tamazight using the Latin characters and even in Tifinagh.  In my 
translations, I tried to be faithful to the cultural meanings of the data while aiming to have the 
target-text trigger the same impact as the original texts might have had on the readers (Georgalou 
2017). I paraphrased some of the texts because they were too long or were meant to provide 
further explanation or contextual information on a preceding entry.  
4.3   Interviews 
Drawing on the user-based dimension of discourse-centered online ethnography as 
outlined by Androutsopoulos (2008), semi-structured interviews were also conducted. In addition 
to the nine main participants, I also conducted interviews with other Tunisian Amazigh people 
who were willing to express their views on the status of Tamazight in Tunisia. The purpose of 
conducting these interviews was to generate more data that validates what is found in the 
Facebook postings and to provide a more comprehensive description of how the processes of 
erasure and ―counter-erasure‖ have been practiced in the context of Tunisian Tamazight as a 
mechanism of identity reconstruction. Indeed, I was inspired to conduct more interviews once I 
heard some of my participants‘ narratives, experiences, ideologies, beliefs, and attitudes 
following the 2011 Revolution which they felt gave them a voice and the chance to reconstruct 
an entire linguistic and cultural identity. 
 All the interviews were conducted in Tunisian Arabic in summer of 2016 and of 2017. 
As previously mentioned, nine of the participants in these interviews are owners of Facebook 
profiles used in this study while the other participants were contacted through Facebook-people-
you-may-know option, personal connections and ―friend of-a-friend technique‖ (Milroy and 




Facebook postings (notes, comments, or photos) engaged them more deeply with the research 
question at hand. At the time of the interview, some of the participants were living in Tunis 
where they work or live while others were in different cities in south Tunisia such as Gafsa and 
Tozeur. Many of the interviewees know each other personally as they all share the common 
interest of preserving Tamazight culture and language or by being active in various Tamazight 
associations. Most of the interviews were conducted via Skype calls to the personal phones of the 
participants. The reason why it was not Skype-to-Skype is because most of the interviewees did 
have a Skype account. Some of the participants talked to me from an open-air location such as 
farms or streets which produced some background noise in the recording. However, this was not 
important since the focus of gathering this data was to analyze attitudes and experiences of 
Tunisian Amazigh people, and not to gather speech data for phonological analysis. Other 
participants were interrupted during the interview by members of their families or friends who 
wanted to talk to them.  
Despite all these difficulties, I managed to collect a sample of 23 participants that I could 
categorize based on age group, education and level of proficiency in speaking Tamazight. While 
the first two demographic categories were collected directly from the participants, the third 
information was more impressionistic. Most of the participants identified themselves as native or 
near native speakers of Tamazight as an assertive mechanism of ethnic and cultural identity and 
strategy of identity authentication (Chapter 6). It was hard to run a Tamazight proficiency test 
due to lack of materials for such language proficiency tests, so I based my estimation on 
observations of their Facebook interactions and discussions combined with the recommendation 
of Gildo, judged to be the most authentic speaker by almost all of the participants. I categorized 




Participants Age Gender Education Tamazight proficiency 
Facebook participants 
 
Gildo 34 M high school native speaker 
Yugurtha  46 M university near native 
Aksil 57 M university near native (Tashelhyt) 
Juba  53 M university relatively intermediate  
Massinissa  54 M university relatively intermediate  
Firmus 56 M university low-intermediate 
Teziri 37 F university low-intermediate 
Takfirinas 49 M university non-speaker  
Dyhia 51 F university non-speaker 
Other interviewees 
 
Yanu (slah) 45 M high school native speaker 
Baragsen (Ta 30 M high school native speaker 
Kacci 63 M elementary native speaker 
Sabtoun 30 M high school native speaker 
Marin  35 M university near native 
Azim  68 M elementary near native 
Badees 43 M university intermediate 
Afan  58 M university relatively intermediate 
Sifaw 25 M university non-speaker 
Sileen 25 F university non-speaker  
Idr 31 M high school non-speaker 
Maghou 47 M university non-speaker 
Ziri 52 F university non-speaker 
Illi 48 F university non-speaker 
Lunja 24 F university non-speaker 
Tadla  35 F university non-speaker 
Table 4.3: Demography of the interview participants 
Table 4.3 shows that there are five levels of Tamazight language proficiency: native 
speaker, near native speakers, intermediate, relatively intermediate, low intermediate, and non-




The second category refers to those who have some level of understanding or speaking while the 
third one refers to those who do not speak Tamazight but identify themselves Amazigh 
ethnically. Figure 4.2 depicts an interaction between age, education and level of language 
proficiency.  
 
Figure 4.2: Effects of age and education on Tunisian Tamazight  
Although I did not conduct a regression analysis, the data shows that Tamazight 
proficiency is higher among less educated and older speakers. Tamazight proficiency lowers 
remarkably with adults in the age range between thirty and fifty. These results reveal that that 
there is an age factor for the decline of Tamazight.  This is evidently related to the fact that most 
Imazighen who were born in the 1960‘s and after had to witness intensive Arabization  wave that 
the first president of the country, Habib Bourguiba imposed under the pressure of a pan-Arab 




the less likely a person is to speak the language. This is predictable since at schools and 
universities only Tunisian dialect or Arabic are spoken and allowed. When people drop out of 
school at an early age, chances for them to migrate to the city are reduced which seems to lead to 
maintenance of their Tamazight.  
Although a list of questions was designed for the interviews (see Appendix 1), it was hard 
to stick to the order of the questions and not engage in more unstructured-like interviews or 
informal conversational interviews. Patton (2002) described unstructured interviews as a natural 
extension of participant observation, because they so often occur as part of ongoing participant 
observation fieldwork. He argued that they rely entirely on the spontaneous generation of 
questions in the natural flow of an interaction. This definition aligns with Labov‘s (1966, 1972) 
suggestion on the best means to enrich natural data is by giving the floor to the interviewees and 
allowing them to dictate the flow of the conversation.  In this study, semi-structured interviews 
turned out to be important for the participants to feel comfortable talking to researcher and not to 
sound as if they were under investigation. The researcher would often allow the discussions to 
diverge from the main interview guide particularly for the three main reasons below: First the 
researcher did not meet them in person. Most the information about the researcher was delivered 
to the subjects through her public Facebook page and friends who played the intermediaries.  
Second, it was important to make the interview more conversational to reduce formality 
and distance in attempt to build better rapport with the participants. Had the interview been more 
structured, it could have caused some discomfort for some participants who might not like to 
communicate with people who live in the West. Third, the study is tackling a quite sensitive 
topic and there might have been fear that the topic of Tamazight revitalization in Tunisia could 




While the length of the interviews varied from one participant to another, they all ranged 
between 40 to 60 minutes. Questions were centered around the general thematic goal of this 
study which is to analyze the processes of erasure that Tunisian Tamazight language have been 
undergoing. Most of the interviews were conducted in Tunisian dialect (Ettounsi). The interview 
data were digitally recorded and transcribed. 
4.4   Questionnaire 
One additional form of data consisted of an online survey questionnaire was distributed 
through Facebook private message medium to Tunisians who were selected based on their 
willingness and their availability. The questionnaire was administered in Arabic, then translated 
in English. The questionnaire contained 20 questions. The biographical section included 
questions about age, highest educational diploma obtained, gender, place of residence, village of 
birth if Amazigh, and languages they speak. Questions on language proficiency and language use 
were designed in a multiple-choice format. Participants were asked to respond to questions about 
language proficiency, fluency, and domains of use, for instance: ―in which language do you 
interact mostly at home?‖ The responses included Tamazight only, Tamazight and Tunisian and 
Tunisian Darija
7
 only. To assess attitudes towards Tunisian Tamazight in various contexts, 
participants were asked to respond to six statements using a five-point Likert scale on which 
options ranged from agree, strongly agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree; examples include 
questions such as ―Tunisian Tamazight should be constitutionalized‖ and ―Tunisian Tamazight 
should be revitalized‖. The survey was administered to assess Tunisians‘ awareness of the 
Amazigh element in their identity post-revolution Tunisia. It is important to evaluate how much 
Tunisians know and what variables have made some people more aware of the Tunisian 
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Tamazight identity than others. Another motivation was to assess subjects‘ acceptability of the 
idea that Tunisian identity has an Amazigh dimension. In other words, the survey serves to 
provide a comprehensive pool of information to identify the causes and outcomes of Amazigh 
cultural and linguistic erasure. Results of the survey will be analyzed in Chapter 5.  
4.5   Analysis 
The study adopts a discourse analytical and semiotic approach to explore ways Tunisian 
Amazigh language and identity erasure and counter erasure are discursively reproduced on 
Facebook.  Contrary to the traditional understanding of ideologies as an instrument of hegemony 
and domination that systems of dissent and resistance do not own, new approaches define 
ideologies as shared representations of social groups expressed and generally reproduced in the 
social practices of their members, and more particularly acquired, confirmed, changed and 
perpetuated through discourse (Van Dijk 2013). Based on this approach, not only ideologies of 
dominations are defined as ideologies-erasure in this study-, but any system of ideas, beliefs, and 
representations produced to struggle against ideologies of domination- counteracting erasure in 
this study-is no less of an ideology too. To uncover these ideologies a combination of micro and 
macro-analytical approaches will be adopted. Hence, a diverse list of linguistic features will be 
considered for analysis, including choices of topics, language, scripts, presuppositions, 
metaphors, sarcasm, attitudinal vocabulary, intertextuality and multimodality.  
4.6   Ethical concerns 
When I first contacted my research participants about this study, there was no concern 
among any of them regarding how I would manage the anonymity of their data. The nine 
Facebook participants wished to be acknowledged by their actual names as authors of their 




their anonymity for the following reasons. First, being a Tunisian Amazigh activist is still a 
vulnerable status. And even though its members are not anticipating nor fearing risks, it was still 
necessary to minimize the potential of future ―harm,‖ particularly so Arabo-Islamic ideologies 
are more powerful than any time before within the rise of political Islam in a post-revolution 
transitional Tunisia. Therefore, a consent form on which participants were assured that their data 
will remain anonymous and will be used strictly for this Ph.D. dissertation was sent to them to 
sign. The consent form also gave them the right to withdraw from the research at any time they 
found themselves uncomfortable during the interview or with having their Facebook postings 
used in the research. As noted above, throughout the data, I have substituted the actual names of 
the profiles with random Amazigh names of historical figures or just proper names. I consulted 
my participants with the names I picked for them. At least four of my participants preferred to be 
called ―Aksil‖ which is the most famous and heroic historical figure for all Imazighen. I decided 
to attribute the name to the participant who had no preference regarding his pseudonym. On the 
screenshots, I blurred the images depicting faces and any place showing personal information. I 
have also refrained from making reference to the original village (‗bled‘) of each participant. The 
bled is a highly salient and socially meaningful fact that anyone can use to easily identify 
Tunisian Imazighen.  
In return for the extraordinary collaboration and help of my participants, I promised to 
mention their actual names in the acknowledgement section of the dissertation. The only ethical 
concern I encountered was with handling third-party data. This refers to users whose comments 
show only on thread discussions on the profiles of the main participants. It was not easy to get in 
touch of those people via phone or Skype, especially that I live in the USA when I was engaged 




through Facebook feature, reply to a comment. I also asked my participants to inform their 
friends about my research. They reassured me they would do that when they could. They also 
assured that as long as their postings are public they have no restrictions on using the materials 
published on their walls including their friends‘ comments.  
Even if taking these ethical issues into considerations seem sufficient for protecting the 
participants from any potential harm, unpredicted accidents can always happen. As pointed out 
by Røyneland (2018) following Bolander and Locher (2014: 17), distinction between what is 
private and public in CMC/social media is becoming increasingly blurred. Therefore, it should 
be taken with a grain of salt.  Data found in the digital space may be sometimes of private nature 
even if it is posted publicly. This is because the notions of ―private‘ and ―public‖ may differ 
culturally. Ess (2002) suggests a computer ethics model that is shaped by partial public praxis 
rather than an absolute public. The model considers resources of diverse ethical and cultural 
traditions to bear on contemporary CMC issues (p. 12). Drawing on these insights of the ethics 
research, I should note that I was forced to be quite selective during my data collection period. 
Although several wall posts fit into the type of data I was looking for, I had to avoid selecting 
them for they contained offensive language or ideas that could have had political repercussions 
for the participants even though they were posted publicly. Following Røyneland (2018, p. 151), 
it was important to consider our conceptualization of private and public as well as to whom the 
media user is directing post or comment.  
In sum, the data for my dissertation is pulled from extensive observations of daily 
activities on Facebook. Through the nine profiles I chose to follow, I explored numerous posts 
on various themes and approaches with regard to Tamazight revitalization and Amazigh identity 






A RISING AWARENESS OF TUNSIAN TAMAZIGHT: AN 










In the changed political and social landscape in post-revolution Tunisia, Amazigh identity 
accompanied by a tendency to revitalize the critically endangered Tamazight language have 
become among the most critical topics centering the public discourse. In the first section of this 
chapter, I will examine the effects of the resurgence of this new discourse on the general public 
in Tunisia through the analysis of the online survey results that was distributed on Facebook and 
via the friend-of-a-friend method in 2016.  Participants in this survey had to be Tunisians but not 
necessarily Imazighen.  This step is important to assess the degree to which Tunisians in general 
are aware of the Tamazight language and identity as part of their social, cultural, and linguistic 
identity. It is also a gateway into investigating whether Tunisians are aware of the erasure 




the ways to analyze Tunisians attitudes towards Tamazight to gain some insights into its current 
status and its future revival prospects. 
Tunisian Imazighen‘s intensive Facebook activities, interactions and narratives play a 
crucial role in the awakening and dissemination of an Amazigh discourse, engaged principally in 
disclosing and countering the essentialist and exclusionary language ideologies that pushed 
Tamazight to a status of endangerment. Tunisian Imazighen seem to be engaged simultaneously 
in constructing and reproducing these same ideologies vis-à-vis Arabic through a complex and 
rigorous Facebook identity work.  Examples of language ideologies predominantly discussed, 
contested, and reversed in the Tunisian Amazigh Facebook discourse include the notion of 
erasure.  
According to Gal and Irvine‘s model (1995, p. 974), erasure is a powerful ideological 
process in which certain phenomena such as linguistic structures, cultural products, social 
groups, sociolinguistics varieties, etc. are rendered invisible. Accordingly, the complexity of 
sociolinguistic reality, such as multilingualism, ethnic diversity, and the existence of language 
minorities get effaced or obscured for being inconsistent with the prevailing ideologies. Erasure 
often interrelates with iconization and fractal recursivity, the two other semiotic processes of 
Gal‘s and Irvine‘s model (1995, p. 974). As a brief reminder of how these two processes are 
achieved, iconization, on the one hand, describes how linguistic phenomena are portrayed as if 
they flowed ‗naturally‘ from a social group‘s biological or cultural essence. This is realized 
through ‗the attribution of cause and immediate necessity to a connection [. . .] that may be only 
historical, contingent, or conventional‘ (Irvine and Gal 2000, p. 37). Fractal recursivity, on the 
other hand, captures the fact that ‗the dichotomy constructed on linguistic grounds through 




gender, ethnicity, race, social class, morality, and aesthetics‘ (Milani 2010, p. 120-121). In this 
way, fractal recursivity entails a chain of binary entwined oppositions, such as American versus 
immigrant, mainstream versus regional dialect, or as this study will show, between Amazigh 
writers of Tifinagh versus Amazigh non-writers of Tifinagh (Milani 2010).  
Drawing on insights provided by Gal‘s and Irvine‘s model (1995, 2000), the second 
section of this chapter examines how the ideological semiotic processes are discussed and 
reproduced in Tunisian Amazigh Facebook profiles. The analysis will only focus on the 
structural organization of the profiles with some analysis of the content of the posts. In other 
words, section two will only discuss how Tunisian Imazighen use the affordances of Facebook‘s 
standard features to create an impression management of a living Tunisian Amazigh identity to 
counter the Arabo-Islamic ideologies which pronounced it already ‗extinct‘. I propose through 
the analysis that Imazighen‘s performance of their Facebook identity is implemented through the 
deployment of an amalgamation of linguistic and semiotic materials (Kress & van Leeuwen 
1996, Blommaert & Rampton 2011), presented discursively in various processes of which 
entextualization stands as the most crucial one.  Tunisian Tamazight language and identity 
performance is also sustained through a dialectic between the explicit or overt metalinguistic 
statements and the implicit or pragmatic ones that require interpretation of linguistic cues to infer 
the internalized ideological perspectives of its speakers or users (Tsitsipis 2003).  
5.2  Section One: Survey Analysis  
5.2.1 Socio-Demographic Profile of the Survey Respondents  
An analysis of the socio-demographic profile of the survey participants provides a 
window into the attitudes displayed by Tunisians towards Tamazight under the dominant and 




ideology. The total sample of responses collected in this study is 194. The majority of the 
respondents in the study were between the ages of 18 and 60. The highest number of responses 
were elicited by participants whose age is between 18 and 38. Results show that 42.4% are 
participants whose age is in that range, which is expected since most of the internet users in 
Tunisia are described as ―teenagers‖ (Cherif et al. 2017). As for gender, results show that 52.1 % 
were males while 47.9% females. A breakdown of the demographic profile of the participants 
shows that the majority were from Tunis (32%), the capital of Tunisia, followed by Sfax (18%), 
the largest state in the south, then the state of Gabes in Southeastern Tunisia (12%). Additionally, 
only people from 12 states out of 24 participated. In terms of education, 84% of the respondents 
have some university education, a demographic which generally has greater awareness of 
Tamazight than other groups.  
5.2.2 Linguistics Profile of the Survey Respondents 
To gather an overview on the linguistic profile of the respondents, the researcher 
designed three questions in the survey. The first one was on the languages that the participants 
speak. The list from which they had to choose comprised Darija or Ettounsi
8
, which refers to the 
colloquial form of the language used in everyday speech in Tunisia, Modern Standard Arabic 
(MSA), French, English, Italian, German, Spanish, Turkish, and Tamazight. Results show that 
92.6% speak Ettounsi. This is supposed to be the mother tongue of the Tunisians who are born 
and raised in Tunisia. In this the survey the researcher targeted strictly this category of Tunisians, 
and yet a small percentage of 7.8% claim they don‘t speak it.  As for Modern Standard Arabic 
(MSA) which serves the function of being the official language, the language of administration, 
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 Ettounsi is the other name of Tunisian Arabic. The dissertation will only use this label hereafter for the following 
reasons. It is more captive of the multiple linguistic layers forming the vernacular language spoken by Tunisians; it 
is considered a language in its own right and not mere dialect of Arabic based on emerging linguistics studies on 
Arabic and Arabic dialectology (Salameh 2011); and It is the name employed by Darija Association in Tunisia to 




and the language of education in the country, of the respondents in the sample, 62.8% claimed to 
be MSA speakers. The percentage of respondents who reported competence in foreign 
languages, especially French and English, surpasses MSA. Figure 5.1 shows that French is 
spoken by 91.5% of the participants followed by English with 76.6%.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Languages Spoken by the Survey Respondents 
 
The decline of MSA supremacy in favor of French and English can be interpreted in 
many ways (Khalef 2018, Salameh 2011, Sarkis 2010). First, there is growing attitude among the 
youth that French and English are more prestigious, functional, and more likely to guarantee 
jobs. Second, with the proliferation of Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) in the lives 
of most Tunisians, Arabic-language content has failed to keep pace with demand when content in 
English and French has been more accessible. This is applicable to most of the Arabic-speaking 
countries. A study conducted by Northwestern University in Qatar in 2016 found that "despite a 
rapid increase in the number of Arabic-speaking Internet users, Arabic content remains one of 




(Khalaf, 2018). A third and perhaps the most important factor for the decline of MSA is 
attributed to increasingly negative perceptions linked to Islamism (Khalaf 2018, Said 2012, 
Sarkis 2010).  Salem Labyath, a member of the Democratic Party in the Tunisian parliament 
warned against the dissemination of ―an inferior complex among the elites and middle class 
towards Arabic in Tunisia‖ (cf. The Arabic News, February 9, 2018). He demanded that a law be 
enacted to mandate the use of Arabic in federal, local, and private workplaces. This includes 
Arabizing all textbooks at elementary and high schools, all mass media products, all research 
patents, advertisements, business signs, administrative paperwork, and even social media 
communication. He went on to insist on imposing legal penalties on those who violate this law 
(The Arabic News, February 9, 2018).  
Continuous reduction of MSA domains of use to political and religious contexts, which 
are often associated with oppressive and conservative ideologies has augmented the mounting 
aversion towards this language.  The decline in the ability to speak MSA might be also related 
to the widespread reaction against a sign of an enforced ―pan-Arabist‖ identity. This is 
interpretation could find support in the fact that Arabic colloquial vernaculars, not only Ettounsi, 
represent the preferred medium of communication in social media as a sign of local identities 
triumphing over enforced ―pan‖ identities (Abouzahr 2018). In a study by Abandah et al. (2015) 
on Arabic language status in the Jordanian networking and mobile phone communications, some 
of the findings show that Facebook has significant percentages of messages in Arabizi 
(Romanized Arabic) and colloquial Arabic at 8.2% and 67.7% respectively. The same study 
shows that Twitter has a significant use of Arabizi and colloquial Arabic at 7.9% and 50.1% 
respectively (p. 455). In another study by Chelghoum (2015) on the role of Social Network Sites 




the previous one. MSA is found to be seldom used in Facebook chat (9%) whereas dialectal 
Arabic and other foreign languages are the most used language at 49% and 60% (specifically 
English) respectively (p. 41). The study concludes that Arabic dialects dominate mostly online 
Facebook chat among Arabic users. 
It is also important to note that answers to the next two questions on Tamazight speaking 
and writing proficiency were provided by just 89 respondents. The remaining 105 skipped these 
two questions rendering the results problematic at best. This is attributed to the fact that the 
survey was not only targeting participants who speak and write Tamazight, but Tunisians in 
general. Based on the subset of respondents who answered these questions (N=89), details on 
self-reported Tamazight proficiency reveal that the vast majority rate themselves as having no 
competence at all (83%).   
 Ability in writing in Tifinagh also seems limited to just 2.3% of the participants. Those 
who participated in these two questions without necessarily speaking Tamazight, still represent 
the overwhelming majority of 83%. It is important to notice, however, that low skills in writing 
Tifinagh do not reflect anything about the literacy rate of these speakers given that Arabic and 






                                     Figure 5.2: Tifinagh writing skills (N=89)  
 
Most of the Tamazight-speaking participants in this survey originate from Douiret (20%), 
Matmata (20%), and Tamazret (26%) which conforms with the sociolinguistic literature claiming 
that these areas are the main sites to find native Tamazight speakers (Gabsi 2009, Bahri 2015). 
However, it is important to remember that most of the respondents took the survey while residing 
in one of the three big states/cities of the country. Also mentioned in Chapter 2, this was that one 
of the causes for the shift away from Tamazight is the rural to urban migration of its speakers.  
 
 




Accordingly, it is not unexpected to find that Tamazight speaking abilities are low within this 
group. Lack of familial settings and a local speech community where individuals can engage in 
Tamazight use in the cities or states where they migrated to, have contributed to its shift. 
Coulmas (2005) emphasizes that:  
Among the factors determining language shift and maintenance two have attracted 
special attention: (1) the micro-social arena of the family as the agent of spontaneous 
intergeneration language transmission; and (2) the macro-social arena of group settlement 
in a ‗territory‘. The absolute demographic strength of a group means little if its members 
are widely dispersed, providing few social settings for using its language outside the 
family. And if a language ceases to be transmitted domestically the bedrock of its 
continuing tradition is undermined (pp. 161-162).  
 
When asked about the language they use at home and with their family members, over 35 % of 
the respondents reported they use Ettounsi. A mere 1% reported they exclusively use of 
Tamazight. The rest of the respondents, however, reported some form of bilingual behavior 
ranging from the  predominate use of Tamazight (14%) to the predominant use of Ettounsi 









The results show a very low percentage of those who use Tamazight exclusively, which is not 
surprising. It was hard to anticipate finding Tunisian Imazighen who strictly speak Tamazight at 
home and with their family members.  A situation where Tamazight and Ettounsi are used 
alternatively would be more expected. The remaining results could be plausible since Tamazight 
continues to have the lowest numbers in usage even among a sample of respondents who 
identified themselves in previous questions as Tamazight speakers. The low numbers associated 
with Tamazight use and number of speakers reflect to some extent the findings of previous 
sociolinguistic research in which Tamazight speakers were reported to make up no more than 1% 
of the Tunisian population with no monolingual speakers remaining or speakers under twelve-
years old (Gabsi 2009, Hamza 2007).  
At this point, the linguistic profile of the survey participants show that Tunisian 
Tamazight qualifies for what UNESCO‘s Language Vitality and Endangerment framework refers 
to as ―a definitely endangered‖ status (Sallabank 2010) even though it surfaced as a surviving 
spoken language in the responses of some of the participants. In addition to the low skills in 
speaking and writing Tamazight reported in this survey, the results clearly indicate weak 
intergenerational transmission of the language as it is reported to be very limited in use between 
family members and by children.   
Despite the discouraging numbers depicted through the linguistic profiles in this survey, 
the resurgence of an Amazigh discourse on social media since the 2011 Revolution points to 
increasingly positive attitudes towards Tamazight even among the majority community of 
Tunisians who not speak it. Attitudes are key as to whether languages are maintained or 
abandoned. They are also changeable over time and depending on the aspect of the language 




can be on a more deliberate or conscious level of cultural awareness (discursive consciousness), 
while others are unexpressed or part of the practical or structural knowledge (practical 
consciousness). He suggests that the more aware group members are of ideologies, the more 
these can be challenged and contested (Kroskrity 2002). Therefore, the remainder of this section 
will focus on describing the types of attitudes expressed by the survey respondents towards 
Tamazight and the way they view its importance in relation to Tunisian identity.  
5.2.3. Tunisians‟ attitudes towards Tunisian Tamazight  
 The strength of support for a variety of subjective statements about Tamazight amongst 
respondents was measured on a five-point Likert scale from strong agreement with the statement 
to strong disagreement. Response categories included ‗strongly agree‘ or ‗agree to an extent, 
‗neutral,‘ ‗strongly disagree‘ and ‗disagree to an extent as well as the categories of ‗I don‘t care‘ 
or ‗I don‘t know‘. The strength of support for the statement ‗Tamazight is a part of Tunisian 
heritage‘ was unanticipated.  Overall, 53% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement 
with a further 28% who agreed to an extent (just over 80% in total), while 13% were neutral, 






                Figure 5.5: Responses to ‗Tamazight is a part of Tunisian heritage‘ (N=194) 
 
A more revealing interpretation of the attitudes was gained from responses to more 
specific attitudinal items and questions. In the survey, participants were given five more 
statements and questions designed to measure attitudes towards a range of domains in which 
Tamazight language might be used. These attitudinal items measured the respondents‘ views 
about the revitalization of Tamazight, its teaching at school, its suitability for the modern world, 
its relation to Arabic, and its future constitutionalisation. Another group of attitudinal items was 
used to measure the degree to which Tamazight was valued as a symbol of group or ethnic 
identity and further statements were included to measure perceptions of Tamazight language 
based on its internal and structural properties.  
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show responses to statement 2 in the survey ‗The death of Tunisian 








           
Figure 5.6: The death of Tunisian Tamazight       Figure 5.7: Tamazight language revitalization 
                   is unimportant (N=194)                                         is a waste of time (N=194) 
 
Respondents were found to attach higher values to ‗disagree‘ whether strongly or to an extent 
regarding both statements. A total of 88 respondents (45%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
Statement 2 and a total of 116 respondents (60%) disagreed or strongly disagreed with Statement 
3. Those who agreed that Tamazight death or revitalization are unimportant represented less than 
20%. Neutral answers represented less than 10 %. However, there was a gap of about 5% 
between the reaction to second and third statements on the neutrality and limited disagreement. 
Respondents seemed to prefer sharing their opinions about revitalizing Tamazight than 
remaining neutral. These results show that the overwhelming majority of the respondents are 
concerned about Tamazight disappearing and feel that revitalizing the language is important. 
On the socio-economic role of Tamazight in the modern world, attitudes were divided 
almost equally between those who agreed and those who did not. Figure 7.8 gives more details 








Figure 5.8: Tamazight is useless in modern Tunisia (N=194) 
 
Statements calling for a governmental support for Tamazight also received the high positive 
responses as shown in Figure 5.9 and 5.10. These statements are ‗Tamazight should be taught at 
school‘ and ‗Tamazight should be constitutionalized‘.  53% of respondents strongly agreed or 
agreed that Tamazight should be taught in school and 60% that the language should be 
recognized in the constitution. 
        
Figure 5.9: Tamazight should be taught at   Figure 5.10: Tamazight should be  
                   school (N=194)                        constitutionalized (N=194) 
 
 
Analysis of the attitudinal statements shows that there are general tendencies towards embracing 




Tamazight presence in the linguistic and cultural scene in the country. High support of 
Tamazight language was accompanied by a robust awareness of ‗Tamazight‘ historical, cultural, 
and linguistic influences on Tunisian identity. This was reflected through questions on 
respondents‘ perceptions of Tamazight linguistic and cultural characteristics. The question asks if 
Tunisian Tamazight is a dialect of Arabic or a different language. The answers choices also 
included the option ―I don‘t know‖.  Over 51% disagreed that Tamazight is a dialect of Arabic 
which challenges the pan-Arabist ideology (discussed in Chapter 2). Quite a high percentage of 
the respondents (more than 38%) were not sure whether Tamazight is a dialect of Arabic or not. 
Nonetheless, only a small percentage   strongly agreed that it is a dialect of Arabic (2%) whereas 
9% agreed to some degree.  
Most respondents disagreed with the statements ‗Tamazight is an ugly language‘ or 
‗Tamazight is a poor language‘. A large percentage of the respondents (almost 50% for each 
statement) do not harbor prejudiced assumptions about Tamazight even though the percentage of 
those who claimed they do not know the language was quite high (over 33% for each statement). 
Those who had strong negative perceptions of the language continued to represent very tiny 
minorities (2% or less). An examination of responses to questions used to assess the degree of 
awareness and knowledge of Tamazight linguistic, cultural, and linguistic aspects in the third 
section of the survey confirmed the generally positive tendencies and attitudes among the 
respondents.  
5.2.4 A growing awareness of Tamazight  influence in Tunisian identity 
Despite the lower participation rate in this section (N=96), probably due to the open-ended type 
of questions, responses demonstrated an increase in awareness of the Tamazight influences on 









Example 3: ―Do you know of any Tamazight word in Tunisian dialect?‖ (N=52) 
 
A total of 52 respondents provided an answer to this open-ended question which is a promising 
number. One of the interviewees in this study clearly expressed this idea which will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6 of this study: 
Excerpt 1: Takfirinas, interview, April 2, 2016 
―…the Tunisian dialect uses many Berber words. Many Tunisians do not even 
know that the words they use are Berber. It is only taught within families that still 
speak the language today. The priority now is to teach the language and the 
culture‖ (Takfirinas, interview, April 2, 2016). 
 
Most of the examples given above refer to body parts vocabulary, domestic animals and 
insects, traditional outfits, and food.  This is consistent with previous research (Sayahi 2014 and 
Bahri, to appear) finding Tamazight substratum in the spoken variety in Tunisia (hereafter 
Ettounsi) is mostly limited to semantic fields of farming, agriculture, animals, insects, and body 
language. The data, however, show terms that are attributed to Tamazight etymology when they 
1.moustache, butterfly, turtle, sister-in-law, 
pimples disease 
2. Turtle 
3. Shelha [referring to another common,yet 
derogatory name of Tamazight in Tunisia] 
4. Turtle, baby, foggy, qashabia [a long cloak 
with a hood], burnous [a long cloak of coarse 
woollen fabric with a hood]  
5. neck, neck, sheep 
6. a lot 
7. dry, shell, [pastry], dumb, clay small heater, 
[unclear], [unclear], backbone 
8. spoon 




are essentially Arabic. The term ―barsha‖ ‗a lot‘ is a significant marker of Tunisian identity and 
probably the most salient lexical term in Ettounsi. Interestingly, Tunisians often attribute it to 
unknown origins or to Tamazight but rarely to Arabic. Throughout the responses to his questions, 
several non-Tamazight terms were assigned a Tamazight etymology. This can be interpreted in 
two ways. First, it reveals how little Tunisians know about Tamazight language, which is 
conceivable, given that the majority used to think that the language is extinct.  A different 
interpretation presumes that most of the respondents think that any word that doesn‘t not sound 
Arabic or French must be Tamazight. This obviously erases several other linguistic layers in the 
make-up of Ettounsi language as Turkish, Spanish, or French with some phonological changes.  
This behavior is often observed among Imazighen, in specific, through Facebook or other media 
outlets. In an article entitled ―hundreds of Berber words in Tunisian Darija‖ published by a 
Tamazight activist, Hajer Berbana, on Essbah Newspaper on April 7, 2014. She included a long 
list of words that she attributed etymologically to Tamazight.  Although Hajer‘s work continue to 
contribute tremendously to raising awareness of the Tamazight element in Ettounsi, some of the 
terms she cited and that many Tunisian Imazighen shared on their Facebook do not necessarily 
have Tamazight origins.  
Responses shown in Example 4 include respondents‘ examples of Tunisian cultural 
customs that are originally Tamazight. A total of 44 responses to this question was impressive 
given that every Tunisian cultural custom, ritual, and behavior was thought to be originally 
Arabic by most Tunisians. This idea was expressed further through Facebook data that will be 






Example 4: Do you know of any Tunisian cultural customs that are originally Tamazight?  
(N= 44) 
 
Figure 5.11 shows an example of a thread from Dyhia‘s page in which the commentators 
sarcastically discuss the attribution of the label ―Arabic‖ to several cultural practices even when 
these practices occur in Amazigh places, regions, or cities. Dyhia blames the media for feeding 









Dihya: An Arabic evening and Arabic gathering at the ancestors‘ house in Gafsa (referring to the 
Amazigh ancestors), and yet media insist on misleading the people buffff 
(paralinguistic/metapragmatic expression of frustration and disapproval) 
 
Commenter 1: Not only the gathering is Arabic, the air and sky too LOOOL Thanks, enjoy your 
days! 
Commenter 2: I am sure you mean a traditional gathering 
 
 
Example 5 also represents an excerpt of the answers to the question ‗name examples of Amazigh 
historical figures‘. There were 44 responses to the question, which was also more than expected 
given that most Tunisians do not know much about these figures because Amazigh history is 





Example 5: Name examples of Amazigh historical figures? (N= 44) 
Even if these names were familiar to a few, they would usually be mistaken for being 
Phoenicians rather than Imazighen. This was confirmed in the interview with Yughurtha: 
Excerpt 2: Yughurtha, Interview, March 11, 2016 
―For most Tunisians, everything came from the East. There was no civilization before the 
coming of Elissar
9
. And you know what, they even take pride in what this woman did 
even though she was a mythical character. The story of establishing Carthage was all 




 do not matter for them; 
they are not even known simply because they were Imazighen. [Sarcastically] After all 
why would Tunisians be interested to know about people whose leader could easily be 
deceived by Elissa bull‘s skin trick (referring to the legend of establishing 
Carthage
12
)…This is all to index that Imazighen are stupid people‖ (Yughurtha, 
                                                 
9
 Elissar, Elissa or Dido (Elishat, in Phoenician) was a princess of Tyre. According to ancient Greek and Roman 
legends, she is the founder and first queen of Carthage.  
 
10
 Kusaila (Amazigh:, Aksil or Aksel, Latin: Caecilius, Arabic: Kusaila[1]) was a 7th-century Amazigh Christian 
king of the kingdom of Altava and leader of the Awraba tribe of the Imazighen and possibly Christian King of the 
Sanhadja confederation. He is known for organizing an effective Amazigh military resistance against the Muslim 
invasion of the Maghreb in the 680s. His name means "leopard" in the Amazigh language. Kusaila died in the year 
690 AD fighting Muslim invaders (Wikipedia 2018)  
 
11
   Yugurta or Yugurten (c. 160 – 104 BC) was a king of Numidia, born in Cirta (modern-day Constantine). He is 
mostly known for the Jugurthine War (112–106 BC) against Rome (Wikipedia 2018).  
 
12
 The legend says that Dido (aka Elissa, from Elisha, or Alashiya, her Phoenician name) was a legendary Queen of 
Tyre City in Phoenicia and daughter of the Tyrian king Mutto.  Dido's brother, Pygmalion, killed Dido's wealthy 
husband Sychaeus. Dido, knowing how dangerous Tyre was with her brother still alive, took her husband‘s treasure, 
fled, and wound up in Carthage, in what is now modern Tunisia. Dido bartered with the locals [referring to the 
Amazigh people], offering a substantial amount of wealth in exchange for what she could contain within the skin of 
a bull. When they agreed to what seemed an exchange greatly to their advantage, Dido showed how clever she really 
was. She cut the hide into strips and laid it out in a semi-circle around a strategically placed hill with the sea forming 
the other side. Dido then ruled Carthage as queen (by Mark Cartwright published on 29 June 2016 on Ancient 




Interview, March 11, 2016) 
 
This preliminary analysis of the survey data demonstrates highly positive attitudes among 
a considerable number of the respondents. This is further illustrated through the answers to the 
last open-ended question in the survey in which respondents were given space to justify their 
choices and explain why or why not Tamazight is important in the context of Tunisia in 
Examples 6-10.  Answers were given in different scripts and languages, but those written in 
Arabic or French are translated.  Overall findings from the comments show that the majority of 
the respondents have positive attitudes and strong identification with the Tamazight historical, 
cultural, and ethnic component of the make-up of their identity. They more often associate 
Tamazight to notions of belonging, Indigeneity, and pride. Interestingly, some self-identified 
Arabs also show support for Tamazight as a vital element of a pluralistic Tunisian identity. Little, 
however, if anything is stated explicitly about the linguistic aspect of it. Respondents do 
elaborate on the importance of documenting or teaching Tamazight, but did not express 
unequivocal interests to learn the language. While absence of similar comments may trigger 
concerns about intentions of confining Tamazight to symbolic and indexical, and folkloric 
functions, it is still too early to jump to that judgment.   







Tamazight civilization is a very ancient civilization in North African and Tunisia, 
which implies that its language is ancient too and it plays a crucial role in the 
making of people‘s identity and culture. Tunisian Tamazight history is miserable. 
In the course of the French colonization, French invaders tried to erase everything 
that is not French or European. Then, there was the independence period during 
which the modern state-nation banned any idea that would oppose the ideas of 
nationalism or the ruling dictator.  Therefore, Tunisian Tamazight was under 
threat.  As for now, after the revolution and all the gains of free speech, we 
reappeared in the arena. It is true that we are still a minority, but the situation is 
better than before. Now, we can find new clubs interested in Tamazight culture. 
Tamazight is a civilization as many others. I believe that each civilization has its 
distinct language and culture, which means that Tamazight and Arabic have 
different languages and civilizations. It will never be possible for us to make 
progress in Tunisia as long as we have an identity crisis. So many teens identify 
themselves as purely Arab when their last names is, [for instance], Masmoudi in 
affiliation to the Amazigh tribe of Masmouda or Sanhaji in affiliation to the 
Amazigh tribe of Sanhaja. Therefore, it is important to constitutionalize 
Tamazight to protect Tunisian Imazighen‘s rights, or at least as tribute to a 
historical civilization that existed in Tunisia. 
 




So that we don‘t forget who we are. Because what unites individuals to their 
homelands is love and what distinguishes us of the rest of the people in the world 
is our culture and history. Accordingly, we construct a progressive society that 
can go forward with its history. Even Marx spoke about the importance of history 
and the autochthones. People cannot found advanced nations without going back 
to history. As an Arab, despite our differences with other Arabic nations, it would 
be a crime against history and identity [to efface the Amazigh element]. 
Moreover, the false Arabic identity that the entire society is ascribed has even 
created diplomatic problems for us with the rest of the world, such as with Israel. 
First, we are ‗by nature‘ people [referring to Tunisian in general]   who are open 
to dialogue with all civilizations and we [Tunisian Arabs] want to make peace in 











Tamazight is a key component of the Tunisian identity. It is the people‘s culture. 
It is rich in material and immaterial cultural heritage. It must be revived and 
constitutionalized in order to enrich the cultural and linguistic diversity in Tunisia.  
 
 











5.2.5. Section one conclusive remarks 
Although no comparative surveys were carried out before the revolution, the little 




interviews and Facebook data that will be used in this study, both show that attitudes were very 
much negative prior to 2011 including among speakers of the language. ‗Why are you 
researching our language? It is even ugly‘ commented one of Gabsi‘s research informants 
(2007). The shift in attitudes towards Tunisian Tamazight has been achieved largely due to the 
post-revolution leadership of various activists, individuals and associations, and to the growth of 
various cultural activities. However, the surge of Amazigh Facebook discourse, focused most of 
the time on constructing and reproducing language ideologies that both challenge and counteract 
erasure could arguably be viewed as the most effective mechanism in raising Tunisians‘ 
awareness of the Tamazight element in their identity. Facebook discourse reflects a strong desire 
among Imazighen to maintain and revitalize Tamazight. Drawing on the framework of Irvine and 
Gal‘s (2000) three semiotic processes, iconization, fractal recursivity and erasure, along with 
tactics of intersubjectivity model proposed by Bucholtz and Hall (2005), the second section of 
this Chapter and Chapter 6 will be devoted to examining how these processes are challenged and 
reproduced to construct and re-construct Tunisian Tamazight language and identity. 
5.3 Section Two:  Facebook platform for indigenous identity display 
The focus of this second section will be mainly on discussing Facebook indigenization as 
a discursive practice. According to Agha (2007), meaning is not communicated through spoken 
and written language only, but also through metapragmatic activities in which communicative 
signs are used to typify other perceivable signs (p. 16). This implies that metapragmatic practices 
are semiotic and linguistic acts illustrating the attributes of the language, its users, and activities 
accomplished through its use (Staehr 2015, p. 93). Such acts can be explicit and implicit 






 in this study and the performance of these meanings are achieved in many 
cases through entextualization, mobilized very often in the processes of de-contextualization and 
re-contextualization. Drawing on the work of many anthropologists such as Bauman & Briggs 
(1996), Silverstein & Urban (1996), and Blommaert (2005), Reyes & Wortham define 
entextualization as a discourse practice where signs accompanying a given speech event become 
stable, have established a context, and pre-supposedly trigger some kind of social action. Reyes 
and Wortham (2015) cite the example of the signs that accompany the term ‗dude‘ studied by 
Kiesling (2004) such as those of ‗relaxed, carefree, and confident young male‘ (p. 5).  Leppänen 
et al. (2013) describe entextualization as a discourse practice that allows the re-use and recycling 
of language and textual materials of a given context as resources in meaning making. 
Entextualization highlights two processes: de-contextualization, by taking discourse material out 
of its context, and re-contextualization by taking discourse material out of its context- and a re-
contextualizing it by integrating and modifying this material so that it fits in new context 
(Leppänen et al. 2013,  Georgalou,  2017).  Amazigh users of Facebook employ a range of 
contextualization cues and semiotic resources to highlight their indigeneity, and many of these 
resources are iconic by nature; that is, they are semiotic resources which iconically mime or 
reproduce speech (Staehr 2015).  
5.3.1 Amazighicizing Facebook profiles   
 
Following the Facebook pages of Tunisian Imazighen from 2016-2018, I quickly 
gathered the impression that the users are fixated at overly ‗amazighicizing‘ their pages to be 
identified as Imazighen. To accomplish this goal effectively, they engage themselves in an 
exaggerated yet crucial task of performativity as indigenous Imazighen of Tunisia. They deploy 
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different modalities through the mediation of various semiotic resources along with re-
contextualization of different social, cultural, and linguistic practices (van Leeuwen and Wodak 
1999). A point of departure in this study focuses specifically on the semiotic combinations and 
organization of the profile pages, background, and personal pictures and what semiotic resources 
are deployed to project the work of self-indigenization. The figures below are examples of 
background and personal profile pictures from the Facebook pages of Firmus, Dihya, Aksil, 




Figure 5.12: Firmus_Linguistic_image 5 
Firmus‘ profile background picture 
 
In Firmus‘ profile picture (Figure 30), the Tunisian flag takes the shape of the Tifinagh 
grapheme Yaz ⵣ, usually pronounced as /z/. This letter originally presents the sign found in the 
middle of the Amazigh flag to symbolize human yearning for freedom, with his arms wide open 
and lifted skyward. Here. Firmus engages in an entextualization activity while adopting a 
decontextulization process. He uses a linguistic sign that indexes Tamazight identity and 
relocates it in a way that is now representing Tunisian identity as a whole. By relocating the Yaz 
sign from an Amazigh discourse to a Tunisian one, Firmus has allowed himself to change the 
initial meaning of Yaz and create a new one.  In doing so, such an iconic detail gains significance 




discursive relationship to the Tunisian national flag. By re-contextualizing the semiotic meaning 
embedded in Yaz, Firmus has used three discursive processes: substitution, legitimation, and 
simplification (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). The original symbolic meanings of Yaz are now 
substituted, reformulated and re-narrated to fit into the discursive intention of Firmus, and that is 
to assert that all Tunisia is Amazigh. In doing so, Firmus gave himself ―personal authority‖ (van 
Leeuwen and Wodak 1999) to take over the symbolic interpretations of the Tifinagh character 
and present them in a new way that simultaneously renders it a symbol of the entire nation. By 
limiting Tunisian identity to its Amazigh aspect through this multimodal reframing, in line with 
the indigenization objectives of Firmus, several other aspects and voices are subdued or silenced, 
such of those Tunisians who have Arab and Turkish or French ancestors. Linell (1998) argues 
that through the selection and re-embedding practices of re-contextualization… [communicators] 
have many opportunities to select, endorse, and/or re-perspectivize suitable parts and aspects, 
edit these parts in new ways and combinations, subdue or silence voices that have been heard 
earlier, or could have been heard at various stages.  
The multi-modal discursive practices of Firmus found on his Facebook background 
profile are commonly noticeable among many other participants in this study. Dihya‘s 
background profile shows the Amazigh flag superimposed on the map of Tunisia bordered by 
statues and busts depicting Amazigh historical figures, two old women imagined to be Tamazight 
for their tattoos, and the name of Tunisia in Tamazight -Tines-, written in Latin and Tifinagh 
orthography.  Dihya not only claims her Tunisian Amazigh identity through her background 
profile, but also in her cover photo as seen of the left side of Figure 5.13 where the Amazigh flag 





Figure 5.13: Dihya_cultural_image16 
Dihya‘s background and personal profile pictures 
 
In designing her background and personal profile picture Dihya performs the labor of 
indigenization that can also be understood within the rubric of re-contextualization. Dihya 
understands Tunisian identity as entirely Amazigh. In making this meaning, she takes up a multi-
semiotic combination (Georgalou 2017) that encompasses both the verbal and the visual to edit 
and reframe Tunisian identity while enhancing its Amazigh component to the exclusion of other 
components. Dihya‘s multilingual writing skills (Arabic, Tifinagh, and Latin scripts) and 
layering of images of Amazigh historical figures, the Amazigh flag, and signs in one multi-
semiotically complex product constitute an essentialist perspective which views history, 
language, and ancestry as sufficient to attribute one unified indigenous identity. For Dihya the 
use of the Tamazight word for Tunisia ―Tines‖ [tines] instead of ―Tunis‖ [tunis] as it is 
pronounced in Arabic or Ettounsi indicates Tunisia‘s connection to its Amazigh roots.  
Dihya underscores the value of this word being etymologically derived from Tamazight
14
. 
She even uses this word as a name of her Facebook profiles. ―Tines‖ has become a performative 
                                                 
14
 While there is an agreement on the proto-Semitic origin of the word ‗Tunis‖, The etymology of the word ―Tunis‖ 
remains a controversy between many theories. Some work relates it to ‗Thanet‘ which is the name of an isle in the 
easternmost of Kent. According to Green (2015), The usual explanation of this name is that it derives from one of 
two well-known Celtic roots, either *tan-, 'fire', or *tann-, 'oak', so that it would mean 'fire island, place of fire'. 




term in the sense that it is not a mere name of a profile derived from Tamazight, but also a term 
that aims to bring a change in the Tunisians‘ perceptions of Amazigh heritage when they learn 
that the name of their country is originally Amazigh. ―Tines‖ -in Dihya‘s profile- functions as an 
index of Amazigh linguistic and cultural heritage and a discourse that is designed to awaken 
Tunisians‘ awareness of their indigenous roots. As such, Dihya‘s personal indigenous linguistic 
and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984) are fundamental to the process of her self-identity 
construction as Amazigh and to the authentication process of her proclaimed identity.  On the 
other hand, it functions as a way of celebrating Tamazight language and culture, and as means to 
experience the world.  
The making of the indigenous meanings through the choice of the Tamazight variant 
‗Tines‖ and celebration of this linguistic form is further elaborated in a meta-commentary by 
Aksil during my interview with him. As shown in the excerpt below, he explicitly entextualizes 
this understanding of the term ―Tines‖ by relocating it in his discourse as a tool of sensing the 





                                                                                                                                                             
Theo Vennemann (2006) argues at length that an acceptable and plausible root for the original British form of the 
name Thanet—*Tanitā, *Tanetā or *Tanetos/is actually available in the Punic language via a name 'Y TNT, meaning 
the 'Isle (of) Tanit', the chief goddess of the great, ancient Phoenician mercantile power of Carthage. Based on 
Wikipedia (2018), Tanit was adopted by Amazigh people who also called it Tannou or Tangou. In modern-day 
Ettounsi, Tangou becomes part of a custom called Ommek tannou or Omek Tangou (‗Mother Tannou‘ or ‗Mother 
Tangou‘) to bring rain in years of drought. In many Tamazight varieties spoken in Libya, Tines or Tinest is the word 
for ‗key‘. This detail might provide additional support for Chapter 2 statement that Tunisian Tamazight, especially 
the one sopken in Zrawa village is closer to Nafusa Mountain in Libya from the vartieties spoken in Morocco or 






Excerpt 3: Aksil interview, June 6, 2016 
 
 
Tines in Tamazight means key. Do you know why Tunis is derived from the 
Tamazight Tines?  It is because when you look at the map, you will notice that 
Tunisia is the first point to spot on the map. It sorts of opens the African map… 
(laughter in excitement) did you see that?! (Aksil interview, June 6, 2016).  
 
 
In his statement, Aksil perceives a ―natural ―relationship between the shape of the Tunisian map- 
which resembles a key- and the etymology of the term ‗tunis‘, which is tines in Tamazight ‗key‘. 
His goal is to highlight an imaginary ‗unique‘ property of Tamazight language. This is not an 
uncommon practice among the participants in this study. Tamazight is even imagined to be the 
‗substratum‘ of all natural languages. The post below from Gildo‘s wall illustrates this idea. 
 
Figure 5.14: Gildo_Linguistic_sm21 
Tamazight is a language substratum of all the natural languages 
 
Tamazight language is a secret linguistic code called a Linguistic substratum that 
exists at the center of human languages. There is no doubt about that. In fact, it is 
impossible to comprehend the secret of the natural languages without a deep 
understanding of the proto-Tamazight system. 
 
 
Gildo‘s statement makes a good example of a language myths approach defined as 
‗attitudes and beliefs…about the language of the community as well as other languages and 




Ferguson 1968). Tamazight linguistic myth of being the substratum of all languages is clearly 
established in face of the linguistic myths of ―the superiority of Arabic‖ which is a well-known 
language attitude among Arabs.  Ferguson (1968: 375) discusses three areas of language 
superiority which frame Arabic language attitudes: the aesthetic (Arabs ‘belief that their poetry is 
the most beautiful), the linguistic (Arabs‘ belief that their language has the vastest vocabulary), 
and the religious (Arabs‘ belief that by being the language of Quran, there must be something 
unique about Arabic) (cf. Eisele 2003). Being familiar with all these types of attitudes towards 
Arabic, Gildo‘s statement seems to be offered as a ‗counter-myth‘.  It could simply be viewed as 
a strategy to debunk Arabic superiority myth by establishing the mythical narrative of Tamazight 
being the foundation and/or the base of the world languages.  
 
Figure 5.15: Aksil_Linguistic_image 5 
Aksil‘s Facebook background and personal profile pictures 
 
Like Dihya, Aksil‘s profile page is multi-semiotic complex display combining visual and 
linguistic signs to foreground, enhance, and affirm his indigenous Amazigh roots.  His 
background picture features the Amazigh flag and his proper name written in both Latin and 
Tifinagh characters (Only the Tifinagh writing is kept visible in Figure 5.15 above). His profile 




the Amazigh flag, the Tifinagh Yaz character in red, the three stripes of the Amazigh flag, blue-
green-yellow, and a sentence in Tamazight Roman script, ‗Tamazight tella, tella‘ meaning ‗live 
long Tamazight‘. Each of these modes is selected to carry specific information about Axil‘s 
identity. In other words, he is making knowledge about himself and he is making knowledge for 
others. Using Tifinagh tells us he knows that Tamazight has a writing system and that he can use 
it. The full Tamazight phrase suggests that he can also speak the language.  
The repeated use of the three colors as a frame of his personal background picture, and in 
the flag he is holding, tells us that he knows the symbolism embedded in these colors and that he 
exclusively identifies himself with it. Looking at these modes as one ensemble (Kress 2011), at 
least two meanings are conveyed. First, these modes are viewed equally in their capacity to 
shape the meaning of Indigeneity (Kress 2011). Second, Aksil doesn‘t only proclaim himself an 
indigenous Amazigh, but also owns the linguistic and cultural capital to verify that. Aksil uses 
the linguistic and cultural capital as a means of distinction that helps enhance and foreground his 
Amazigheity. In his deliberately crafted indigenous and Amazigh profile, Aksil‘s repertoire of 
identity (Kroskrity 1999) excludes any link that does not assert a unified, pure, unadulterated 
Amazigh identity. Aksil‘s ―doing‖ (DeFina 2014) of an essentialized Amazigh identity is not 
limited to his background and cover pictures, but extends to the self-information section that 
Facebook affords to present one‘s identity categories such as work place, school, place of 





Figure 5.16: Axil_cultrual_st2 
Axil‘s Facebook Intro  
 
 
In this section, Aksil describes himself as an employee at a job or a company called ‗Imazighen‘.  
Like Firmus, he is involved in an entextualization activity, relocating the name of an ethnicity, 
mainly the plural form of it, to become a name of a job or place where he works. This might be 
interpreted in association to being a full time activist working for the indigenous rights of 
Imazighen. Similar practice is also illustrated in the introductory section of Yughurtha in Figure 
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Figure 5.17: Yughurtha_historical_st3 
Yughurtha‘s Facebook Intro  
 
Yughurtha decontextualizes a lexical term used to describe army titles at the present and 
places it into an ancient Amazigh history context to characterize his work identity. This example 
shows how present day occupations are entextualized in the past to not only perform a 
community membership, but also to indigenize them by highlighting the very distant past they 
belong to. Through the process of entextualization, Yughurtha actively engages in the social 
management of decontextualizing and recontextualizing linguistic and discursive elements 
(Bauman & Briggs, 1990, p. 74). He also takes control over the use of linguistic resources and 
their intended meanings and ideologies (Bauman &Briggs, 1990, p.76). Yughurtha likes to focus 
his Facebook postings on history. In other words, he always tends to create associations between 
himself and /or Amazigh people and the past. By linking Amazigh identity to an ancient past, he 
puts forward the idea that Amazigh culture is primordial and thus has a greater claim to the land 
and to self-rule than other groups that came later such as the Arabs. This is an example of what 
Bucholtz and Hall (2005) call legitimation, the process through which the historical material 
imposes or affirms Amazigh identity. This can also be seen through the semiotic elements of his 




The picture is an old photograph featuring a group of Amazigh men fighting cold weather 
while crossing desert mountains with heavily laden donkeys. The picture reflects what it seems 
to be a forced migration or displacement.  
 
Figure 5.18: Yughurtha_historical_image 6 
Yughurtha‘s Facebook background picture 
 
This discursive choice could be interpreted in two ways: first, it could be a challenge to 
the absence of Imazighen in history books and historical discourse (see Chapter 2). Second, by 
engaging in historicizing activities, Yughurtha is establishing assertions to authenticity and 
power (more discussion on this discursive practice through historical materials will follow in 
Chapter 6).  Jenkins (2002) states that in discourse management, the past can be reshaped, 
discovered, rediscovered, remembered, forgotten and invented by virtue of temporal framing 
processes. To further accentuate his Amazigh identity, Yughurtha also uses Tifinagh to write his 
name, which is also the name of his page. The use of Tifinagh is part of a discursive pattern of 
Facebook micro-level activities that accounts for how almost all the participants in this study use 
this linguistic resource semiotically to index Indigeneity and authenticity. Another script that 
indexes Tamazight is found on Tunisian Imazighen Facebook pages is Roman. This can be seen 




consisting of Tamazight spelling of his name in Latin script, his name spelled in French (blurred 
for ethical reasons), and a contemporary photograph of the Amazigh village of Zrawa. His cover 
photo features him holding the Amazigh flag with a landscape of the same village. When I talked 
to Gildo during his interview in 2016, he claimed that he knows how to write Tamazight in 
Tifinagh very well. His claim was supported by almost all the interviewees in this study. They all 
referred me to him when I asked about who would know Tifinagh best among Tunisian Amazigh 
community. Gildo does not include Tifinagh on his Facebook profile page. Further data form his 
page where he writes in Tifinagh will be analyzed in Chapter 6. At this level of analysis, 
however, Gildo distinguishes himself from the rest of the participants by using Latin script rather 
than Arabic. Through this linguistic and semiotic resource, he characterizes himself as an 
original Amazigh. He presents himself not only as a fluent speaker of Tamazight, but also as 
someone who has mastered its pronunciation and sound system, using a Latin phonetic 
orthography to write it.  
 
Figure 5.19: Gildo_cultrual_image4 
Gildo‘s Facebook profile pictures 
 
Although the linguistic/semiotic cues that Gildo deploys could have been sufficient as 




in the background has specific resonance in terms of identity claims. They serve as a 
performative exercise of identity and belonging. Following Scollon and Scollon (2003), 
Georgalou (2017) suggests that our bodies give and give off their meanings because of where 
they are and what they do in place. In the same line of reasoning, Jaworski and Thurlow (2009a) 
argue that this type of photographic posing constitutes a kind of placement action which 
indicates and locates the self. In picturing, himself in the village of Zrawa one of the most 
conservative villages in terms of Tamazight language and culture, Gildo constructs himself not 
only as an Amazigh, but perhaps the most indigenous as anyone could be.  
5.3.2 The letter Yaz : an iconic function in Tamazight language and identity  
 
The creation and reconstruction of an Amazigh identity on Facebook is not just a matter 
of ―being‖ but it is an ongoing ―doing‖ (DeFina 2011) that requires cultural capital, very often 
the linguistic capital as well, and access to constitutive discursive elements of Amazigheity.  
Building on this argument, Hall (2000) views identity as a process (identification) rather than as 
an attribute or a series of attributes, and that focusing on the process allows for a consideration of 
the concrete ways in which people will assume identities, attribute to each other membership in 
various categories or resist such attributions. In other words, they point to ‗constructing 
identities‘ as a kind of ongoing social and ‗discursive work‘ (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1970). 
Therefore, in addition to background profiles, cover photos, or introduction sections, Tunisian 
Imazighen‘s multimodal and discursive identity work continues persistently through the rest of 
Facebook‘s affordances. For example, on the left side of the timeline profile layout, 
performances of Amazigheity continue through the display of a network with friends who also 




Amazigh matters. Figure 5.20 and 5.21 below are examples from Yuba‘s and Teziri‘s Facebook 
timeline profiles.  
 
 
                                                      Figure 5.20: Yuba_Linguuistic_image 7 





                                               Figure 5.21: Teziri_Cultural_image8 
                                                      Teziri‘s left-side timeline profile  
 
Teziri‘s and Yuba‘s profiles show numerous postings featuring the Tifinagh character Yaz or Z.  
Figure 5.20 and 5.21 show that Yaz functions as a signified semiotic device of the Amazigh 
identity through women‘s tattoos, wall paintings, emblems, and logos. Several discursive values 
and meanings associated with being Amazigh are invested in this linguistic phenomenon, which 
over time, was believed to be an icon of nobility and freedom. As scholars such as Agha (2007, 




the linguistic components with which they co-occur‖. Besides, and as discussed earlier, the 
Tifinagh character for Yaz is also interpreted as an embodiment of a man with open legs and 
arms symbolizing freedom and dignity or nobility.  This speaks to ―the role of the body in 
discursive construction of identity‖ discussed by Zimman and Hall (2009: p. 22). Hence, the 
linguistic feature Yaz is one of the components of a larger embodied semiotic system of identity 
negotiation in that it is combined with other material products. Eckert (2005, p. 24) calls this 
practice bricolage. With bricolage individuals can combine semiotic variables in unique 
configurations associated with various persona types (Davis 2013: 106). Drawing on the same 
research of Davis (2013) following Silverstein (2005), a major element of emblematic identity 
displays is in the wearing, holding, using, and showing a given identity quality.  
It is important to realize that the key identity-relevant attributes of such cultural 
texts are not necessarily anything like represented ―content‖ as such, but rather all 
the verbal and nonverbal signs that, displayed by and around the self, in effect 
wrap social personae, social spaces, moments in social-organizational time, even 
institutional forms, with ―in-group‖ (versus ―out-group,‖ of course) status. Such 
occasions of display are performative; in and by wearing, singing, saying, eating 
such-and-such, an identifying quality of person, place, event, etc. comes into 
being—here and now—in a framework of categorization that is now made 
relevant to whatever is going on or can go on. (Silverstein, 2003, p. 538) 
 






Figure 5.22: Massinissa_Linguistics_thread19 
Massinissa‘s comment on Yaz letter  
 
 
Commenter 1: Does it mean that Z is used excessively in Tamazight?  May I 
seize this opportunity to ask you about the meaning of the word Yedder as well?  
Massinissa: Good morning (in Tamazight), good morning (in Arabic), thank you 
for your interest. This shows well your strong attachment to your Tunisian 
Tamazight identity. The letter Z or YAZ in Tamazight is the core of the language 
because it represents the identity. It is the embodiment of a free man.  
 
 
In this thread, Massinissa first posts a list of 15 Tamazight words containing the letter Z written 
in Roman script. To make emphasis on the importance of the Yaz grapheme, he employs 
typographical devices such as capitalization. Such a typography is used to express Massinissa‘s 
desire to call attention to or enregister this letter as iconic of the language. Capitalization in this 




towards the iconic function of Yaz in Tamazight language. This is better illustrated in the 
translation of the comments thread in Figure 5.22.  
In his reply, Massinissa clearly articulates how Yaz has become mobilized as an icon that 
embodies the essence of Imazighen‘s free and noble character. Massinissa‘s linguistic and 
metalinguistic comment align with Irvine and Gal‘s (2000) model of the notions of iconization 
referring to ‗linguistic phenomena, that are portrayed as if they flowed ‗naturally‘ from a social 
group‘s biological or cultural essence. This is realized through ‗the attribution of cause and 
immediate necessity to a connection [. . .] that may be only historical, contingent, or 
conventional‘ (Irvine and Gal 2000: 37). Through iconization, not only are different individuals 
essentialized as a more or less homogenous social group on the basis of allegedly shared 
linguistic features, but an apparently ‗natural‘ opposition is also created between that social 
group and other groups that are not perceived to give evidence of the same (linguistic) 
characteristics (Milani 2016).   
In this respect, Tunisian Imazighen‘s approach to their language and identity seem to be 
very close to the language ideological approach which argues that beliefs and assumptions about 
language are related to how the speakers perceive themselves. This belief system manifests itself 
through the discourses that create indexical links between: (1) perceived or presumed features, 
genres, styles or varieties of language and (2) broader images of their purported speakers in 
terms of nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, aesthetics, morality and so forth (Woolard 
1998). More analysis of Tunisian Imazighen‘s ideological work while bearing in mind the 
semiotic processes of iconization, fractal recursivity, and erasure as mechanisms and discursive 





5.3.3. Amazigh ethnic identity and Tunisian nationhood: Herderian relation 
As Tamazight language becomes increasingly indexical, a Herderian ideology gets 
reinforced to a point where the language becomes the essence of Imazighen‘s national (or ethnic) 
identity. In this way, the best and highest use of Tamazight in the expression of an authentic 
national culture lies in recuperating the language as the only language indexing Tunisian ethnic 
and national identity while denying ―the legitimacy of multiple voices and multiples languages in 
public discourse‖ (Bauman and Briggs, 2003, p.194).    In figure 5.23, Aksil and one of his page 
followers assert sharply that Tunisian nationality is strongly dependent on its Amazigh ethnic 
identity.  Aksil opts for a multimodal approach through which he orchestrates two modes of 
meaning: the visual and the textual. By placing his comment in a central position between 
Tunisian flag on top, a symbol of nationhood, and the Amazigh flag in the bottom, a symbol of 
ethnic belonging and primordiality, he engages himself in a process of naturalization of the link 
between his ethnic identity and national identity. Disagreement with such an ethnic conception 
and understanding of La patrie (Calhoun 1993) is deemed by both, Aksil and his follower, as 
treason of Tunisia and betrayal of the Amazigh ancestors. A true Tunisian is someone who 





Figure 5.23: Aksil_cultural_comment3 
Aksil‘s assertion of natural link between Amazigh Ethnicity and nationhood 
 
Commenter: Tunisia is ethnically, territorially, and linguistically Amazigh 
 
Aksil: I [generic form of the first personal pronoun] am Tunisian North African by homeland, 
Amazigh by identity and belonging, also geographically, historically, and culturally. He who 




Emphasis on the ethnic rather than the political criteria in the construction of the Tunisian 
nationhood is clearly articulated in figure 5.24. Takfirinas interprets ethnicity and  nationalism as 
synonyms. This becomes clear when he calls Tunisia an Amazigh nation. In displaying Amazigh 
flag all over the Tunisian map, he seeks to show that Tunisia is essentially Amazigh not Arab, 





Figure 5.24: Takfirinas_Ethnicity_st13 
Tunisia is an Amazigh nation 
 
 
Tunisia is a civic nation. It is also an Amazigh nation 
that belongs to North Africa. It is not Arab.  
 
Since language plays a key role in ethic (or ―naturalizing‖) versions of nationalism 
(Anderson 1991:196), and since Tamazight language is believed to be the mother tongue of all 
the members of the Tunisian nation and that is at least through the baby talk register (see Yuba‘s 
post in figure 5.25 below), Takfirinas seems to take it for granted that the true existence of a 





Figure 5.25: Yuba_Linguistcs_st83 
Tunisian baby-talk is Tamazight 
 
 
The International Day of Mother Language…I am addressing Tunisians specifically. To start the 
story, we all know that if we want to talk to a Tunisian infant we go ―sheshi‖ ‗sit‘; ―ham‖ ‗meat‘; 
―nenni‖ ‗sleep‘; ―nana‖ ‗grandmother‘. While many know the origin of these terms, others 
ignore that they belong to the Tamazight baby talk register. This implies that Tunisians speak 
Tamazight since childhood before Arabization, alienation, and domestication stages take place.  
 
While Yuba oversimplifies the notion of mother tongue to an extent speaking a register of 
language-baby-talk in this case- would be enough to consider that language a mother tongue,  
Takfirinas asserts in Figure 5.26 that the entire lexicon of Ettounsi  is highly influenced by 
Tamazight. Being the most shared language-Ettounsi-provides an ample evidence to argue for 
the existence of a natural link between Amazigheity as an ethnicity and Tunisian nationhood. 
According to Calhoun (1993), the language of nationalism is often the second language that 
unites the different peoples of a nation; or the elite language, shared among aristocrats and/or a 
bourgeois; or the language of a colonial power (p.17), Tunisian Imazighen; however, seem to 
view Arabic, the language of nationalism in Tunisia differently. For them, it is rather an invented 
or imagined tool of creating Tunisian nation-state. A true test of nationhood, however, requires 





Figure 5.26: Takfirinas_Linguistics_st14 
Tamazight language is a test of nationhood 
 
You don‘t know that you are speaking dialect which most of its lexicon is Tamazight. But you 
will discover that you are speaking a dialect that is unintelligible for Arabs. 
 
You don‘t know that the percentage of the French ethnicity in Tunisia is 5%; it is even higher 
than the Arab one, which is 4%. But you will discover that the percentage of the Amazigh 
ethnicity is 88%.  
 






The primordial relationship between ―being Tunisian‖ and ―being Amazigh‖ as shown in 
Aksil‘s, Takfirinas‘, and Yuba‘s understanding of nationhood and ethnicity is clearly motivated 
by an ideology that seeks to represent Tunisian Amazigheity as an intact and continuous identity. 
Understanding Tunisian nationhood as a continuity of the past, the historical, and the traditional 
offers an account of Amazigheity as a living, uniform and homogenous identity. This aligns with 
Smith‘s (1989) argument that ―In order to survive ethnie must take on some of the attributes of 
nationhood, and adopt a civic model‖ (p.157).  
This assumption in which a non-Amazigh is not a Tunisian and does not belong to 
Tunisia is further complicated by several other problematic linguistic assumptions: if you don‘t 
identify as Amazigh, then you are ‗Arabized‘ or a ‗/musta?rab/ Amazigh‘ (to be discussed 
further in Chapter 6). The term /mustaʔrab/ is often used in derogatory contexts to refer to 
Tunisians who do not identify themselves as Imazighen due to lack of awareness or denial. They 
are perceived as inauthentic Tunisians even though they were born and raised in Tunisia.  To 
illustrate, figure 5.27 shows a conversation between Takfirinas and his commenters in which he 
calls those who identify themselves Arabs based on their religious or linguistic criteria 
/mustaʔrabeen/. The use of this term unfolds at least two negative interpretations. First, it erases 
the existence of other ethnicities, particularly the Arabs, in an indirect assertion that Tunisia is 
essentially and homogenously Amazigh only. Second, the term has a derogatory meaning, 
referring to those who dissociate themselves from the Amazigh identity to associate themselves 
to Arabic ―imagined‖ or ―fake‖ one. Thus, the usage of this label constitutes an instance of 
dissociative practice with an Amazigh identity practices.  Dissociating oneself from Amazigh 
identity when being Tunisian is inexcusable for the Amazigh people. Accordingly, the 




macro-discourse on national identity. Tunisian Imazighen consider Tunisia, as previously 
discussed, an essential Amazigh nation, and they reinforce this understanding using various 
semiotic and discursive displays on the Facebook platform.  
 
Figure 5.27: Takfirinas_Linguistics_thread56 
They are mustaʔrabeen not Arabs 
 
 
Commenter 1: the problem is that when we provide well referenced and proven explanations to 
someone, they use the religious argument. They would claim that the holy Quran is written in 
Arabic so they are Arabs.  There a whole confusion between [ethnic] belonging and religious 
affiliations. There is still a lot of work to be done in the field my friend. 
 
Commenter 2: That‘s [the religious affiliation] their last cart to play. 
 
Takfirinas: Unfortunately, we find this kind of argument only made by the musta?rabeen [the 
Arabized].   
 
These examples illustrate how Tunisian Imazighen on Facebook persistently reproduce 
an essentialist ‗ethno-nationalistic‘ ideology based on the assumption that language, ethnicity 
and nationality have a fixed one-to-one correspondence, which will extend in later analysis to 




Tunisian Imazighen to be a language that overlaps with Tamazight to a great degree - indexes 
Amazigh identity (Phyak 2015). Hence, ‗speaking Ettounsi‘ corresponds to ‗being Amazigh‘.  
These assumptions are instrumental in iconizing the ethnicity and Ettounsi as the natural 
outcome of being Amazigh. In such a discourse, it is easy to see how other ethnicities and 
languages that have contributed to Ettounsi are erased. A detailed examination of these 
discursive reproduction and reconfiguration of what constitutes a Tamazight language and 
identity will follow in the next chapter.  
5.3.4.  Section two conclusive remarks  
In this chapter, I approached Facebook as key tool for enabling a positive attitudinal 
change towards Tunisian Tamazight language and identity which could play an important role in 
reversing language shift. Comparing the findings of the online survey with previous work (Gabsi 
2011) suggests that there seems to be greater awareness and acceptability of Tamazight as a 
principle constituent of the Tunisian identity than there was prior to the revolution. The shift of 
attitudes could ease the task of revitalizing the language and achieving more social and 
institutional recognition of Tamazight. I claim that this shift of attitudes has been achieved 
largely due to the efforts of several Tunisian Imazighen through their intensive Facebook 
activities since the 2011 revolution. For many Amazigh Facebook users, this site has become a 
key-self representational tool to combat the hegemonic assumption that Imazighen no longer 
exist, to communicate their presence and assert their identities. In doing so, they simultaneously 
adopt a counter–erasure ideology where semiotic processes of iconization, fractal recursivity, 
and erasure are enacted discursively.  
In the second section of this chapter, I discussed how Amazigh engage in intensive 




features of their Facebook profiles, such as the background profile pictures, cover photos, the 
page name and the left menu where friends are listed, networking, and other demographic 
information are situated. The focus was on performativity of Indigeneity and Amzigheity in 
which processes of entextualization (de-contextualization and re-contextualization) play a key 
role. Considering that the semiotic setting of these Facebook features is essentially multimodal, 
the analysis looked at both linguistic, metalinguistic, and other semiotic means by drawing on 
Tunisian Amazigh activists‘ reinterpretations of features, texts and discourses which originate 
from different contexts. The section revealed how the semiotic resources are essential for the 
performativity and meaning-making of Amazigheity and Indigeneity. It also demonstrated how 
building connectedness and associations or boundaries and inequalities are enacted through the 
multimodal products displayed through Facebook profile page features.  
More specifically, Facebook users at this point of the study are able to characterize 
themselves as Imazighen showing what connects them to this identity (authentication) and what 
verifies the claimed connection (legitimation). They claim an Amazigh ‗identity‘ via 
performative usage of particular linguistic and visual resources, histories and ideologies. At the 
same time, Tunisian Imazighen subscribe to the ideological construction of ‗identity uniformity 
and homogeneity‘ in many occasions throughout the analysis.  By invoking a fixed and 
essentialist (Herderian) relationship between Amazigh ethnicity, Tamazight, and Tunisian 
nationality, they are not only constructing ideological boundaries around Tunisian Amazigh 
identity, but also excluding, distancing, or even silencing other identities that also fit within those 
boundaries. In either erasing ways, entextualization through de-contextualization and re-
contextualization processes of particular linguistic signs are shown to be helpful discursive tools 




 Following the original argument by Bauman and Briggs (1990, p. 76), Tunisian Amazigh 
Facebook users present themselves as active agents for whom entextualization is an ‗act of 
control‘ through which they can claim a degree of social power. This power manifests in various 
ways: in their access to the activity of entextualization, in the legitimacy of their claims to 
reinterpret the texts, in their ability to perform the interpretation, and in the differential values 
attached to various types of texts.  
In addition to meaning–making of Amazigheity and Indigeneity through the discourse 
practices of decontextualizing and recontextualizing Amazigh linguistic and cultural materials, it 
was demonstrated that there are tendencies to ascribe everyone in the entire country of Tunisia 
the Amazigh identity. It is in this respect that Irvine and Gal‘s (2000) notions of iconization and 
erasure offer us useful conceptual tools with which we can tease out the ideological 
underpinnings of this connection. They are building an argument that rests on a complex set of 
assumptions, of which the most central is that ‗being Tunisian‘ essentially means ‗being 


























Tamazight first [„Arabic‟ is the crossed-out term] 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Language revitalization projects put much of their emphasis on creating resources to teach 
endangered languages with the hope of increasing the number of speakers. While these 
endeavors are vitally important to bring an endangered language back to life, they remain 
insufficient. Kroskrity (2000) argues that contesting language ideologies and practices that force 
language shift are equally important as focusing on increasing the number of its proficient 
speakers. This perspective is gaining more ground with the increasing rise and use of technology 
and social media among endangered language speakers and indigenous communities. Recent 
studies of indigenous languages on Facebook have shown that this virtual platform has turned 
into a battleground where several language norms and language ideologies are put forth and 
contested (Carlson 2013, Lafkioui 2013, Phyak 2015, Prevett 2017).  These studies unite around 
glorifying Facebook‘s contribution to cultural, ethnic, and linguistic plurality. Nonetheless, 
Facebook‘s diversity and hybridization cannot obscure a salient re-emergence of contrary 




These norms and ideologies are traditionally reinforced by the nation-state.  Moreover, 
individuals who have some historical, cultural, or ethnic claim to an endangered language or 
have the ability to speak it are also reproducing the same nationalist norms and ideologies in 
their Facebook discourse.  This relates to the current view of identity as a dynamic construct that 
incorporates notions of performativity, positioning, discourse, and negotiation (Norton, 2000). 
According to Block (2007), identities can be thought of as ―socially constructed, self-
conscious, ongoing narratives that individuals perform, interpret, and project (p. 27).‖  He goes 
on to write that ―identities are about negotiating new subject positions at the crossroads of the 
past, present and future‖ (p. 27). This concept of identity as fluid and constructed is basically 
what triggers research on the online writing practices of multilinguals (e.g. Androutsopoulos, 
2013; Chen, 2013; DePew & Miller-Cochran, 2010; Saxena, 2011; Sharma, 2012; You, 2011). 
According to Schreiber (2015), digital literacy practices involving high levels of code-mixing, 
invented spellings and transliterations and other forms of linguistic creativity, express new, often 
hybrid identities. Online spaces, such as Facebook, provide space for the interactants to 
appropriate or reimagine codes of a given language that best expresses their identity formation 
and alignment.  
Tunisian Amazigh on Facebook represents an example of a digital arena where language 
ideologies are contested and reproduced in a discourse that simultaneously deconstructs and 
constructs ideologies of homogeneity, hierarchies, and uniformity. Language choice on 
Facebook, shows that Tunisian Tamazight is also constrained by nascent ideological tendencies 
and intentions that limit individuals from using all of the multilingual resources (Tamazight, 
Ettounsi, MSA, and French) at their disposal (cf. Blommaert  2009; Varis  and Wang  2011). By 




traditional meaning of ―indigeneity‖, a point discussed briefly in the previous chapter, along with 
the sociopolitical changes that aided the resurgence of Amazigh identity in public discourse, this 
chapter will continue to examine the Facebook discursive practices that Tunisian Imazighen 
deploy as they are shaping and reshaping their Amazigheity. More attention will be paid to how 
they negotiate questions, such as: Who counts as Amazigh? How membership in Amazigh group 
identity is constructed and reconstructed? How a re-emerging Amazigh identity is used to 
redefine Tunisian identity? What counts as Tamazight language? What counts as Ettounsi 
language? How do multilingualism and multi-orthography express the diverse aspects of 
Amazigh ideological identity? And how do they position their Amazigheity in relation to other 
identities they encounter in the context of Tunisia?  
To this end, the present chapter examines the language and semiotic processes that 
Tunisian Amazigh participants use on Facebook. The chapter begins by addressing the question 
of erasure that Tunisian Imazighen have been subject to. I am particularly interested in 
examining how the participants represent themselves as subjects of erasure and how they 
respond to the institutional and social agencies that reinforced it. I will also show how they 
articulate and argue their reappearance vis-à-vis a public discourse that problematizes their 
nascent visibility and claims of authenticity.  
In the second part of the chapter, I analyze how Tunisian Imazighen establish and index 
their Tunisian Amazigheity as they are drawing from existing and  pre-existing semiotic and 
linguistic resources. In doing so, Tunisian Imazighen are no more subject to but subject of the 
discourse (Davis 2013). This implies that they are in control of relocating reframing, 
appropriating and reconfiguring the semiotic recourses and linguistic forms available for them to 




through processes of iconization, fractal recursivity, and erasure.  Recall that iconization 
involves ‗‗linguistic features that index social groups or activities appear to be iconic 
representations of them, as if a linguistic feature somehow depicted or displayed a social group‘s 
inherent nature or essence‘‘ (Irvine and Gal 2000, 37). Fractal recursivity refers to the tendency 
of ideological features that differentiate among social groups or establish social hierarchies to be 
deployed at multiple levels or scales. Thus, the same features that distinguish between one group 
and another can also be used to discriminate within groups and subgroups recursively (Leeman 
2014). Finally, erasure is the process whereby information that is inconsistent with an ideological 
representation is rendered invisible or explained away (Irvine and Gall 2000, p. 38). 
Multimodality (the mix of text and other semiotic signs (e.g. emoticons, pictures, videos, 
etc.), entextualization (based on identification and analysis of the paths through which textual 
material has traveled to be appropriated and  reused as source of meaning making (Bauman and 
Briggs 1990: 73)), and intertextuality (as an act that consists of using language and linguistic 
forms that belong to a network of texts (discourse, images, etc.), past and future, in order to 
communicate meaning by complex relationships to those texts (West 2015) are crucial parts of 
the construction of identity on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook.  Following Bolander & Locher, 
(2010), Facebook users represent themselves implicitly and explicitly by selecting images and 
text for their homepages and by sharing links to articles, images, and videos on other sites. While 
doing so, they rhetorically engage in re-contextualizing others‘ words and ideas into a more 
personal frame, as users. Drawing on Bolander‘s and Locher‘s work in addition to that of Briggs 
and Bauman (1992), and Silverstein and Urban (1996), this chapter finds multimodality, 




become discursively and meaningfully deployed for Tunisian Amazigh identity construction in 
Facebook.  
Regarding identity alignment, Bucholtz and Hall (2007) argue that identity is a social 
category that needs to be understood as an interactional achievement during which speakers of a 
certain language differentiate themselves from and equate themselves with social groups or 
identities. This is accomplished through what they call interpersonal tactics of identity. For 
Bucholtz and Hall (2007), practices and processes of differentiation and alignment can be 
accomplished through three pairs of identity relations: resemblances and distinctions, 
authentication and denaturalization, and authorization and illegitimation. This perspective is 
relevant to the analysis of the context of Tunisian Imazighen as being in the process of 
identifying who they are by defining and redefining their association or dissociation with other 
identities. The contradiction that each of these pairs holds is essential to understand how 
ideological processes such iconization and erasure are negotiated and executed during the 
creation of Tunisian Amazigh linguistic and ethnic identity traits and boundaries (Kroskrity 
2014). On Facebook, it is the semiotic constructions and processes of indexing or eluding 
differentiation or alignment which seem most fruitful for investigation.  
6.2. Section one: Tamazight language and identity erasure 
In response to the language shift that Tunisian Tamazight has experienced, Amazigh 
community members have devoted a huge part of their Facebook discourse to increasing 
linguistic awareness of the language ideologies that pushed their language and identity to a status 
of endangerment. In this section, I argue that Imazighen‘s awareness of the language ideologies 
that suppressed their language and identity has a prominent impact on the efforts to reverse 




can be deliberate, taking place at the level of discursive practices (―discursive consciousness‖), 
or unexpressed, making part of the structural or practical knowledge (―practical consciousness‖). 
In this section, I will consider the metadiscursive and metalinguistic reflections of Tunisian 
Imazighen on the Arabization ideology that alienates and erases their language and identity as a 
form of practical consciousness.  
6.2.1. Exposing Tamazight erasure discursively 
The first meta-comment on erasure in this study comes from Takfirinas, a forty-nine-
year-old Amazigh activist who started learning Tamazight after the 2010-201 Revolution. In 
Figure 6.1, Takfirinas announces that he will be collaborating with another Amazigh woman in 
producing a Facebook series under the title ―disclosing history, civilization, and ethnicity 
deceivers‖.  In the announcement, he only includes an excerpt from ―Identity in Tunisia in the 
New Era‟, a book by Jalloul Jribi published in 1992.  The writer in this excerpt takes a strong 
homogenizing ideological Herderian stance, depicting Tunisia and the Maghreb as essentially 





Figure 6.1: Takfirinas_Linguistic_lt3 
Takfirinas sarcastic response to a pan-Arabist approach 
 
 
Takfirinas and [name of the other person] **** present to you:  
A series for disclosing the falsifiers of history, civilization and ethnicity   
A book entitled ―Identity in the Era of Tunisia‖ was published in 1992 by Professor 
Jalloul Jribi, the director of the High Institute of Religion and a Member of the High 
Islamic Council of Tunisia during the former president era. Hereby is an excerpt:  
―Countries in the Arab Maghreb have always had one natural unity and a geographical 
territory that shares similar characteristics and climate. Also, they have been historically 
united in founding a civilization and facing the enemies; and culturally similar in building 
thoughts and approaches. In fact, these countries are related to each other. They belong to 
one region of the same continent. Their inhabitants belong to one ethnicity, and that is the 
Arabic ethnicity. They believe in one religion, and that is Islam; and they speak one 
language, and that is Arabic. Thus, it would be safe to argue that there are no other people 
who own all these aspects of unity combined. [This is] the reason why the Arabic 
community has been successful in defeating the invaders and confronting change-makers 
over the time.‖ 
  
- Mr. Jelloul, how come you speak about an Arabic Maghreb when its roots are 
Amazigh?! 
- Mr. Jelloul, why is it that they [Magreb countries] represent a connected and natural 
unity when you [in reference to pan-Arabist] are the ones who insisted on drawing 




- Mr. Jelloul, what civilizations are you talking about when you limited the ―Grand 
Maghreb‖ history of forty thousand years BCE to the Arabs‘ history of ‗SOME‘ recent 
fifteen hundred years?! 
- Mr. Jelloul, how come we are Arabs when our blood, culture, traditions, rituals, food, 
clothes are very different from those of the Arabs with no single similarity? 
- Mr. Jelloul, what success are you talking about with regard to the Arab nation when it 
is sinking in dirt all the way up to the neck [Tunisian idiom]?  
- Mr. Jelloul, may God show you the right path [religious idiomatic expression] 
 
 
In this posting, Takfirinas creates a text in which the content is modified in way that is 
geared towards producing a new interpretation that fits his discursive intentions. Tannen (2013) 
refers to this form of communication as metamessaging as it doesn‘t state what the writer or the 
speaker wants to say or do directly (Tannen 2013). While the source text might be recognized by 
some readers of this Facebook posting as appreciative of the Arabization ideology of North 
Africa, Takfirinas has decontextualized and embedded it in a new context, in which it has 
acquired a quite opposite interpretation from the original one.  The original text is now used not 
to spread the Arabization ideology, but rather to condemn it. Following Leppänen (2008), it is an 
example of entextualization -- when the source text is integrated within the new text, changing it 
into a novel form. This process triggers new interpretations of the source text (cf. Reyes 2011).   
The posting displays a heterogeneous mélange of semiotic features. The 
announcement/title that Takfirinas makes on top of this posting simulates the title of a TV, radio, 
or other form of media. In the same vein, he uses more than one linguistic mode to form his 
rhetorical questions as he mixes Modern Standard Arabic and Ettounsi. The question word for 
How come (Kifesh/), for example, is repeatedly used in Ettounsi. The idiomatic phrase in 
addition to the religious one in the fifth and sixth question are also stated in Ettounsi. Through 
the manipulation of an interplay of figurative linguistic devices, such as rhetorical questions, 




in a sarcastic way. Colston (2007) defines sarcasm as underlying negative meaning that varies in 
intensity, and usually achieved through devices such as hyperbole, rhetorical questions, and 
understatement.  The opposite idea or critic is quite obvious in Takfirinas‘ posting as he uses 
sarcasm as the primary discursive and persuasive strategy to condemn and ‗counter‘ the pseudo-
homogenous Arabic identity that the author of the entextualized/source text advocates. In doing 
so, Takfirinas discloses how the nation state discriminates by erasing other identities in Tunisia, 
principally the Tamazight one.  Sarcasm continues to be chosen as a linguistic device to disclose 
and counter erasure by other participants such as Dihya in Figure 6.2 and Yughurtha in Figure 
6.3. Each of the posts invokes examples of misinformation about Amazigh outfits and place 











Nothing has changed for long centuries. We used and we continue to ascribe our culture, 
civilization, and cultural properties to colonizers and invaders (Phoenician, Roman, 
Vandal, Arabs, Arabians [another adjective for Arabic, it is often used with a derogatory 
meaning], French, Ottoman…etc.)   
Things are apparently genetic in us 
Hereby is a paragraph from a book entitled Ifrikya and as we have said many times, the 
word ifrikya and African means Amazigh/Berber historically, principally the ones from 
Tunisia; in the aftermath, the term has encompassed all the people in the African 
continent   
―Unfortunately, it seems Tertullien was right when he pointed out the weak collective 
memory of the Africans in his critique in the second century CE. He criticized them [the 
Africans referring specifically to the Amazigh people] for being proud of wearing the 
Roman Abaya while ignoring the fact that it was one of their own crafts/products. It 
seems the later generations had inherited a short memory from them. In fact, many of 
them continue to forget that current Tunisian cultural heritage, which is so diverse 
culturally and which is capable of interacting with and open to other cultures owes all 
these qualities to the indigenous people who have always been marginalized and their 




Following Weingartner & Klin (2009) and Klin & Drumm (2010), Dihya sarcastically 
comments ―things appear to be genetic,‖ introducing ambiguity into her discourse by creating 
possible alternative interpretations for listeners. However, depending solely on sarcasm as a 
linguistic device to express her intention would not have solved the ambiguity without having 
previous knowledge of the history of assimilation of Amazigh people. Dihya‘s followers or 
readers of this post may not have access to the meaning embedded in the comment. Unlike a 
person-to-person conversation where speakers have prosodic and paralinguistic tools to add 
important information to help interlocutors interpret their messages in online writing, and 
Facebook in particular, doesn‘t provide these affordances. Thus, adding a literal statement has 
the same effect as sarcasm. In doing so, the excerpt from the book helps to resolve the ambiguity 
by illustrating how the erasure of Tamazight language and identity occurred due to negative 




Figure 6.3 from Yughurtha‘s wall shows a photograph of a road sign referring to the 
name of a region that‘s called Shatt Zenata ‗Zenata Beach‘. In the photo, there are two signs 
indicating the road to Zenata Beach in Arabic above and French (Plage Zenata) below. On 
Yughurtha‘s wall, the image is preceded by a short comment by Yughurtha that says ‗here are 
the beaches of the (Zenata) people. This is a very sarcastic post, however, someone who does not 
have enough context about it, who doesn‘t know Yughurtha, or does not know that Zenata refers 
to a name of an Amazigh tribe, may not be able to detect any sarcasm. And yet, what‘s more 
important is the work of entextualization. He appropriates and modifies visual materials (from 
road signs), the name of a known tribe, and a term from classical Arabic qawm [in the comment 
above the picture] ‗community, people, folks‘ to make up a sarcastic statement (‗here is the 
beach of the [Zenata] people‘).  
The visual materials are of particular interest in this posting. Although the sign has a 
specific meaning and function - that of giving directions - it acquires a new meaning as an image 
in the context of Facebook by being transformed into a sarcastic statement. What Yughurtha is 
trying to refute indirectly is the juxtaposition of the word ‗beach‘ with the tribe of Zenata who 
had no connection to modern day beach activities.  The sign gives direction of a regional area 
that is called ‗Zenata beach‘. According to Yughurtha, finding signs as such indexes widespread 
ignorance of an important part of Amazigh tribal history, such as the fact that the famous tribe of 
Zenata did not have interest in sea activities. The sign might also be done deliberately as a 
strategy of falsifying the historical and cultural characteristics of Amazigh people. Yughurtha 
chose sarcasm to unveil another example of Amazigh erasure: being identified with something 




Subsequently, two of the metadiscursive comments on Yughurtha‘s posting in Figure 6.4 
confirm that the Amazigh tribe of Zenata had no interests in sea or beach activities. Yugurtha‘s 
comment above the sign implies that either ignorance of Amazigh history and/or deliberate 
intentions to misrepresent and falsify the cultural, historical and linguistics properties of 
Amazigh identity are examples of the erasure strategy that has aimed at pushing Imazighen into a 
full assimilation to Arabic. Yughurtha chose sarcasm as a mode for delivering this message and 
disclosing the causes of erasure because following Peter (2013, p. 10), ―it serves the discourse 
function with the best return of effort for the current context.‖ 
 








Figure 6.4: Yughurtha_historical_thread 19 
Zenata beach discussion 
 
Comment1: Earth is no longer the same. It is replaced with a different earth…Zenata did 
not have any interest in the sea.  
Comment 2: Most of the Zenata
16
 were nomadic Bedouins. This is not to say that there 
were some of them who were more stationary. They worked in desert trading. They 
probably crossed the sea when they spread to Andalusia. I specifically mean the Braziles. 
What is more appealing to me is the name Zenata as it refers us back to the Fatimiites 
who moved to Egypt and they probably took with them some of their Zenata supporters.  
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 The Zenata are one of the main divisions of the medieval Berbers, along with Senhaja and Masmuda.  
They were traditionally nomads. The Zenata tribes entered Morocco from Tunisia in pre-Islamic times and grouped 
themselves with the tribes of Maghrawa, Miknasa and Banu Ifran. Some of these tribes surrendered quickly to the 
Muslims in the 7th century, while others, like the Jarawa under al-Kahina, put up a successful resistance for a long 
time. In the 8th century most of the Zenata were Kharijites and took part in the Maysara revolt against Umayyad 
rule. The last Kharijite rebellion was in the 10th century under Abu Yazid, and was defeated by the Fatimids.  
During the 10th century the Zenata were predominantly allied with the Caliphate of Cordoba, which fought for 
control of Morocco with the Fatimids. In the process the Zenata were pushed out of Morocco by the Sanhaja tribe, 
allies of the Fatimids. However, in the 13th century the Zenata regained political importance with the Abdalwadids 
in western Algeria and the Marinids in Morocco. Finally they held sway over Morocco under the Wattasids in the 
15th century. They claimed an Arab (South Arabian) origin, for what most historians regard as political reasons, but 
this claim is not widely accepted. Their varieties of Tamazight languages, collectively termed Zenati, are spread 
over a wide area; for this reason, several languages are termed "Zenati" or in some cases are spoken by people who 




Another example of highlighting erasure on Facebook discourse is from Yuba‘s page. 
Figure 6.5 involves metaphor, rhetorical question, religious register and sarcasm. The post was 
published to comment on the political conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Yuba 
sarcastically implies that Amazigh activists and Tamazight should be held accountable for this 
conflict since it has always been depicted as divisive and a threat to the national unity. The post 
contains a mixture of figurative language to convey sarcasm vis-a-vis nation-state ideologies 
which view Tamazight as a threat to linguistic and national unity in Tunisia.  
 
 
Figure 6.5: Yuba_social_st25 
Yuba‘s sarcasm 
Amazigh and Tamazight activists are the cause of the clash between the Arabs of the 
Gulf…didn‘t they say Tamazight is Fitnah [a religious concept for disorder and unrest]?‖.  
 
 
In this post, we can see how the ideological discourse associating Tamazight with notions 
of divisiveness and dissention (Sadiqi 2017:147) is repositioned and re-used as sarcastic context 
on Facebook. Following Grice (1989), metaphor and sarcasm in this post impose on the reader 
two stages of interpretations. At first, it aids in recognizing ―a categorical falsity‖ as 
metaphorical. This appears in linking Tamazight to fitnah (disorder, unrest), and secondly, by 
highlighting this meaning as contradictory with the one that the speaker/writer holds, namely that 
Tamazight has never been a trigger of disorder or disruptiveness in the way pan-Arabists and 




Throughout the analysis of the examples above, Tunisian Imazighen present themselves 
as not only aware of the erasure ideologies that have been imposed on their language and 
identity, but also of the discursive alienating practices that reinforce the work of erasure. This is 
expressed through a number of metadiscursive posts and comments, but mainly through the 
figurative language of sarcasm and irony. At this point, excerpts from pan-Arabist oriented 
books, idiomatic phrases, religious terminologies, signage, and shared political and ideological 
knowledge are entextualized into a collective target of sarcasm used to unveil the erasure 
discourse in the following sites:   the ‗one language one nation ideology‘, speakers‘ negative 
attitudes towards their mother tongue (internalized hegemonic language attitudes), 
misrepresenting aspects of Amazigh cultural, and depiction of Tamazight as threat to the national 
unity, a cause of disorder and divisiveness, and symbol of backwardness.  
6.3. Section two:  Counter-erasure in counteracting erasure  
A considerable part of Tunisian Tamazight identity construction and re-construction work 
on Facebook is achieved through negotiation and performance of linguistic resources through 
multilingualism and multiple-orthographies and scripts. Since all of these resources are 
characteristics of Tunisian Amazigh Facebook, the analysis will focus on language and script 
choice as discursive strategies for signaling alignment or dis-alignment. As such the analysis will 
draw on the tactics of intersubjectivity (Bucholtz and Hall, 2004) in which individuals do not 
project a single unitary identity, but express diverse aspects of their identities depending on how 
they position themselves in accordance with or in contrast to the available ethno and 
sociocultural positions. Identity in this case is not viewed as a static trait or internal state but the 
result of practices of locating the self and the other in various subject-hood positions (Bucholtz 




More specifically, the focus of this study is on how participants maneuver the linguistic 
resources available to them through Computer-Mediated Discourse (CMD), and how they benefit 
from the freedom of speech afforded by Facebook, and the rise of minority voices in post-
revolution Tunisia. This implies that the languages they use can be sources of gaining and 
exercising power, and thus they are essential for the (re)construction of their identities as 
minoritized
17
 or oppressed groups and individuals (Blackledge & Pavlenko 2002; Blommaert 
2010; Blommaert & al. 2003; Bourdieu 1982, 1991; Gal 1989, 2006; Heller 1995). They can also 
be sources of obstructing others‘ power, which and can lead to a repositioning of the ‗dominant‘ 
speaker in the interaction context and to a reconstruction of his or her identities (Bourdieu 1991, 
Lafkioui 2013).  
6.3.1 Counter-erasure, multilingual resources, and Tunisian Amazigh identity  
Four main languages function as the main linguistic and interactive resources on Tunisian 
Amazigh Facebook: Tamazight, Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), Ettounsi, and French. Other 
languages in their repertoires such as English, Spanish, and Italian are rarely used for 
communicative or meta-communicative comments. A great many of the interactions occur in 
MSA or Ettounsi while French is more used by some (i.e. Yughurtha and Firmus) than others.  
This is explained by the fact that only these two participants traveled and lived for some time in 
France (Chapter 3). Tamazight is found in all the pages in the Facebook corpus. It functions as 
the symbolic marker of the three main ethno group identities (Amazigh, Tunisian, and North 
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 Tunisian Imazighen resist narratives that describe them as a minority. They often resort to the cultural properties 
and genetic studies to present themselves as majority. A genetic study published by Hajjej et al. (2015), for instance,  
showed that Tunisians are related to present-day North Africans, Amazigh people and to Iberians, but not to Eastern 
Arabs (Palestinians, Jordanians and Lebanese). This suggests that the genetic contribution of Arab invasion of 7th-
11th century A.D. had little impact of the North African gene pool. Tunisian Imazighen take these findings for 
granted to argue against minoritizing narratives. Despite the lack of a strong linguistic argument that Tamazight is 
endangered,  Tunisian Imazighen sometimes use the fact that Ettounsi is influenced by its Tamazight substratum, as 






African). The interactive functions and social values attributed to these linguistic resources on 
Tunisian Amazigh Facebook are obviously different from what is performed in the offline 
context where Tamazight would be highly unlikely due to low proficiency and domain loss. 
Lakfioui (2013) sums up the offline functions and evaluations of the languages mentioned as 
follows: 
As national and local policies determine basically the sociolinguistic hierarchy of 
the languages used by the Imazighen in the offline context in North Africa and its 
diaspora, mother tongues such as Tamazight (e.g. as used by the Kabyle of North 
Algeria and the Jerbi of South Tunisia), generally with a non-official and minority 
status, cannot compete with the dominant languages such as Arabic (the language 
of the Islam and its umma, i.e. transnational Islamic community), French (the only 
official language of France) and English, which is generally seen as the most 
international language and which has been socially and interactively growing in 
importance since the electronic revolution (p. 140).  
 
On the Facebook space of Tunisian Imazighen, however, the function of these languages 
is no longer the same as in the offline context.  When relocated online during the entextualization 
processes, they may acquire new social and cultural values and be part of new processes of 
meaning-making. The affordances of social media for the performance of identity through 
entextualization is aptly described by Kress and van Leeuwen (1996, p. 34) as ‗the new realities 
of the semiotic landscape‘. By this, they point to processes of change taking place at different 
levels (the nation-state, technology, and economy) that not only have an impact on political and 
cultural boundaries, but also on semiotic boundaries (Leppänen et. al. 2013).  
Tunisian Tamazight language for example continues to be regarded as invisible, useless, 
and even extinct. In most official and political discourse since the 2011 revolution, it is 
completely ignored and silenced.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 2014 Constitution, for 
example, completely ignored the linguistic and cultural rights of the Amazigh people of Tunisia. 




very instrumental and functional language. The following example from Gildo‘s page illustrates 
this by attributing new values and functions to Tamazight. The example is a quite lengthy post 
written exclusively in Tamazight. In a Tunisian context, it is still hard to find many people who 
can read and understand this text. Yet, Gildo‘s posting is not about the content as much as it is 
about changing perceptions of the language.  
 
Figure 6.6: Gildo_Linguistic_lt13 





Posting long texts exclusively in Tamazight in the Tunisian context is clearly a form of 
performance. Gildo is aware that only few if any of his profile visitors will be able to read and 
understand the long texts he posts. Thus, it is safe to argue that he uses them only as 
performative mechanisms to present himself as a Tamazight native speaker and authenticate his 
identity. This practice also sends the message that Tamazight is not dead in the context of 
Tunisia. It still has speakers who can speak and write it fluently and proficiently.  In this 
discursive performance, meanings of vitality, grammatical and lexical richness, and prominence 
unfold, in attempt to counter the ideologies that frame Tamazight as a ―simple‖, ―poor‖, and 
―extinct‖ language. MSA, in contrast, is used in only on one occasion in this example, to 
translate the title of the text.  The way Tamazight and MSA are used and distributed in Gildo‘s 
text encapsulates an implicit meta-pragmatic comment on linguistic practices, making a ‗counter-
hegemonic bid‘ and pointing to a switch of the symbolic positions of the two languages (Tsitsipis 
2003). Hence, by relocating it within a Facebook discourse, Tamazight is now presented as a 
prominent language with significant cultural value.  
The content of Gildo‘s post contains a descriptive analysis of some of the linguistic and 
grammatical properties of Tamazight. Gildo is not a linguist, grammarian, nor does he hold a 
university degree as described in Chapter 4, and yet here, he presents himself as language expert. 
Being able to write elaborately in Tamazight along with being knowledgeable of its linguistic 
system are part of how Gildo discursively authenticates his linguistic expertise. It is important to 
understand that in doing so, Gildo is performing an Amazigh identity for himself while 
simultaneously engaged in verifying and confirming that Tamazight is still alive and still has 




The following example in Figure 6.7 from Massinissa represents a flyer announcing an 
event for the Amazigh New Year. The bilingual use of Tamazight and Arabic points to different 
symbolic meanings attributed to both languages. Massinissa‘s meta-comment – a welcoming 
message to the visitor of Tamazret, his home village- is delivered in Tamazight, then translated 
into Arabic. Here, Tamazight is given precedence over Arabic, whose role is reduced to a 
medium of translation.  On the flyer, Tamazight, written in Tifinagh, is also given prominence by 
being located at top of the announcement followed by Arabic and French in lower positions 
within the image. Tamazight prominence is also featured by being located on the left-side of the 
flyer (Tamazight is read from left to right) through the name of the village of Tamazret, while 
Arabic is given a secondary status by being placed in to the right side. An Arabic reader may 
look at the right side first for information. In figure 6.7 the right margin is manipulated in a way 
that gives Arabic less status.  The name of the village Tamezret appears under the Tunsian flag 
along with the Amazigh agricultural New Year. Since all these elements are located to the left, 
they are more likely to be captured prior to the Arabic script even for someone who reads Arabic. 
the use of Tifinagh on top of the image. The reader of this image is positioned to get attracted to 
the left side margin more than the right one by means of ornamental and embellished writing of 
Tamazight. The left margin positions the reader to understand not only that Tamazight is an 





Figure 6.7: Massinissa_cultural_image27 
Massinissa multilingual identity performance  
 
By displaying Tamazight as the source language and Arabic as translation medium indexical 
values associated with meanings of rootedness, localization, and nativeness are attributed to the 
former while the latter is positioned as ‗foreign‘ and ‗strange‘.   
Another posting exemplifies the re-organization of the cultural values attributed to the 
multilingual resources that Tunisia Imazighen use in the posting below from Massinissa‘s wall as 
well. The text in Figure 6.8 features a poem written exclusively in Tamazight. Arabic is pushed 
to the bottom of the poem whose sole function is as a short meta-commentary about the theme of 





Figure 6.8: Massinissa‘s Tamazight identity performance  
 
In relocating and reframing Tamazight as a written literary language from an oral 
interactive context to an online Facebook space, its cultural and symbolic values are reframed. 
Writing exclusively in Tamazight as in this example or in Gildo‘s example apparently target a 
Tamazight-speaking majority. Nevertheless, in the context of Tunisia, this type of audience is not 
available. Thus, we can conclude that the use of Tamazight is more performative and symbolic, 
reshaping perceptions of language vitality and expanding the domains of its use to include 
literary and technical genres. This display of Tamazight constitutes a performative act about the 
performers as well which follows Akkya‘s (2014) discussion of performance as an act 
constructed and constituted via semiotic links and is also linked to diverse styles, personae, 
stances, hence identities (cf. Bucholtz1999b, 2009; Chun 2001; Eckert and McConnel-Ginet 
2003; Fuller 2007; Kiesling 2005; Mendoza-Denton 2007; Ochs 1992, 1993). Massinissa‘s 
literary use of Tamazight doesn‘t present him as an Amazigh only, but as someone who 
commands the language ‗authentically‘ being able to write complex and elaborate genres of 
literature using this language. Arabic functions strictly as an auxiliary language for short meta-
commentaries or translations. In this context, bilingualism on Tunisian Imazighen‘s Facebook 




Tamazight designates ingroup membership (―us‖) while Arabic indexes the outgroup that they 
differentiate themselves from (―them‖). This speaks to Cutler and Røyneland (2018) observing 
the multilingual practices in CMC as ―window into how speech styles, dialects, and languages 
are being reevaluated at the local and the global level, reflecting ongoing social shifts in the 
indexical values of these various codes (p.25). 
Tamazight language is a significantly important marker of separation between Imazighen 
and rest of the Tunisians, especially those who identify themselves as Arabs. Even individuals 
who do not speak Tamazight - the majority- still find different linguistic tools to distinguish 
themselves as Imazighen and set up boundaries with other groups in Tunisia. The use of certain 
lexical items and meta-commentaries serve as a significant indexical function in construction of 
an ethnic Amazigh identity for these individuals. The Tamazight greeting term azul ‗Hello‘, for 
example, has become very common in Tunisian Imazighen‘s Facebook. Most Tunisians who 
identify themselves as Amazigh have abandoned the Arabic greetings, such as essalamu 
aaleykum or asslama for azul even if the rest of the content in the posting is in Arabic or 
Ettounsi.  Figure 54 provides an illustration of this phenomenon. It is a statement denouncing 
unethical misconduct against one of the Amazigh activists during Tamazret Village Festival 
written by Yuba. The statement opens with a lyric from a popular Tunisian Amazigh Rap song 






Figure 6.9: Yuba_Cultural_st17 
Azul a marker of Amazigh identity alignment  
 
Azul, we will never cease to exist…. once upon the time...the double standards  
Towards the end of Tamazret Festival in 2016, which has been organized by the Heritage 
Maintenance and Revival Association since 1992, a few mercenaries and chronically-
disabled people attempted to insult [Yuba] for doing nothing other than using Tamazight 
as an essential element in the festival. These attacks included my family by insulting my 
parents and by calling me very offensive names. However, none of the admins of the 
page responded to that unless they were notified to do so. The response was funny. Some 
of them claimed they were traveling while others claimed they were on a holiday.  
Special thanks to Mr. [person‘s name].  
 
 
As shown in Figure 6.9 above, Massinissa incorporates only the Tamazight greeting in an 
otherwise mostly Arabic statement. Yuba, as described in Chapter 4, does not speak Tamazight 
fluently even though he is a very well-known activist in the community. On Facebook, he uses 
either MSA or Ettounsi for when he writes. What reinforces the claim that azul is employed as an 
index of identity rather than to show his Tamazight communicative abilities, is the use of 
intertextuality in Yuba‘s posting. The term is defined as ―a socially constructed act that consists 
of using language and linguistic forms that belong to a network of texts (discourse, images, etc.), 
past and future (in the sense of anticipating audience assumptions, responses, etc.), in order to 
communicate meaning by complex relationships to those texts (West 2010). In making use of 




message of the lyric that contains a strong assertion of identity.  This is an evidence that azul has 
become more of an identity index than a greeting term. In Figure 6.10 below, Teziri‘s posting 
includes a Happy Ramadan wish (fasting month for Muslims). Being a non-fluent speaker of 
Tamazight like Yuba, she delivers the content of her message in Arabic, but, starts her text with 
the Tamazight greeting phrase Azul Fallewen which is a close translation to the Arabic religious 
salutation Essalamu A‟aleikum.    
 
Figure 6.10: Teziri_cultural_st9 
Azul as an Amazigh identity marker  
 
Azul fellwen! Hello, Happy Ramadan to the Amazigh and Islamic Umma/community 
everywhere in the world. 
 
 
Even though Teziri‘s posting is about a religious context, she still makes use of the 
Tamazight greeting phrase instead of the Arabic religious one.  The use of the phrase Azul 




Tamazight speakers. Below is an excerpt from my interview with Yughurtha who clearly objects 
the use of this phrase.  
Excerpt 4: Yughurtha interview, July 23, 2016 
 
So many Imazighen say azul fellwen in greetings, which is not right. That is the literal 
translation of essalemu A‟aleikum/peace be unto you. In Tamazight we don‘t say unto you 
(Yughurtha interview, July 23, 2016).  
 
By challenging the use of the phrase azul fellwen in his meta-commentary declaring his 
own knowledge of the ethnically marked lexical usage of azul, Yughurtha invokes the status of 
an authentic speaker who has the authority to define the boundaries of the linguistic territory of 
his ethnic group and those who identity with this group. This provides more evidence of how the 
lexical term azul without fellwen has become as an ethnic marker used to describe in-group 
status while setting ethnolinguistic boundaries with other ethnic groups in Tunisian society.  
Rejecting fellwen is a distancing strategy since azul fellwen appears to be a calque on the Arabic 
Muslim greeting essalemu a‟aleikum (‗peace be upon you‘).  Tannemirt (‗thank you‘) is another 
example of a symbolic identity marker that makes no claims about the speaker‘s competence in 
Tamazight. In recent years, many Imazighen have abandoned the Ettounsi term Ya‟atik Essaha 
or Merci along with the Arabic term Shukran in favor of Tannemirt, both in their written and 
conversational practices. Thus, by incorporating azul and tannemirt into their discourse, Tunisian 
Imazighen show alignment to lexical and semantic components of Tamazight via the use of 
salient and widely diffused lexical items. The use of these markers is one of the ways Tunisian 
Imazighen signal their ethnolinguistic distinctiveness.  
Linguistic differentiation is a very crucial aspect of defining identity for Tunisian 
Imazighen. However, the use of Tamazight doesn‘t imply abandoning the multilingual 




shows the focal role of multilingualism and multimodality in constructing Tamazight identity on 
Tunisian Amazigh Facebook. It is a translation of Yughurtha‘s interview featured in a 
documentary entitled Imazighen of Tunisia” The Right to Appeal. In this documentary, both 
Aksil and Yughurtha made an appearance to talk about Tamazight and its relation to Ettounsi. 
The re-contextualization of this cultural product on Facebook is not for documentation purposes 
only, but also aims at meeting the linguistic and hybridized nature of Tunisian Amazigh 
Facebook where multilingualism is common (Tamazight, Ettounsi, MSA, and French). The 
multimodal insertion of this documentary video on Facebook is motivated by the intention to 
explain the position of Ettounsi in the process of Amazigh identity alignment. 
Ettounsi, our Darija [colloquial], includes countless numbers of Tamazight words, 
e.g. Kruma [neck] comes from Takrumt [in Tamazight]. Many, many terms are 
originally from the Tamazight dictionary that entered our Tunisian Darija or other 
Darjas in North Africa, such as the Algerian Darija, the Moroccan Darija, and the 
Lybian Darija. Besides all this, the structure of sentences [syntax] in our Darijas is 
based on the morphological and syntactic structures of Tamazight language. Even 
negation is in reality based on a Tamazight rule. E.g. Ana ma mshitch ‗I did not 
go‘ ma mshitch is a Tamazight negation because in the Modern Standard Arabic it 
is lam amshi so what‘s the etymological source of the suffix tch at the end of ma 
mshitch? More examples include ma klitch ‗I did not eat‘ and ma ritch ‗I did not 
see‘. Where did the suffix come from? Well, it is from Tamazight. Also, 
phonetically speaking, which refers the sound system, we have so many regions in 
the coast that you know about, such as Mahdia [a Tunisian city] where they do not 
pronounce /θ/. One may wonder why? Why don‘t they pronounce this sound? 
Because, at first, in Zenata, which is a Tamazight dialect there is no letter tha /θ/. 
And in Tamazight language there is no letter tha /θ/, and there are few people who 
have a childhood speech difficulty with /θ/, /ð/ and the emphatic /ðˤ/. [tleta] 
instead of / θle θa/ ‗three‘ or /idhar/ instead of / ɪðˤhar/ ‗afternoon‘. Where do all 
these sounds come from?! If a researcher tries to find out their origin, he will 
discover that they come from TAMAZIGHT [my emphasis; capitalized to signal 
Yughurtha accentuating this term during the interview], from the substrate, which 
means we have even preserved the structure of words in Darija, Tunisian Darija. 
We have preserved the sound system of Tamazight. Tamazight sounds are 
numerous in Darija because we have few sounds which are emphatic. I am still 
speaking about Darija and I mean that we have emphatic sounds in Darija.  We 
say /barʃˤa/ ‗many‘, /ʃˤ/ is emphatic whereas the brothers [sarcastic use of the term 
brother to signal distance and dis-alignment]  in the Gulf regions / say /barʃ ə/. 




[sounds] come from? They come from our mother tongue, the substrate language 
which is Tamazight. malla a‟azri  ma‟angar kabbusa  w mitlakmit fi barnussa. 
Now, try to find the Arabic words in this sentence which every Tunisian is able to 
comprehend [This sentence is from Ettounsi, but according to him every single 
word in is Tamazight]. So, to finish commenting on this sentence, I would say that 
all Tunisians speak Tamazight. All Tunisians are Tamazight speakers. There are 
those who master Tamazight, that‘s who we call speakers and there are those who 
we call non-speakers, but I would say they are speakers who do not master 
Tamazight language because in Darija they use Tamazight words.  
 
 
Figure 6.11: Yughurtha_linguistic-video1 
Ettounsi is originally Tamazight 
 
Yughurtha‘s commentary includes several claims about Ettounsi structural grammar that may not 
be valid. His analysis of Ettounsi negation, for example, is still argued by many linguists to be 
the outcome of Arabic rather than Tamazight contact (cf. Kossmann 2014). What is important 
here is that, from the point of view of Yughurtha, Ettounsi is a combination of numerous 
structural features originating essentially from Tamazight with no reference or mention of any 
other source. Yughurtha‘s comments make perfect sense in light of identity alignment, and can 
be interpreted in two ways: maintenance of ethnolinguistic identity for those who speak 
Tamazight and adaptation of Ettounsi as a substitute identity marker for those who do not speak 
Tamazight. Thus, the process of identity alignment does not necessarily require speaking a 




identity. In such a culturally and linguistically hybrid community, the notion of mother tongue is 
no longer the defining factor of an Amazigh identity. Ettounsi may be sufficient to index 
Amazigh community membership. In other words, if nativeness is to be assigned, Ettounsi would 
be amply adequate. For some Tunisian Imazighen, Ettounsi is nothing but another form of 
Tamazight in the sense that its phonological, morphological, syntactic and even lexical systems 
are highly influenced by the Tamazight ones.  The following example from Dihya demonstrates 
how this assumption is framed: 
 
Figure 6.12: Dihya_Linguistic_thread 5 
Dihya‘s comment on Ettounsi being a distorted form of Tamazight 
 
Of the most famous Tunisian proverbs we have: the featherless hen is drowning in dirt 
and screaming [ywa‘awish] / jʋaʕʋɪʃ/. What is the meaning of iwa‟awish? Hereby the 
definition from the Tamazight-Arabic dictionary by the Algerian professor Khadija Saed:  
 
Hen scream…. …….i‘uish   /ɪʕuʕɪʃ/  
Whooping cough…… ta‘uuasht  /taʕuʕaʃt/    





Being continuously Arabized linguistically and culturally for numerous centuries, we 
have changed and distorted so many Tamazight words.  At times we reduce a letter and 
other times we insert a strange letter. However, it is very important [to acknowledge] that 
our mother tongue is still alive.  
 
Commenter 1: and we say in our Darija [variety] ywa‟awish/ (‗he screams like a hen‘) 
Dyhia: I believe the disease that is called wa‟awasha in our Darija refers to the whooping 
cough?? 
In this sense, there is an ideological construction of Ettounsi as language highly 
influenced by Tamazight to an extent that it could be viewed as another dialect of Tamazight.  
This assumption acts as a nascent force on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook, erasing other linguistic 
sources of input in the make-up of Ettounsi. While trying to present Tunisia as a tolerant 
multilingual and multicultural country (‗Tunisia is open to all and to everything‘) (Yuba 
interview, 2016), Tunisian Imazighen persistently reproduce an essentialist mother-tongue 
ideology which reproduces the belief that language and ethnicity have a one-to-one 
correspondence (Phyak 2014). ‗My mother tongue is my identity‘, said Gildo in his interview. 
Thus, the mother tongue from this perspective could be either Tamazight or Ettounsi. 
In the examples below, Tunisian Imazighen seek to redefine being Tunisian as being 
essentially Amazigh. This is realized through processes of intertextuality as in Figure 6.13 from 
Yuba‘s wall. To support the assumption that Tunisia is essentially Tamazight, Yuba relies on a 
quote from the first president of Tunisia, Bourguiba, during the enactment processes of the Code 
for Personal Status (CPS)
18
 in 1956.  As many Imazighen, Yuba believes that feminism, 
women‘s emancipation and gender equality are more widespread and accepted among Tunisians 
than anywhere else in the world due to the ―Amazigh‖ nature of this society as it is known for 
                                                 
18
 It is a series of progressive Tunisian laws aiming at the institution of equality between women and men in a 
number of areas. It was promulgated by beylical (attributive to bey, the governor of Tunisia during the French 
colony. The term is orginally turkish. It refers to the chief or governor of a province) of Tunsia  decree on August 
13, 1956 and came into effect on January 1, 1957. This Code is one of the best known deeds of Habib Bourguiba, 
who was Prime Minister and later President. 
He gave women a unique place in Tunisian society, notably abolishing polygamy, creating a judicial procedure for 




being matriarchal and pro-gender equality. This is stated in Writing, the story of alphabets and 
scripts by Georges (1992) when describing the matriarchal nature of the Tuareg Amazigh 
society.  ―It is highly unusual in the history of writing in that it is confined to women. Tuareg 
society is in fact matriarchal, and there, as elsewhere, literacy represents power.‖  
In Yuba‘s interpretation, Bourguiba took advantage of this nature to be able to pass the 




Figure 6.13: Yuba_social_st43 




Identity is the foundation for progress. For example, when Bourguiba (first president of 
Tunisia) enacted the Code of Personal Status and in order to establish a nation he said, 
―our identity is Tunisian-Berber‖. In saying so, he smartly prepared a context for 
Tunisians to accept the idea of women‘s emancipation [he advocates for] which is 
already part of their culture [referring to the Amazigh culture] and to have them love 







By viewing the post-colonial changes of freedom and equality in Tunisia as attributes of the 
natural characteristics inherited essentially from their Imazighen ancestors there is process of 
iconization that frames Amazigheity as a privileged identity.  During this process, there is an 
erasure of several other ethnic, linguistic, and historical components that have shaped the present 
‗Tunisian‘ identity, such as Arabic, Jewish, French, Turkish, Spanish, and Italian. Amazigheity is 
depicted as having a privileged status, and not just for Tunisians, but also all humanity. In Figure 





Figure 6.14: Yuba_social_comment 32 
Amazigheity is an equated to humanity 
 
Commentator: Amazigheity is the heritage of the humanity as a whole because it is a 
fundamental component of human history. It documents a very important stage of human 
intellectual progress. Therefore, he who alienates Amazigheity is in fact alienating 
humanity.  
 
Yuba: indeed, this is what we should disseminate. This is the reason why I pointed out to 
the importance of discourse. Discourse is very important to know how to communicate 





At this point of analysis, three major issues regarding Tunisian Amazigh identity 
reconstruction and re-contextualization of multilingualism arise. First, Facebook is the space 
where ideologies about Tamazight language and ethnicity are contested and constructed. 
Tunisian Amazigh Facebook displays a great diversity of language practices. Nevertheless, the 
ideological construction of these languages through processes of iconization, fractal recursivity, 
and erasure are discursively employed to reproduce ideologies of ethnic and linguistic 
hegemony. The following graphic from Takfirinas‘s page demonstrates explicitly how Amazigh 





Figure 6.15: Takfirinas_Linguistic_image12 





In Figure 6.15, we can see a clear process of re-contextualization in which visual materials 
including a map of Tunisia with an Amazigh emblem, the flag superimposed on it, around the 
margin, textual and statistical figures purporting to represent Tunisian ethnic and linguistic 
demography are presented. Figure 6.15 is an example of entextualization involving the relocation 
of materials (maps, symbols, statistics) from various sources and recontextualizing them as 
demographic facts about Tunisians. This constitutes a discourse of resistance against hegemonic 
Arabization while reconstructing an ideology that invokes a one-to-one relationship between 
language and identity. Speaking Tamazight is assumed to be an essential marker of Amazigh 
identity while speaking Ettounsi is constructed as another way to be Amazigh. Although MSA 
remains dominant on Facebook and in the corpus of data collected in this study, its value is 
reduced in the discourse to a mere vehicle or tool to express and convey content in or about 
Tamazight. As for French, the data in this study does not reveal much usage at all. A better and 
more enriching analysis of the ideological construction of French in Tunisian Amazigh Facebook 
will be addressed in the next section of multi-orthography and re-contextualization.  
6.3.2. Section two conclusive remarks 
In this sense, we see that multilingualism on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook does not care 
for the level of proficiency as much as language use and function. This makes it fit in the most 
current framework of multilingualism which includes ‗all people who function in more than one 
language regardless of proficiency (Cutler and Røyneland 2018:5).  The way MSA, Ettounsi, and 
Tamazight are chosen on Facebook correlate with symbolic practices and ideological features 
that ―may defy or reverse the very essence of fragmentation, hybridization, [and] destabilized 
identities‖ (Blommaert et al. 2009, p. 204). Tunisian Imazighen‘s multilingualism provides a 




groups are necessarily proficient in all the linguistic repertoires available. Observations of the 
multilingual practices of the participants is to a large extent consistent with the language 
proficiency description attributed to them in Chapter 4.  When they are all native-like speakers of 
MSA and Ettounsi, their proficiency in Tamazight remain hard to describe, except for the case of 
Gildo who is clearly a native speaker of the language.  Similarly, their use of Tamazight online 
may not be the same as their offline use.  And yet, what is possible to infer, at this point, is that 
multilingualism on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook is a source of identity performance and an 
instrument to challenge ideologies of erasure while reproducing others. Besides, Tunisian 
Imazighen‘s multilingual interactions seem to have contributed positively to an ongoing 
revalorization process of Tamazight and work towards destigmatization among Tunisians.  
Despite the lack of precise evaluations of Tamazight proficiency levels among Tunisian 
Imazighen, Facebook is clearly opening up opportunities for more use and production of writing 
in this language which increases its visibility and legitimacy. As a conclusion to this section, 
multilingual practices on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook are mirrors of a micro-level language 
planning exercised through Imazighen‘s agency at the grassroots level and it is essential in a 
context where Arabization policies, Arab nationalists, and the Umma narratives attempt 
continuously to isolate, marginalize, and erase Tamazight.   
 
6.4. Section three: counter-erasure in counteracting erasure 
  
6.4.1. Counter-erasure, multi-orthographic resources, and Tunisian  
 
     Amazigh identity  
 
Social networking sites such as Facebook are distinct among platforms for online writing 
in the ways in which they support and shape identity construction. Multimodal affordances and 




multilingual people (Androutsopoulos, 2013).  Writing systems represent powerful symbols of 
the languages they encode, to the extent that, in the public mind, a language and its writing are 
often the same thing (Shreiber 2015). Script may even be the main or only characteristic which 
differentiates two ‗languages‘ (Coulmas, 2003). Scripts are particularly powerful identity 
markers. Therefore, the Urdu script, for instance, most of the time indexes Muslim identity; the 
Devanagari script indexes Hindu identity. The Urdu script as seen by an angry, inflamed Hindu 
mob summons up talismanic images from the present and the past (Sebba 2009, p. 39). 
 In this sense, orthography can function to differentiate groups at different levels of social 
organization. Unseth (2005, p. 22) lists factors that can affect how people want to distance or 
identify themselves by orthography such including clan identity, ethnic identity, national 
identity, affiliation with membership in political movements, prestige, and religious identity, and 
he provides examples for all of these. Hence, the power of orthography as an index of identity 
should be valued just like any other linguistic variable that may signal identities and ideologies. 
Following Sebba (2009), iconic power is not reserved just for complete orthography. Within a 
single orthographic system, such as the Roman one, there exist many possibilities for iconizing 
particular font styles, characters, and diacritics. For example, the letter <w> signals something 
archaic in Swedish, confined to loanwords and surnames (which sometimes retain their old 
spellings, and sometimes have been modernized) (Sebba, 2009).  Spitzmüller (2007 , p. 403) 
points out how the umlaut has been used by Heavy Metal Bands with names such as Motörhead, 
Mötley Crüe, ZnöWhite, Beowülf, Blöödhag, Infernäl Mäjesty, Infernö to index the musical 
genre as well as the notion of ‗Gothic‘ more generally.  
Another example concerns the Haitian writing system.  In this context, standardization 




whether written Haitian should resemble, and thus be viewed as a variety of French, or a 
language distinct from French (Schieffelin &Schieffelin and Doucet 1994). Similar 
considerations exist in the case of writing Galician (a language spoken in Spain, which is close to 
Portuguese but has been in prolonged contact with Spanish) (Sebba, 2009).   Although there is an 
official norm, there is at the moment no standardized way of writing Galician. Rather, there is a 
whole continuum of norms; these are not randomly distributed, but reflect an ideological stance 
on the part of the user, as to whether Galician is a kind of Portuguese, or a language different 
from Portuguese. Celso Álvarez-Cáccamo and Mário J. Herrero Valeiro (1996, pp. 148–9) 
describe how the tipping point between what is symbolically ―Galician‖ (gallego) and what is 
symbolically ―Portuguese‖ can be located in the presence of <ç>, or <ss> or even in the nasal 
tilde on <ã>, <õ>.  All of these conventions are associated with Portuguese - not Spanish -
orthography and hence become symbols of the ‗Portugueseness‘ of Galician in contrast with 
other conventions (shared with Spanish) which symbolize ‗non-Portugueseness‟ (Sebba 2009).   
The main point here is that characters, scripts and diacritics could acquire iconic 
meanings by language users to create solidarity, groupness, and alignment or to distance and 
differentiate themselves from others. Orthographic and script choices can be a powerful symbol 
of group membership, identifying the users as belonging to or differing from other groups using 
the same or different scripts. Regarding Tamazight, the language is written using three different 
scripts which I describe in detail below: Tifinagh, Arabic, and French.  
Tifinagh is a modern alphabetical derivative of the traditional script, known as Neo-
Tifinagh, introduced in the 20th century. Tifinagh is believed to have descended from the ancient 
Libyan (libyque) or Libyco-Berber script, although its exact evolution is unclear (Chaker1994; 




of Tamazight languages throughout Africa and on the Canary Islands. It is attested from the 5th 
century BCE to the 3rd century CE. The script's origin is considered by most scholars as being of 
local origin (Chaker, 1994, 1996) although some scholars suggest it is related to the Phoenician 
alphabet (Yasir 1996). In a recent paper published by Sternberg (2015), the researcher argues for 
a Proto-European origin of the script.  According to Souag (2000), Tifinagh orthography became 
widely adopted by Tamazight speakers in Morocco and Algeria only in the 1960s when the 
Academie Berbere (later renamed Agraw Imazighen), a group of Kabyle activists in Paris put 
forward a proposal in 1967 taking letter forms indiscriminately from Tifinagh and Libyan, with 
vowel letters and letters for spirants added, written left to right.  To date, there is no information 
on how many people can currently use or read this script.  
Adopting Tifinagh as a main script for Tamazight is usually motivated by two reasons. 
First, Tifinagh has unique characters which would allow the revivalists to take pride in bringing 
back an ancient writing system. Second, Latin script is usually associated with a lack of 
patriotism while Arabic is associated with traditionalism (Souag 2000). In this sense, Tifinagh 
makes a better option for indexing uniqueness and authentication concurrently. This perception 
is very common among Moroccan, Algerian, and Libyan activists.  A debate over which script to 
select for Tamazight has not been documented in the historical record in Tunisia. The remaining 
of this section will reveal differing opinions on which script should be chosen for Tamazight in 
Tunisia.  
Arabic script for writing Tamazight 
According to Souag (2000), Tamazight languages in the North began to be written again 
as early as 1200 years ago, when the anti-Caliphal Ibadite sect of Islam established a state in the 




traced back to 1200 and 1300 C.E. For the later medieval period, evidence of Tamazight writing 
is found almost everywhere the language was spoken.  Tamazight religious poetry and 
translations as well as dictionaries written in Arabic script were attested starting as early as 1580 
(Souag, 2000).  Arabic continued to be used to write Tamazight during the colonial period in 
North Africa (1830-1962). It was also used for some correspondence and collections of poetry 
and fables used it, such as Poésie Populaire de la Kabylie de Jurjura; the Ibadhis of Jabal 
Nafusa In Libya, and or Tashelhyt writing in Morocco (Tawalt website). According to Souag 
(2000) in modern times, using Arabic script for writing Tamazight has fallen into near-complete 
disuse in Algeria - even Mzabi works use Latin - but a modernized orthography proposed by 
Muhammad Chafik - is still commonly used in Morocco and Libya, especially for Tashelhyt, 
despite competition from Neo-Tifinagh.   
In Morocco, several books in recent decades have used Arabic script, including some 
fiction, a dictionary, and most notably the recent first full translation of the Quran into Berber, 
published 2003, a powerful influence in itself. Even in Algeria it was officially adopted for 
pedagogical purposes in 1996, although that project was abandoned soon after (Souag 2000).  In 
the corpus used for this study, Arabic script is used extensively on only two Amazigh language 
webpages: Tariffit Project and Tawalt. This is not surprising since most North African computers 
tend to be equipped with French operating systems, and, while no language other than English 
has a significant online presence, French has far more webpages and software than Arabic 
(Souag 2000). Writing Tamazight in Arabic had facilitated for centuries the transmission and 
documentation of Amazigh culture. Souag (2000) calls it a ―genuine vehicle‖ for Amazigh 
culture. Besides, most Imazighen master reading and writing Tamazight in Arabic script than the 




nationalism, and Arabo-Islamic ideologies, negative attitudes towards the use of Arabic script 
appear to be increasing over time. More sociolinguistics altitudinal studies in this regard are 
required to verify these observations.  
Latin script 
The use of Latin script goes back to the French colonial period (1830-1962) when 
missionaries and army linguists were frustrated with having to learn the Arabic alphabet, and 
with the expense of printing the vowel signs necessary for pedagogical publications.  Latin script 
was more frequently used among those who had some French education during this period. 
Souag (2000) argues that the increase in literacy under the French also helped the spread of Latin 
script.  Since independence, in 1956 and particularly since the establishment of a standard 
transcription for Kabylie in 1970, Latinization has been strongly promoted by Amazigh 
(particularly Kabyle) intelligentsia - most of whom, having been educated in French, are more 
familiar with the Latin script than any other - as well as being very popular with the emigrant 
community in France (Souag 2000).  Additionally, Latin script seems to fit very well with the 
specific character of the Kabyle Berberist movement, much of which is pro-Western to an almost 
Atatürk-esque
19
 extent (Souag 2000). As a result, most of the Tamazight published in Latin is 
originally Kabyle (spoken in Algeria); Tashelhyt speakers in Morocco and Nafusa speakers in 
Libya use Latin to a lesser extent. Publications in North Africa include several poems, short 
stories, dictionaries, grammars, and a few plays. Latin script is getting more institutional 
advocacy, such as from the Haut Commission pour l‟Amazigheité.  Hence it is speculated that 
Latin will likely take hold irreversibly in the coming years as Tamazight is taught more and more 
in schools. Tamazight has been taught in Algeria since 1995 in at least16 provinces out of 48 and 
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 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is the founder of the Turkish republic. He is known for leading a cultural revolution 
which reducing the power of the religious clerks, introduced the Latin script and gave women the vote. In this 




at different levels and in Morocco since 2002 in at least 317 primary schools and few universities 
across the entire country. It also started being taught in Libya since the post 2011-Revolution 
with no specific numbers released yet on how many schools teach Tamazight.   In 2004, a Latin 
alphabet Amazigh computer package came out. At the present, almost all Amazigh webpages use 
some idiosyncratic, keyboard-friendly variety of Latin transcription.  
In the rest of this chapter, I will present the multi-orthographic practices of Tunisian 
Imazighen on Facebook, while investigating the social meaning and ideological practices 
engendered in each of these orthographic choices. The data in this part of the chapter will be 
examined based on a quantitative and qualitative approach treating each of the script choices as a 
linguistic variant.  In doing so, I first selected 163 screenshots from the data that shows writing 
in Tamazight language. These are the only screenshots found in the data with Tamazight writing. 
Drawing on a similar work by Al-khatib (2008), I categorized the data based on a system of three 
functions: ―greetings and thanking‖; ―ethnic-related content‖, such as proper and toponymical 
names; ―cultural content‖ that conveys connotations related to Amazigh society and culture; and 
―comments on general topics‖. The number of occurrences of each of the scripts in the 
categorization functions was calculated. Applying the qualitative analysis again, I will 
demonstrate how the script variations are determined by Amazigh linguistic ideologies (i.e. 
Tifinagh as a semiotic marker of Indigeneity; Arabic as semiotic marker of religiosity, and Latin 
via its connection to French, a language that indexes modernity and power). 
6.4.2. Tamazight multi-orthographic practices on Facebook 
The analysis of the data demonstrated that more than 64% of the orthography of the posts 




16% for the former and 12% the latter. It has also been observed that the participants tended to 
share postings only in Latin script more often than posts only in Tifinagh or Arabic.  
scripts Number of textual 
posting 
% 
Roman/Latin 105 64 
Arabic 26 16 
Tifinagh 32 20 
Total 163  
Table 6.1: Distribution of Tifinagh, Latin, and Arabic orthography 
on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook (N=163 posts) 
The results in Table 6.1 suggest that more participants feel comfortable writing using Latin script 
online. This could be justified in two ways. First, it is important to note that the term Latin
20
 and 
Roman are used interchangeably in this study. Second, most Tunisians are familiar with the 
French alphabetic system regardless of their level of education or French competency. Thirdly, 
MSA and its colloquial varieties are reported being written more often in Romanized script than 
Arabic especially in digital spaces (Al-khatib, 2008). According to Souag (2000, 2004), the 
availability of Tamazight literature printed in Arabic script is diminishing gradually, apart from 
religious publications.  Results in Table 6.1 agree with Souag‘s (2000) findings as Arabic 
appears the least used script in Tunisian Amazigh Facebook.   
Other than Gildo, none of the participants knows how to write in Tifinagh. Yet, my 
results show that it is more dominant on Facebook than Arabic. The use of Tifinagh also remains 
higher than Arabic in data in which both scripts are used simultaneously.  For example, Figure 
61 from Massinissa shows Tamazight numbers written in both Latin and Arabic. Examples as 
such are calculated as one Linguistic variable versus examples in Figure 62 from Yuba‘s page 
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 Latin or Roman script refers to the same set of alphabet. Romanized script, however, refers to the use of Roman 




showing both Latin and Tifinagh, which are calculated as a different variable.  Note the text on 
top of Figure 6.16 incudes instruction in Arabic language on how to read Tamazight numbers. 
Similarly, the text at the bottom of Figure 6.17 is an Arabic translation - not Tamazight written in 
Arabic script - of the phrase written in Latin and Tifinagh on top of the post entitled ‗learn 
Tamazight‘.  The text on top of Figure 6.17 includes an announcement of the start of classes for 
teaching Tamazight and Tifinagh in two Amazigh associations: The Tunsian Association of 




Figure 6.16: Yuba_Linguistic_lt40 





Figure 6.17: Massinissa_cultrual_text_Image 11 
Latin-Tifnagh double-script double example 
 
 
A close examination of the data reveals that postings with Tamazight written in Latin and 
Tifinagh are used more often than postings with Tamazight written in Latin and Arabic. More 
specifically, Table 6.2 aligns with the findings in Table 6.1 showing that participants prefer Latin 
and Tifinagh to Arabic. However, it is important to notice that we have a very small sample of 
data for this part of the analysis that may not make the findings very conclusive. More of this 





Script Number of postings Percentage 
Latin-Tifinagh 12 57%  - 7.3% (of the total data) 
Latin-Arabic 9 43% - 5.7 % (of the total data) 
Tifinagh-Arabic 0 0% 
Total 21 100% - 100% 
Table 6.2: Double-script data: Latin-Tifinagh versus Latin-Arabic (N=21 posts) 
 
Preference for the Latin/Roman script might not be exceptional. Several written 
languages use Romanized letters for the following reason.  Individuals who introduce a new 
writing system for a given language are often bilingual. These script mediators or orthography 
mediators as called by Sebba (2009) usually adopt a writing system that is familiar to them. 
Subsequently, numerous languages have orthographies based on the Roman alphabet, rather 
fewer use the Cyrillic alphabet, and many languages use or have used versions of the Chinese 
writing system.  Following the publication of a ‗Standard Alphabet‘ by Karl Richard Lepsius in 
1855 and the International Phonetic Alphabet in 1888, the majority of newly written languages 
have used an alphabetic script based on the Roman, though with adaptations (Sebba 2009). This 
also could be explained on the grounds that using Romanized letters for writing language is 
motivated by the growth of Internet and Social Networking Sites (SNS).  Romanized Arabic 
letters, for example, were not used to write Arabic before the advent of the Internet (Al-Khatib 
2008; Warschauer 2002, Silhani 2013). The origin of this phenomenon goes back to the 1990‘s 
with the introduction of technology (Warschauer 2002). Subsequently, we find that this practice 
is more common between teenagers rather than adults. The widespread use of this new form of 
written communication (‗Arabish‘, ‗Araby‘, ‗Arabizi‘ etc.) is gradually diminishing the need to 
use Arabic script in communication although things may be changing as Arabic keyboards 




In research conducted by Yaghan (2008), four factors are given for the spread of this 
orthographic practice: first teenagers found Arabizi a trend that facilitates group positioning 
among their peers. Second, several teenagers view writing in classical Arabic as not always able 
to express contemporary issues nor does it facilitate the use ―casual‖ forms of language such as 
slang and is better confined to educational function. The third factor was efficiency since the 
number of characters it takes to write a message in Roman letters is much less than in Arabic 
script.  Finally, teenagers depicted Arabizi as flexible form of language, orthographically 
unregulated and norm-free, which reduces concerns about errors. These attitudes are based on 
the flexible grapheme system in Arabizi. Letters that do not have a close phonetic approximation 
in the Latin script, for example, are often expressed using numerals or other characters, such as 




  While technical factors have traditionally been responsible for the prevalence of Latin or 
Roman script in writing Arabic, Tamazight might stand as a different case. The choice of 
orthographies has a history of raising debates in the context of Morocco and Algeria. Souag 
(2004) argues that the Kabyle movement in Algeria is considerably more pro-Latin. Souleimani 
(2013) states that Neo-Tifinagh was officially selected as the main code of Tamazight and won 
tremendous governmental support to be taught at schools. In each of the two countries, activists, 
intellectuals, ordinary speakers of the language continue to disagree on the script choices made 
by the authorities. Questions of identity, ideological affiliation, and linguistic differentiation are 
important factors behind each script choice. Close examination of the data used in this section of 
the chapter suggests that using Tifinagh to write Tamazight by Tunisian Imazighen is often 
shaped by the cultural meaning embedded in each of the shared Facebook posts. The following 
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analysis is based on how a language function, such as greetings, wishes, announcements …etc. 
has an impact on each of the Tamazight code choices and how each of these choices is 
determined by an ideological tendency. The following discussion is based on the various 
functions and social meanings of each of the script choices use to write Tamazight.  
6.4.2.1 Arabic  functions: Performing religious alignment 
Most of the participants in this study are found to use Arabic script to write Tamazight more 
often in religious contexts than in other forms of cultural messages. For instance, they use Arabic 
to exchange greetings and wishes during Eid (Muslim feast), Moulid (Muslims ‗prophet‘s 
birthday), and the Muslim New Year. For illustrations of this, see Figure 6.18 and 6.19 from 
Massinissa‘s and Yughurtha‘s pages. 
 
Figure 6.18: Massinissa_cultural_st53 







Figure 6.19: Yugurtha_cultrual_thread 33 
Tamazight Happy Eid message written in Arabic script 
 
 
It is highly likely that by using Arabic script in religiously-bound contexts, Imazighen 
attempt to express attitudes or stances that cannot be expressed with other orthographies. We 
argue that the switch to Arabic script in similar contexts serves an affective function through 
which Imazighen are aligning themselves with the religious meaning-making that is often 
associated with Arabic. Religious context is probably the main context where they are found 
using Arabic letters to express Tamazight messages. A closer examination of Figure 6.18 shows 
that the two responses to Massinissa‘s message are written in Arabic language and script. Both 
responses involve exchange of religious wishes as well, such as,  kol a‟am w inti  bi kheer 
‗Happy New (Islamic) year‘ and Ramadan Mubarak ‗Happy Ramadan‘. In Figure 6.19, 
commenters use Latin or Romanized script to thank Yughurtha in Tamazight for his wishes, but 
not to exchange religious wishes with him. What is notable here is that the change of the 




choice. This could be verified when we notice that the Arabic script appears again in the last 
comment in the thread since it is, also, about a religious wish for Eid. 
 Imazighen Facebook interactants often find themselves forced to engage in discussions 
over their religious identity in a setting where Arabic is asserted as the ‗language of God‘ and 
superior to the indigenous Tamazight. It is commonly known that any cultural or linguistic 
activity aiming at reviving Tamazight language and identity or demanding political and social 
recognition is perceived to be inimical to the proper practice of Islam. The example below from 
Gildo‘s wall clearly describes the ideological association between Tamazight and religious 
dissent or kufr:  
 
Figure 6.20: Gildo_cultural_st_image35 
Gildo‘s comment on associating Tamazight with religious dissent 
 
(Arabic text above image) The Amazigh movement is usually accused of antagonizing Islam. It 
is also claimed that most of the members of the movement are francophones. There are even 
those who would associate the movement with allegations of a conspiracy by foreign agents. 
These false allegations against the movement have caused many citizens to lose sympathy for the 






(Text in the flyer): Why whenever I declare that: I am not Arab [(bold writing in red is Tifinagh; 
yellow is Arabic]) you use Islam as a shield through which you would shoot your dirty arrows at 
us [(Imazighen].).  
 
Therefore, Tunisian Imazighen are often observed taking explicit stances that emphasize 
their religious alignment with Islam.  These stances draw on and perpetuate an ideology that 
defines them as Muslims while simultaneously placing them in confrontation with the Arab-
Islamic ideology. In this respect, the use of Arabic script in religious context is interpreted as part 
of a discursive alignment strategy and an example of stance-taking that DuBois (2007) describes 
as inherently intersubjective.  
Du Bois argues that in enacting a stance, the speaker simultaneously creates three 
consequences: 1) evaluation of an object, 2) positioning of a subject (usually the self), and (3) 
alignment with other subjects (DuBois, 2007, p. 163). As such, DuBois states that every act of 
stance act is both an act of evaluation and an act of alignment. His conceptualization thus 
suggests that stance cannot be analyzed as a feature of a context-free grammar that is directed at 
the level of the sentence; rather, it must be analyzed as a highly-contextualized phenomenon that 
emerges in sequential interaction. In DuBois‘s own terms, stance must be looked at ―beyond the 
utterance to its presupposed conditions of use‖ (2007, p. 146). In this framework, individuals 
position themselves on a scale of alignment with respect to the stance object, taking similar or 
different stances from others and thus producing intersubjectivity (cf. Davis 2013). The way they 
position themselves through the use of Arabic script speaks to DuBois‘s discussion of stance 
along with the adequation and distinction tactics of intersubjectivity in Bucholtz‘ and Hall‘s 
model (2005). 
With the term adequation, Bucholtz and Hall explain that processes of identification need 




individuals to be positioned as alike, they need not—and in any case, cannot—be identical, but 
must merely be understood as sufficiently similar for current interactional purposes‖ (Bucholtz  
Hall 2005: 495). In the choice of Arabic script to communicate religious messages, Imazighen 
downplay a crucial aspect of difference with other Tunisians in order to highlight a shared 
religious identity. The stance becomes observable in the excerpt below from Yuba‘s page. He is 
critical of activists who identify themselves as Imazighen, but refuse to celebrate Islamic 
holidays as an action of resistance against the Arab-Islamic ideology:  
 
 
Figure 6.21: Yuba_cultural_lt48 
Yuba presents Imazighen Muslims as the majority in a process of alignment 
 
(Arabic text above the graphic image): ―Critic… with all due respect to free speech, yet, I 
believe that some Amazigh activists who refuse to celebrate Islamic events as part of 
their activism are free to do so; but could they explain why would they link Tamazight to 
their refusal? Tamazight is open to all religions, cultures, and civilizations. How are we 
going to persuade the Arabicized Imazighen that Tamazight is their identity, civilization 
and culture while in acting so, you send them underlying messages that threatens their 
spiritual and religious beliefs? Eighty-percent of Imazighen are Muslims and most of 
them are conservative. In putting forth such a discourse you are paving the way for 
extremist ideologies to win over. This is actually what Tamazight native speakers are 





In this post, Yuba asserts - though with no references - that the majority of Imazighen are 
Muslims.  This makes them ―sufficiently similar‖ to the rest of people in Tunisia.  Arabic script, 
regardless of its association with an ideology that aimed at erasing Tamazight historically, is now 
a crucial definer of the religious identity for Imazighen.  The idea that Arabic orthography has 
inherited religious privileges is further illustrated in my Skype dialogue with one of the 
interviewees: 
Excerpt 5: Sifaw, age 33, Interview from July 13, 2016 
 
―Tamazight is my mother tongue and the language of my ancestors but as you know 
Arabic is God-chosen, endowing it — as you know— with a sacred character‖ (Sifaw, 
age 33, Interview from July 13, 2016).   
 
The following comments on a post by Axil projects the same ideology about the sacredness of 
the Arabic script and its tight relation to religion. 
 
Figure 6.22: Aksil_cultural_image_thread12 
Imazighen‘s comment on the use of Arabic script 
 
 
Aksil‘s posting involves a flyer written in Arabic language and Arabic script. In the 




written in the color of the Amazigh flag (blue, green, and yellow), which is also featured in the 
post below. At the same time, the post includes the following statement written in white on the 
top-left side: ―I am Amazigh. I use Arabic language to read the Quran and to pray. God said be 
Muslim. He did not say be Arab‖. While Aksil singles out Arabic for its religious function, the 
two commentators who posted responses below the flyer appear to be Imazighen as well. They 
express the view that Arabic as having an inherited-privileged status over all forms of writing 
including Tamazight.  Note that the comments written in Arabic in Figure 6.22 are rewritten in 
Arabic for better legibility, then translated in English as shown below:  
Commenter 1:  
 
 
True, we should not discriminate between languages and people, but God revealed the Quran in 
Arabic for reasons that only he knows about. He also sent an Arab prophet.  
 
Commenter 2:  
 
 
We should move away of the discriminatory policies, but in my opinion, the Arabic language has 
been valorized and levelled to a sacred and high position because it is the language of the Quran. 
That is what made it even more influential than Tamazight language in our daily life.  
 
 
Profiting from the multimodal affordances of Facebook (colors, flyer, images, likes, 
comments, Aksil tries to simultaneously perform a Tamazight identity that is not in conflict with 
the Islamic one, but rather in alignment with it.  In this multimodal discursive process, Aksil is 
trying to suppress or smooth over points of differences for the sake of creating a similarity 
(adequation) which will in his opinion benefit the revitalization of Tamazight. The use of Arabic 
script in religious contexts is basically motivated by the need to accentuate Imazighen‘s 




Islamic discourse wherein Tamazight is viewed as ―both useless and secular, even profane, 
represent[ing] a pagan past that the Imazighen should dissociate themselves from if they are to 
be true Muslims‖ El-Masud (2014). 
6.4.2.2 Tifinagh functions: Performing ethnic and cultural identity 
While Arabic orthography is found to discursively act as an affective stance meant to 
convey meanings of similarity and association, Tifinagh seems to convey exactly the opposite 
stance. In Bucholtz‘ and Hall‘s words (2005), it acts as a tactic of distinction. This process, the 
mirror image of adequation, relies on the suppression of similarities to highlight dissimilarity 
(Davis 2013). In this case, writing in Tifinagh is argued to be motivated by an intention to create 
distinctiveness and ethnicization. However, before we delve in the analysis of discursive 
distinction processes, it is important to remind the reader that Tifinagh has been subject of debate 
with regard to the standardization of Tamazight orthography.  Following the selection of Tifinagh 
as an official script by the Moroccan Kingdom in 2003, several controversies arose among 
people with different views and affiliations (Lafkioui 2002, 2008b, 2011c, 2013). Many perceive 
Tifinagh, especially in its neo-version, as artificial, folkloric, and more suitable for travel 
brochures and logos than daily use (Souag 2000, 2004). Being concerned that Tamazight elicit 
similar negative perceptions, several Imazighen continue to oppose this choice.  Moroccan 
governmental and institutional support of Tifinagh through (IRCAM) (Institut Royal de la 
Culture Amazighe) is interpreted by many Imazighen as a manipulative policy intended to 
further suppress and isolate Tamazight, rather than maintaining and revitalizing it.  Tunisian 
Imazighen, however, do not seem to feel the same way. In the following examples from Aksil‘s 









Figure 6.23: Aksil_Linguistic_lt19 
Aksil‘s comment on Tifinagh as a distinctive feature of Tamazight identity 
 
Tamazight is my blood and Tifinagh is its alphabet. If you don‘t like it, just leave it. The 
world is big. There are places in the world where you will not even be able to hear your 
‗Arabic‖. If Tamazight doesn‘t please you. If you hate it you can simply leave it and go to 
an Arabic country where you can find Arabic. It you hate the Tamazight character, that is 
fine. You are not required to love it.  All that you need to do is excuse us from learning 
your language (Arabic) which has pulled us millions of years back.  
 
 
Tifinagh does not only mark the ethnic, cultural and linguist value of Tamazight but also 
creates distinction between those who support the use of Tifinagh as a basic writing system and 
those so-called ―Arabicized Imazighen‖ – which implies that all Tunisians are Imazighen but got 
Arabicized – who favor the usage of Arabic over Tifinagh. In this process, another type of 
opposition is created between those who perform evidence of their Amazigheity through their 
endorsement of Tifinagh, and those who do not (the reason why they are labelled elamzeegh 
elmusta‟arabeen ‗Arabicized Imazighen‘).  Irvine and Hall (2000) name such a binary 
opposition ―fractal recursivity.‖ In the context of script choice, being identified as a Tamazight 
speaker might become invalidated when processed through the work of fractal recursivity, if 




a ―categorizing and differentiating cultural ‗object‘‖ (Gal 2002, p. 80). In other words, fractal 
recursivity determines who of the Tamazight speakers is an authentic, original, and indigenous 
by virtue of choosing Tifinagh and who is not, hence, called ―an Arabicized Amazigh‖ connoting 
fakeness, un-indigeneity, and even deceitfulness. In this sense, fractal recursivity works in sync 
with erasure within the Amazigh community itself.  The use of Tifinagh as an evaluation 
measurement does not only create hierarchies within the community, but also renders individuals 
or speakers who cannot be forced into either side of the binary unrecognizable (Accordingly, 
non-speakers of the language who identity as Imazighen or non-speakers who support Tifinagh 
use even if they have not learnt how to use it yet, have no consideration at all as Amazigh 
people.   
In the example below from Gildo‘s page, the use of Tifinagh takes the form of an 
epistemic stance through which the stance-taker presents himself as possessing linguistic 
expertise and command of Tifinagh.  Gildo‘s post features a text written strictly in Tifinagh with 
no orthographic transliteration or translation despite the fact that whoever sees it in Tunisia is 
unlikely to be able to read it. By representing himself as a proficient writer of Tifinagh, Gildo is 
authenticating himself while simultaneously projecting his stance with regard to the use of such 





Figure 6.24: Gildo_Linguistic_st 26 
Gildo‘s Tifinagh writing on Facebook 
 
Berber language is commonly known as Tamazight language. Her speakers are called Imazighen. 
They live in North Africa. It is the mother tongue of the inhabitants of Tamazgha. It is a resisting 
language across the history. It has resisted till the 7
th
 century when Islam first came to North 
Africa. When the Arabs came to North Africa to preach Islam, Tamazight was still very well 
spoken at that time.  
 
 
 In the following paragraphs, I examine other examples in which Tifinagh writing is 
displayed on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook. It is notable in all these examples that Tifinagh is not 
deployed for pragmatic, communicative or instructional purposes, but rather as a performative an 
emblematic act through which ritual greetings, places, logos, actions, announcements and other 
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Figure 6.25: Gildo_cultural_st_image30 
‗Good morning‘ in Tifinagh followed by French and Arabic translation 
 
Figure 6.25 is a post form Gildo‘s Facebook with ―good morning‖ greeting above the 
image written in Tifinagh first, then translated in French and Arabic. Below the greeting is a 
photograph of a little Amazigh girl with facial tattoos. Some of the motifs of the tattoos are 
rooted in the Tifinagh alphabet. According to Gildo there is at least a dozen Amazigh tattoo 
motifs that are Tifinagh letters, such as Yaz and letter T also called Syala when it appears on the 
chin. Positioning these letters on visible spots of the body, such as the chins and cheeks converts 





Figure 6.26: Aksil_Cultural_image18 
Identity in Tifinagh  
 
The term ‗identity‘ written in Tifinagh on top of the image.  
(Arabic text): ―We are from North Africa not from Najd or Aleppo. Our ancestors are 
Imazighen. They have never been Arabs.‖ 
(Inside the blue color blue): ‗identity‘; (inside the green color): ‗language‘; (inside the 
yellow color): ‗culture‘.  
 
In Figure 6.26 Aksil engages in a process of proving his Amazigheity using Tifinagh along with 
the symbolic colors of the Amazigh flag, the blue, green, yellow and red. In combining the 
textual and visual with Tifinagh as most salient feature, Aksil creates a frame for his explicit 
statement in which he disputes the oriental hypothesis that attributed the origins of Tamazight to 
the Middle East (Chapter 2).  
 
Figure 6.27: Gildo_cultural_image 36 




Figure 6.27 features the logo of the Azrou Association on the upper left. The logo 
contains only the name of the association in bold Tifinagh around the top of the logo and a 
translation in Arabic in the lower portion. The name of Azrou Association of Amazigh Culture 
also appears in French above the word ―Amazighe‖ in the top center of the image. As it clearly 
shows, French is written in small size as opposed to Tifinagh which appears in bold. The multi-
orthographic compositions of these postings reflect different values and meanings that the 
Amazigh participants have attributed to them during the processes of editing and sharing them on 
the Facebook space. As shown in Figures 6.26-6.27 above, Tifinagh is always placed above other 
languages with Arabic towards the bottom. The placement of Tifinagh on top of Arabic 
contributes to the linguistic landscape of ‗originality‘, ‗precedence‘, nativeness, and 
‗indigeneity‘. Featuring Tifinagh in various settings, such in logos, tattoos, or event 
announcement also provides more exposure to Tamazight through its unique orthographic 
system, while resisting claims that depict Tamazight as only an oral language, and allowing those 
who affiliate themselves with Tamazight to demonstrate their position as ethnolinguistically core 
members of the Amazigh community (Davis 2013), as well as promote the revitalization efforts 
of Tunisian Tamazight.  
Additionally, these language practices are evidence of ‗cultural capital‘ (Bourdieu 1972, 
1982, 1991) that points to a collective Amazigh identity shared by anyone participating in 
discursive activities on Facebook. The presentation of Tamazight as a ‗unified‘, ‗written‘, and 
compatible with the keyboard technology responds to the ubiquitous demands and pressure of 
‗modernity‘, but also empowers it interactively by increasing its social and cultural status 
(Lafkiou 2014). Nonetheless, the Tifinagh writing system remains limited to acts of 




very few people can read it. Thus, even though Tifinagh is ideologically constructed as a 
predominant and essential linguistic marker of Tamazight, we find that Latin/Roman script 
through its association to French to be a more common (and functional) way of writing it overall.   
6.4.2.3 Latin functions: Performing a modernized identity  
Using pragmatic language, such as greetings and thanking expressions in Tamazight 
represent symbolic and practical markers of an Amazigh ethnolinguistic identity for Tunisian 
Imazighen. As discussed previously, they are crucial symbolic resources (Bucholtz 2017) that 
assist Imazighen in authenticating their Amazigheity.  As far as this study is concerned, there are 
numerous examples showing that participants tend to deliver Tamazight greeting and thanking 
expressions in Latin script. The function of greeting and thanking is ultimately derived from a 
certain communicative intent. Expressions such as azul ‗hello‘, azul fellwen ‗hello‘, tifawen 
‗good morning‘, ayuuz ‗Bravo‘, tannemirt ‗thank you‘, are often written in Latin script.  
In most cases, these expressions are followed with an image of an Amazigh village 
landscape, Tamazight women dressed in traditional clothing, or a descriptive message about 
aspects of Amazigh cultural, ethnic, or linguistic patrimony in Tunisia. Note that the message is 
often displayed in Ettounsi or MSA due to the lack of fluency in Tamazight among Tunisian 
Imazighen as mentioned in previous chapters. For better illustration, see the Figures 6.28-6.29 
from Gildo‘s, and Massinissa‘s pages. Figure 6.28 shows an image of two kids from the village 
of Azru riding an overloaded donkey with some sort of crops. Again, the letter ―Z‖ in the word 
Azru appears as the most salient element in the picture reminding us of the indexical notions of 
this letter. Gildo‘s comment on top of the image includes the greeting term ‗Azul‘. Figure 6.29 is 
taken from a cultural event in the village Azru as well. The inhabitants of the village are gathered 




readers through this image. At last, Figure 6.30 is  a thank you message written in 
Latin/Romanized Tamazight. Massinissa mentions the names of a number of Amazigh activists 
that he wants to thank you for the work they have contributed during an Amazigh cultural event.  
                                       
Figure 6.28: Gildo_cultural_image 22                    Figure 6.29: Gildo_cultural_image 23 




Figure 6.30: Massinissa_cultural_st42 
‗Thank you‘ message, directed at a number of participants 
at an Amazigh cultural event 
 
Tamazight pragmatic expressions function as identifiable emblems of Tamazight 
affiliation. These expressions more often displayed and included in multilayered semiotic 




landscapes, tattooed women, Amazigh jewelry and outfits, for example are often displayed 
beneath the greetings as indexical elements of Tamazight culture as in Figures 6.28 and 6.29. 
Combining pragmatic language with cultural images serves symbolic purposes by turning each 
of post into an emblem-like or an iconic representation of Tunisian Tamazight linguistic and 
cultural identity. The choice to write Tamazight in Latin script in these three examples continues 
to appear in other areas of communication, particularly in didactive posts on the Tamazight 
language shown in Figures 6.31- 6.32 from Gildo, Teziri, and Yuba‘s Facebook pages.  
 
 
Figure 6.31: Gidlo_Linguistic_lt7 






Figure 6.31 is an excerpt of a long text posed by Gildo on linguistic and grammatical properties 
of Tamazight. The text is written in Arabic. However, whenever there is a mention of the term 
Tamazight or one of its derivative forms, the author writes them in Latin script. When Teziri 
learned her first two Tamazight sentences as in Figure 6.32, she announces her learning 
achievement in French while she opts to use Latin orthography to write them. Comments on 
Teziri‘s accomplishment include thanking and flattering expressions written in English (<you are 
a queen>) and Tamazight using Roman script (<tanemirt> ‗thank you‘; <Ayuz> ‗Bravo‘). 
 
 Figure 6.32: Teziri_Linguistic_thread9 
Learning first Tamazight sentences 
                
 
(French and Tamazight at the top of the Figure): 
I am happy to announce that I can make a sentence in Tamazight now: ―where are you 






Figure 6.33: Yuba_Linguuistic_image63 
Tamazight computer vocabulary 
  
In Figure 6.33, Yuba uses Latin script for translating French computer jargon into 
Tamazight. In doing so, Yuba is not only involved in teaching Tamazight, but also modernizing it 
and expanding its domain by displaying a list of modern computer terminologies. A close 
examination of the list reveal that there is no phonetic assimilation of the words as loans. It is 
rather based on a semantic approach where the meanings of each of the computer words is 
expressed with a native Tamazight term. For example, the Tamazight word for computer is 
Aselkim.  Yuba‘s purist tendency in adopting computer terminologies is very clear through this 
post. And yet, by making the choice of Latin orthography, he implicitly makes a statement about 
its usefulness for modern life as well.  Hence, Tamazight is presented a language that has the 
vocabulary needed for diverse goals and it can be used to talk about modern matters, such as 
urban life, technology, and politics. Behind making choices like this, Tamazight should no longer 
be stigmatized for being ―poor‖, ―ugly‖, ―timeless‖, or ―backward‖. Of course, by no means is 




their discursive practices on Facebook.  The linkage of Tamazight to languages of modernity and 
progress, such as French and English serves as source of empowerment to Tamazight language.  
Tunisian Imazighen almost exclusively use Latin orthography in postings featuring 
cultural materials, events, proverbs, poems, or other form of literary products. What is found to 
be more interesting is the use of Latin script in didactive posts meant to teach Tamazight. 
Teaching neologisms, particularly computer jargon, and more quotidian words such as the days 
of the week, pronouns etc. is done through the written medium of Latin script. More examples 
are shown in Figures 6.34 and 6.35 from Gildo‘s page.  In the former, he shares a Tamazight 
poem with a French translation. In the latter figure, Gildo is asked about how to say the phrase 
―Azrou tribe‖ in Tamazight. Azrou is the name of his village. Etymologically the term means 
‗stone‘. Hence, he gives the Tamazight equivalents of the terms used in the phrase. He even uses 
the Romanized alphabet or Arabizi to write the Arabic words, such as qabila (Arabic word for 
tribe) and jami3 sukkan Azrou (Arabic phrase for ‗all the inhabitants of Azrou‘). Writing Arabic 
in Latin script acquires a semiotic potential, suggesting a shift in the hierarchies of these two 
languages.  Latin or Romanized script is constructed implicitly as a symbol of power, progress, 
and modernity. Additionally, Latin script is put forth as the linguistic matrix towards which 







Figure 6.34: Gildo_cultural_poem1 
Tamazight poem by Belarhzali 
 
 
Figure 6.35: Gildo_Linguisitc_thread 15 
Translating Tamazight to Arabic using Latin orthography 
 
At this point, it is possible to argue that Latin or Romanized script is treated as the default 
for Tamazight based on the Tunisian Imazighen Facebook interactions I have observed. The 
choice of a Latin-based orthographic system is ideologically tied to various assumptions 
regarding French well as its linguistic and cultural capital. The French orthography is commonly 




writing Tamazight language (Souag, 2000, 2004). Additionally, in some of the examples above it 
is clearly observable that French functions as meta-communicative tool assisting in the 
acquisition of Tamazight. Although in some of the previously analyzed examples in previous 
parts of this study, MSA and Ettounsi, both seem to have had the same meta-communicative 
functions, it is important to recall that both codes are limited to specific functions of use (religion 
and affective functions respectively).  
Additionally, when these languages are used for translation purposes in Facebook‘s posts, 
they always appear in a lower position(s) than Tamazight. French in the examples above is 
displayed either in parallel position with the Tamazight script (Figures 6.33 and 6.34) or on the 
first line of Facebook message as in Figure 6.32. The preference for Latin or Romanized script 
over the other two scripts could be also understood in terms of the well-established historical and 
sociocultural links between France and North African countries.  Following Lakfioui (2014), it is 
also possible to argue that the choice of Latin/ or Romanized alphabet as the default script for 
communication on Facebook ―allows for accommodation through meta-linguistic re-
contextualization, which is indispensable for successful content transmission among non-fluent 
and ethnically diverse participants‖ (pp.140-141).  The instrumental function of the Latin or 
Romanized alphabet is discussed further in a brief interview with one of the twenty-three 
Imazighen whom I interviewed. Idr was a thirty-three-year-old from the Island of Jerba. This 
happened when I sent him a Tamazight sentence written in Arabic to translate for me via Skype. 
He replied in Arabic:  
Excerpt 6: Idr – age 33, July 31, 2017 
 
―Write it in Latin. That makes it clearer. Who gave you this sentence? [Jerba knew that I am not 
a Tamazight speaker] Ask him to rewrite it using the French alphabet because it is clearer. The 




The excerpt above reflects the attitude of many Imazighen who favor the use of a Latin-
based script to write Tamazight. Clarity, flexibility, and ease of communication and 
comprehensibility are some of the positive meanings associated with Latin script, which 
ultimately stem from its linkage to French, and to other culturally powerful international 
languages, such as English and Spanish. Writing in Arabic script, in contrast, seems to be 
associated with vagueness and presented as an inhibitor of comprehensibility. Imazighen‘s 
negative attitudes towards Arabic are transformed into a resolved desire of distinction and 
illegitimation (Bucholtz & Hall 2005); often articulated explicitly in meta-commentaries, such as 
the one below from Takfirinas‘ page (Figure 6.36):  
 
 
Figure 6.36:  Takfirniass_Linguistic_thread17 







December 18 is World Arabic day!!! 
Why would the world celebrate the Arabic language? What did the Arabs accomplish in 
sciences? How did they contribute to the progress of this world? 
Should I celebrate this day with you or should simply write ―ridiculous‖ and move on. If 
I had to celebrate a language day, I would pick up February 21
st
 instead (referring to date 
that relates to a Tamazight event)  
Commentator1: December 18 is my birthday. I only celebrate my birthday [laughter] 
Commentaor2: Arabic is the language of male servant. Only male maids celebrate that 
day 
Commentator 3: When Imazighen used to valorize woman, treating her as a symbol of pride 
and honor, Arabs used to bury her alive.  
 
 
Here, Takfirinas writes that celebrating World Arabic Day is ridiculous. He draws on the iconic 
link that exists between Arabic and Arabs‘ ‗backwardness‘ in modern science and technological 
discoveries. The process of associating Arabic language to failure and backwardness due to 
general derogatory assumptions about its speakers relates to Irvine and Hall‘s (2000) discussion 
of identity formation during which: 
The Other, or simply the other side of a contrast, is often essentialized and 
imagined as homogeneous. The imagery involved in this essentializing process 
[…] images in which the linguistic behaviors of others are simplified and seen as 
if deriving from those persons' essences rather than from historical accident. Such 
representations may serve to interpret linguistic differences that have arisen 
through drift or long-term separation (p. 79)  
 
Distancing themselves from Arabic language and culture through explicit meta-
commentaries or explicit discursive structures is what Amazigh Facebook interactants attempt to 
accomplish through their Facebook linguistic practices. Accordingly, favoring Latin over Arabic 
could be interpreted as an act of differentiation or dissimilarity with whatever evokes meanings 
of backwardness and an act of association or alignment with whatever evokes meanings of 
modernity.  Souag (2000, 2004) states that ―Latin is often seen too unpatriotic‖ being associated 




contrast, the Facebook space seems to have reframed Latin script due to its association with 
French – and other modern languages – ―[…] away from an asymmetric system in which it takes 
a dominant and normative position towards a more symmetric system in which its sociolinguistic 
functions are locally negotiated and assessed, hence engendering a ‗more multi-centered 
sociolinguistic culture‘ (Coupland 2009, Lafkioui 2014). Adopting a Latin-based system of for 
writing Tamazight with no formulaic or strict system of spelling (e.g.  The name of the village of 
Azrou is sometimes written phonemically as <Azru> and in other times in French orthography as 
<Azrou>) is still significant in that they are the product of debate in which Tamazight language 
is regarded as great cultural capital. Following Lafkiou (2014), any use of this language, whether 
formulaic or impressionistic, is highly indicative of Tunisian Amazigh identity and serves, even 
indirectly, in the construction of intersubjective spaces that support the Amazigh claim. In fact, 
even explicit stances as the one taken by Takfirinas against Arabic implies that Tamazight 
language has a vital cultural value that deserves to be celebrated nationally or even globally. 
Hence, its acquisition become strongly valued and valorized. Additionally, the display of 
Tamazight in parallel structures with French elevates the symbolic power of Tamazight as both 
dominant and powerful.  
The framing of Tamazight on Facebook as a flexible and prolific language able to adopt 
and invent new words, demonstrates how these neologisms can act as markers of social and 
cultural changes, and reflect attitudes about the language. Writing Tamazight words in Latin 
script while using Arabic as a medium for meta-commentary about the grammatical, 
phonological and spelling properties of these words indexes Tamazight‘s position as the key 




6.31). Accordingly, in these online spaces, Tamazight overrides the dominant position of Arabic 
supported by Arabo-Islamic ideologies and pan-Arabism discourse.  
Hence, the shared multilingual and multi-orthographic resources on Tunisian Amazigh 
Facebook play pivotal roles in the semiotic and performative construction of a Tunisian 
Tamazight identity and  in legitimizing the language.  When Tamazight and Ettounsi are –
almost- equally employed as markers of ethnic and cultural values, Arabic is reallocated from a 
dominant position to a more limited context of use. Similarly, the script choice and orthographies 
on Amazigh Facebook require us to examine ―orthography as social action‖ (Sebba 2012; Jaffe 
et al. 2012). Tunisian Imazighen do not know how to write Tifinagh or Latin script as none of 
these scripts has been ever instructed to them even though the majority of them is expected to 
have at least reading knowledge of French. Out of the nine participants in this study, only Gildo 
has an advanced literacy in both orthographies. He claims that he is self-taught. Other 
participants would always refer to the resources found on the internet, such as the Tifinagh chart 
(see appendix 3) to write in Tifinagh or use the Roman
22
 letters. Arabic orthography, however, is 
supposed to be the most accessible resource since all the participants can write in Arabic. 
Nonetheless, the results of my quantitative analysis (although limited by the small size of the 
corpus) demonstrate that Arabic is the least favored script among these Amazigh activists on 
Facebook. Analysis of the semiotic and multimodal functions of the three scripts of Tamazight 
language reveal they are selected based on social and ideological factors where questions of 
identity and linguistic differentiation are the most enduring.  
Amazigh Facebook interactions point to the emergence of new unified ideological 
movement in which the concept of an ―Amazigh community‖ is strongly present. People who 
participate in reinforcing this concept on Facebook constitute a kind of language community, 
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which indexes the interactants‘ belief that they speak or write the same language (Silverstein 
1998, Lafkioui 2014). The concept is in contrast with that if speech community, which refers to a 
group of people sharing the same language and set of grammatical norms and rules. The 
following example from Dihya shows a video teaching Tamazight in Tifinagh without specifying 
what variety of Tamazight is being taught (Figure 6.37). As discussed earlier, no official writing 
form has been agreed on since the debate over the three scripts is still ongoing. And yet, Tifinagh 
is presented as the default writing system of the language in this video while Ettounsi is used as 
meta-communicative tool assisting in the acquisition of the target language, Tamazight. 
 
Figure 6.37: Dihya_Linguistic_video1 
Teaching Tamazight in Tifinagh and Ettounsi 
 
The video of which there is a screenshot in Figure 6.37 is an example of a series of 
teaching videos produced by a Tunisian Amazigh speaker as part of his volunteering 
participation in revitalizing the language. The videos are targeting both children and adults. Each 
lesson is centered on one theme, such as numbers, names of the week days, months, or seasons, 
pronouns, etc. The screenshot in Figure 6.37 is from a video on Tamazight pronouns. The 




called Kabbous. For many Imazighen that type of hat is originally Amazigh for the mere reason 
that it is Tunisian. Many Tunisians, however, attribute it to an Andalusian origin. As depicted in 
Figure 6.37, the instructor displays the Tamazight possessive pronouns on the left side of a small 
white board that he uses and writes their Arabic correspondents on the right. In this process, 
Tifinagh is placed first, taking more space and visibility on the board. Based on this display, one 
may infer that Tamazight is a ―primordial‖ and ―literate‖ language. The title of each video in the 
series is usually written in Arabic and French.  
These videos, however, are not about the use of these two languages. Something else is at 
stake when the decision is made to teach Tamazight using Tifinagh and Ettounsi. The 
reproduction of these videos on an online platform, such as Amazigh Facebook, characterized by 
its multilingualism and multiple scripts (Tamazight, Arabic, and French) and multimodality 
make them more accessible to a larger audience. Interestingly, Tifinagh is not only a means to 
represent Tamazight as a written language, but to foreground other written linguistics varieties 
(Arabic and French in this context) characterized by their dominant linguistic value, and to be 
juxtaposed against them. According to Ivković (2015), multilingual semiosis as such are about 
―linguistic otherness‖. He argues that the property of multilingual representations is based on 
foregrounding other variety, juxtaposition it against the dominant linguistic matrix in a given 
context (p. 34). Another series of cartoon videos was also produced by a few volunteers from the 





Figure 6.38: Dihya_Linguistic_video2 
Video teaching Tamazight to children 
 
This video series represented in the screenshot in Figure 6.38 is devoted to teaching 
children. Interestingly, it uses Tamazight as medium of instruction.  These videos contain 
subtitles in Tifinagh followed by a French translation.  The video attempts to present Tamazight 
as a ‗unique‘, ‗unified,‘ and ‗written‘ language which responds not only to the ubiquitous 
demands and pressure for ‗modernity‘, but also empowers it interactively by increasing its social 
and cultural status. The choice of a Tifinagh-based script alongside Latin is motivated by a 
highly-ethicized and oppositional stance vis-à-vis hegemonic Arabic, Arab nationalism, and pan-
Arabism in North Africa. The transfer of these pedagogical genres of videos from a limited-local 
offline to the online context require that they are comprehended by trans-local receivers. This is 
done by multimodal means, such as the textual and visual. The use of French in this context, 
constitute an essential requirement for the reconstruction process of a translocal Amazigh 




global interactive space, trans-localism (trans-nationalism) forms an important impulse for the 
reconstruction of group identities (p. 143). 
6.4.3. Section three conclusive remarks 
  The presumption that Tamazight is a unified coherent verbal medium used the same way 
by all Imazighen erases a multitude of Tamazight languages and dialects that differ from each 
other to the same extent that French is different from other Romance languages and from Latin.  
Tamazight is not a single uniform language. However, presenting it so is consistent with how 
Imazighen tend to view their language and identity. When other Tamazight varieties get ―filtered 
through cultural and institutional ideologies‖ (Ehrlich 2001:4), the work of counter-erasure 
begins. Presenting Tamazight as a one language involves an oversimplification process of 
Tamazight multiple languages and dialect variability. The counter-erasure practice is also 
observable through using Ettounsi (first video) or French (second video) as a medium of 
instruction or translation while excluding MSA. This becomes clear when we know that that 
most of the viewers of those videos are more likely to be versed in MSA than in French. 
Accordingly, script choice and language use on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook is charged with 
symbolism, in that the presence or absence of a language or script in the multilingual digital 
space, transmits symbolic message as to the ―legitimacy, relevance, priority, and standards of 
languages and people and groups they represent (Shohamy 2006:110).  
  To sum up, users on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook have a great number of language and 
script resources and choices. Multilingualism and multi-orthographies represent some of the 
main defining features of CMC discourse. Each of these language and script choices is 
constrained by interactive functions, social values, meanings, and ideologies, which have 




processes of counter–erasure. The outcome of these processes is that when Tamazight language 
or scripts appear in multilingual combinations and settings, it acquires new semiotic 
interpretations that lift Tamazight above the status of ‗minority‘, ‗spoken‘, ‗endangered‘, ‗poor‘ 
language and make it ‗majority, literate‘, and ‗unified‘ language as any dominant language.  
Another outcome, is that Tunisian Tamazight discourse surrounding language and identity is 
more about the people and their ideologies than about documenting the language and fostering its 
actual use. The Tunisian Amazigh community is clearly mobilizing Tamazight language under 
certain ideological conditions and is clearly engaging in their own form of erasure while 
constructing narratives that reverse and even counteract the ones that led to the long-standing 
erasure of their language and identity. And yet, even when these processes discursively and 
semiotically are interpreted as acts of reversing or reproducing new forms of erasure, they 
remain important for the revitalization of Tamazight and also for the construction of a more 
pluralistic Tunisia where its varied cultures, ethnicities, and languages can no longer be tailored 
into a pure and neat Arab essence (Salemeh 2010). Other identities also exist and deserve 
recognition and validation. Therefore, Amazigh language and identity ideological discourse is 
also valid if that is what is required to voice the fact that Tamazight is a fundamental constituent 















Tamazight is an identity, language, civilization, land, and history. It is not ethnicity, race, or 
anything alike. He whoever inhabited North Africa, regardless of his origin, and got integrated 
in Amazigh civilization becomes necessarily Amazigh even if he doesn‟t speak Tamazight.   
           
7.1 Tunisian Tamazight language and identity construction in discourse and 
semiotics summery 
 
Facebook in Tunisia has introduced a space of new communication that facilitates connections 
and communications in ways that have never been possible before the 2011 Revolution. The rise 
in use of such a social networking site combined with the political and social changes following 
the Revolution have had significant impact on the linguistic landscape in the country. 
Resurgence of a Tamazight language and identity revitalization discourse constitute a major shift 
in linguistic perspectives among Tunisians. Drawing on insights from theories of language and 
identity, studies of semiotics, and computer-mediated discourse (CMD), this dissertation 
analyzes discursive and semiotic performances and constructions of Tunisian Tamazight 
language on Facebook in the hopes that these efforts will lead to future revitalization and 
revalorization of the language. It was demonstrated throughout this study, that Facebook for 
Tunisian Imazighen is not simply a communication space, but a flourishing discursive platform 




basis. Some of these ideologies are visible through symbolic group identity markers while others 
are less explicit and require some acquaintance with the historical, cultural, and social contexts.  
Across the history of the Tunisian Tamazight language, a continuous cascade of obstacles 
has contributed to the decline in its use and transmission across generations as well as to the 
erasure of Amazigh ethnic, cultural, social identity components in Tunisia. These obstacles 
include, but are not limited to the growth of urbanism, economic deficiency, diasporization of 
speakers, competition with dominant languages for association with nationalism, uniformity, 
and/or modernity, suppression-oriented language and education policies, but primarily the 
ongoing pressures of Arabization., Taking the form of both a policy and an ideology, its intended 
goal is to transform Imazighen‘s cultural, social, and linguistic ethos. Using these historical 
realities along with the debates over the etymological origin of the terms ―Berber‖ and 
―Amazigh‖ and the typological classifications of the Tamazight language family and Tunisian 
Tamazight in specific, I devoted Chapter 2 to re-discuss these issues with the benefit of more 
updated perspectives. 
 In doing so, I demonstrated that the term ―Berber‖ does not really hold derogatory 
meanings as most Imazighen tend to believe. It is found that the term has rather semantic roots in 
few Tamazight varieties, particularly in few Algerian Tamazight toponymical places and by the 
Tuareg where it refers to meanings close to the one of ―roaming around‖. Stating these 
etymological explanations is equally important as approaching this online ethnographic study 
from an emic perspective. Indeed, this study is among the pioneers in considering the natives‘ 
preferences and using only the term Amazigh (pl. Imazighen) to refer to the people and 
Tamazight to refer to the language. Objection to the term ―Berber‖ is basically an example of 




has been appropriated by Arabization and Arabo-Islamic ideologies to demonize Imazighen as 
barbaric and ignorant. Involving and emic approach allows for a closer and more empathetic 
view of Tunisian Imazighen and the motives behind their Facebook discursive and linguistic 
performances. Similarly, revisiting the typological classification of Tamazight was necessary, not 
to raise questions about its structural and functional features, but to present a refurbished 
typological model of Tamazight language family and of Tunisian Tamazight.  
  Taking into consideration Imazighen‘s preferences of how they want to call the language 
and how they want to be called as its speakers or representatives are the motivations for redoing 
the typological tree. Accordingly, Chapter 2 provided a typological tree that employs the term 
Tamazight instead of the traditional terminology Berber as a name of the language family and of 
some sub-branches of that family. Tunisian Tamazight has not had any previous representation 
on Tamazight typological trees. This dissertation is possibly the first to include a tree featuring 
Tunisian Tamazight as a separate branch of Tamazight language.  In addition, it is a pioneer in 
describing the dialectical variations within Tunisian Tamazight. Based on a study by the author, 
Tunisian Tamazight can be classified into three different groups: Plosive, Fricative and Affricate 
varieties. The first group refers to the dialects that have kept the original proto-Tamazight dental 
plosives as plosives as in the village of Douiret. The second group involves the varieties where 
the dental plosives have evolved into fricatives as the village of Azrou/Zrawa, while the third 
group involves varieties where the dental plosive are shifting into affricates as the Tamazight 
varieties spoken in the Island of Djerba. It is important to notice that the latter variety is still hard 
to classify since the dental plosives has not changed completely to the affricate status (Bahri, to 
appear). Including a sketch of the Tunisian Tamazight dialectical variations provided some 




of Ettounsi as highly influenced by Tamazight. This was illustrated in Chapter 6 where I showed 
how Yughurtha ascribed the lack of the interdentals in El-Mehdia city variety to the impact of 
Tamazight.  
Facebook as a catalyst of social, cultural, and political change in Tunisia has offered 
unprecedented fluidity and multiplicity of discourse and language practices. With the awakening 
of the Amazigh movement, multiple factors such as ethnicity, language, culture, and politics are 
intertwined in one space in discussions around constructing and reconstructing the post-
revolutionary Tamazight identity. An issue that was considered taboo before 2011 under the 
hegemony of a nationalist discourse fostered by the Arabo-Islamic and Arabization ideologies. 
To discuss the ideological erasure of Tamazight, I divided Chapter 3 into three major areas of 
focus: literature on Tamazight erasure, literature on Tamazight identity erasure in other North 
African countries, and a review of theories of linguistic identity as an interactional and 
ideological product.  
Regarding the first issue, I showed how Facebook is a digital space where both, the 
forces of Arabization and Amazigheity co-exist. Most importantly, I demonstrated how actors of 
Arabization continue to produce a discourse of exclusion and erasure of the ethnolinguistic 
Amazigh component on the online space. This is visible in their metalinguistic statements shaped 
by assumptions iconizing Tamazight as a lexically poor and primitive language, unable to have 
linguistic influences on other languages. Describing Amazigh voices as ―over-sentimentalized‖ 
denies Tunisian Imazighen the capability of participating in an equitable discussion over the 
ethnolinguistic identity in Tunisia. This view reflects the larger sociopolitical dynamics of 
language ideologies that are less about Tamazight, and more about the Amazigh people 




language ideologies ―are not only about language. Rather, [they]…envision and enact links of 
language to group and personal identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology‖ (pp. 55–
56). The reductionist and oversimplification of the Tamazight lexicon is an example of erasure 
that occurs when the ―facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed 
or get explained away‖ (Irvine and Gal 2000, p. 38). In the context of Tunisia, it is motivated by 
the desire to continue delegitimizing Tamazight practices not only in public and private sectors 
(as it has been historically), but also in contemporary digital and social media spaces. Due to the 
vital significance of Facebook in post-revolutionary Tunisia, demands to Arabize Facebook are 
often voiced directly by authors, politicians, and the so-called authorities.  
At this point, my dissertation‘s contribution is entrenched in addressing how hegemonic 
Arabization and the prevalent assumptions about Tunisian Tamazight are constructed through 
Facebook. Most notably, however, it shows how Facebook has become a more democratized 
space where both homogenizing ideologies and heterogeneous language practices can co-occur. 
Sharing the Facebook posts of Arabization advocates on Imazighen‘ Facebook pages have 
always triggered a certain form of speech as [sarcastic] ―likes‖ and visual or textual comments 
among Imazighen. This reflects the repositioning of power relations where it is no more a 
relation of dominant and dominated, but rather of processes of identity construction in the 
interaction context. Lafkiou (2014) provides a compelling statement on how this happens in 
Tunisia: 
[S]peech as a social process can be a source of gaining and exercising power, and 
thus is fundamental for the (re)construction of identities by minoritised or 
oppressed groups and individuals […] Recent political events, such as the Jasmine 
revolt in Tunisia, show the consequential impact of electronic media on national 
and international socio-political discourses, empowering ‗dominated‘ individuals 






The interactional paradigm argues that identity as a social category needs to be 
understood as an interactional achievement that can mark particular practices and people as 
similar to some and differentiated from others. This required looking at the interpersonal tactics 
of identity proposed by Bucholtz and Hall (2005), a series of meaningful practices and processes 
that serve to either establish resemblances or distinctions, to authenticate or denaturalize and to 
authorize or make illegitimate forms of social action.  
Analysis of the linguistic policies in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya found that they are 
generous towards acknowledging the Tamazight element in their national and ethnolinguistic 
sense of identity, both constitutionally and institutionally. Nevertheless, Tamazight continues to 
be marginalized and devalorized in local Tunisian discourse produced and reproduced about this 
language (Groff 2018). By, recurrently using ―Berber‖, which has become an ethnically marked 
and stigmatized term highly disfavored by the majority of Tamazight speakers, Moroccans, 
Algerians, Libyans, and Tunisians distance themselves from the Amazigh people along with the 
negative social meanings and stigmas attached to Tamazight language and ethnicity (e.g. 
barbarism, ignorance, and even paganism) (Almasud 2014). Despite the fact that Tamazight 
varieties spoken in Morocco and Algeria have resisted extinction, they remain vulnerable to such 
a threat as long they lack the symbolic power granted by educational, economic, religious, and/or 
political status. The iconization of Tamazight varieties as barbaric, ignorant, poor, and pagan is 
essentially tied to the low sociopolitical power of Imazighen. These iconic comparisons are 
recurrent in the public space and social media, particularly on Facebook. This leads me to 
describe the status of Tamazight in Tunisia.   
Unlike Morocco, Algeria, and Libya, Tamazight in Tunisia has already been pushed into 




language emerged only after the 2011 Revolution. While an unprecedented number of social and 
cultural activities have been taking place in the offline space since then, this dissertation argued 
that a considerable part of the revitalization work is done through the mobilization of Tamazight 
language as a discursive category through the use of CMD on Facebook. In Chapter 5, I started 
the data analysis by investigating the effects of the revitalization work five years after the 
revolution through an online questionnaire administered in 2016. The results revealed that there 
is a positive change of attitudes towards Tamazight among Tunisians.  
In this way, I argued that Tamazight‘s value has increased in Tunisia as a result of the 
emergence and rise of an Amazigh discourse on Facebook. The dissertation recognized the role 
that this social media outlet plays in empowering marginalized languages and identities. 
Facebook provides the space where a new linguistic diversity in Tunisia is being fostered. The 
new multilingual reality and linguistic diversity is marked by an excessive use of Ettounsi and 
the unprecedented emergence of Tamazight in public spaces on Facebook. Tunisian Imazighen 
cultivate Tamazight language usage on Facebook in ways that defy the long-held assumption that 
Arabic is the mother tongue of Tunisians in line with the one-language one nation ideology.  
Acknowledging the emerging multilingual Tunisia, however, in any official or legal 
context, might still need more time. With regard to Tamazight, two factors may delay its 
recognition by politicians. First, there is a lack of serious documentation work on the language. 
There is still much to be done in the form of writing grammars, dictionaries, readers, and 
pedagogical materials. Arabo-nationalists in power may find the lack of linguistic written 
materials an excuse to continue to deny the existence of Tamazight in Tunisia. Second, one of the 
defining aspects of Tunisia‘s transitional phase since the 2011 Revolution is the resurgence of 




has never experienced before. The rise of religious ideologies is usually accompanied by the 
idealization of Arabic language and rigorous antagonism towards Tamazight.  This echoes Al-
Masud‘s (2012) stating: 
 The colonization of Tamazgha (referring to North Africa) is not physically 
imposed by an outside ‗Arab‘ population, as in settler colonialism, but is a distinct 
form of colonization enacted by a ‗post-colonial‘ state and maintained by an 
Arab-Islamic ideology internalized by a historically elite sector […] Arabic is 
asserted as the ‗language of God‘ and superior to the Indigenous Tamazight (p. 
133).  
 
Imazighen are thus prevented from maintaining their own language and customs due to 
the processes of Arabization and Islamization, in which Amazigh culture is perceived as inimical 
to the proper practice of Islam. In this sense, the novel multilingual discourse on Facebook may 
continue to face the threat of erasure as the rising current sociopolitical forces may attempt to 
police and reshape the online discourse according to the Arabo-Islamic ideology. This 
interpretation is based on an idiosyncratic analysis of the vulnerable social and political 
transitionary phase that Tunisia is going through at the present.   
What is visible through the data in this study is that revitalizing the Tamazight element is 
achieved through the adoption of a modernist language ideology focused on countering 
hegemony through the assertion of a counter hegemony. To this end, I argued that Tunisian 
Imazighen are using linguistic, discursive, and semiotic resources to reverse their erasure through 
what I call ‗counteracting-erasure‘. Irvine and Gal‘s (2000) three semiotic processes—
iconization, fractal recursivity and erasure—provided a framework to analyze how the same 
language ideologies are re-constructed and reproduced on Facebook by Tunisian Imazighen as 
part of the counteracting-erasure processes. The dissertation defines this concept as a strategy 
used by Imazighen to distance themselves from any influence of the dominant Arabic identity. It 




and dominant representations through constructing positive and equally essentialist images of 
their community. Accordingly, and like all social identities, Tunisian Amazigheity is produced in 
and during interactions with others. The consequence of this interaction has been the production 
of ‗representations‘ of other individuals and groups in terms of real or attributed differences 
(Harris et al. 2013).   
Following the relationality principle of identity construction (Bucholtz and Hall 2005), 
the study also used the framework to look at how Tunisian Tamazight identity is constructed and 
reconstructed through various, often overlapping, complementary relations, including 
adequation/distinction, authentication/denaturalization, and authorization/illegitimation 
(Bucholtz and Hall 2005, p. 598). While resisting erasure of their language and identity, Tunisian 
Imazighen reconstruct an ideology that invokes an essentialist relationship between being 
Tunisian and being Amazigh. They consistently argue that most Tunisians are essentially 
Imazighen in ethnicity and culture. They also consider Tunisians who do not identify themselves 
as Imazighen to be musta‟arabeen or ‗Arabicized‘. Although the term literally means ‗to make 
someone or something Arabic‘, it appears to be undergoing a process of pejoration when used by 
Amazigh community members to connote lack of rootedness and agency. A musta‟arab is 
―inauthentic Tunisian‖, ―betrayer or disloyal to his or her ethnic roots‖, ―fake‖, ―ignorant‖, and 
mainly ―subordinated‖, and ―unfree‖. Such group categorization or labels are often stated 
explicitly in the meta-linguistic commentaries. 
 In discussing this, I devoted the second section of Chapter 5 to demonstrate how 
Tunisian Imazighen use varied semiotics to engage in an over-indigenization processes of 
Facebook. I argued that entextualization through processes of contextualization and 




focus was not only on language use, but also on other multilingual semiotic resources, such as 
images, texts, symbols, emblems and discourses that have been reallocated for the purpose of 
new meaning-making and the creation of new effects. An example is the entextualization of the 
Tamazight character for Yaz (the letter Z) from the Amazigh flag as new symbol of the Tunisian 
flag, map, and other cultural materials. The iconic representation of this grapheme constitutes a 
redefinition of the entire Tunisia and Tunisians as essentially Amazigh.  Another example is in 
relation to the Tamazight term Tines, the name of Tunisia in Ettounsi.  Tines is etymologically 
derived from Tamazight and means ‗key‘. The use of Tines and other toponyms as iconic 
determiners of Tunisian Amazigheity indexes Imazighen‘s ideological tendencies towards the 
construction of an Amazigh indigenous identity for all Tunisia. Recurrent references to 
toponyms with a Tamazight substrate in Ettounsi often function as essentializing markers for 
exclusionary and purist ideologies of Amazigh identity for all Tunisians.  
As pointed out by Gal and Irvine (2000, p. 37), the machination that naturalizes or 
essentializes a given linguistic feature and the community who uses it also works in sync with 
erasure. In the process of erasure, facts that are seen as inconsistent with the official story are 
―filtered through cultural and institutional ideologies‖ (Ehrlich 2001, p. 4) and explained away, 
making ‗victims‘ understandings of the events … unrecognizable or imperceptible‖ (Ehrlich 
2001, p. 1). In attempting to over-indigenize the linguistic, ethnic and cultural resources in 
Tunisia as ideological contestation to the erasure imposed on them, I argue in Chapter 5 that 
Tunisian Imazighen have reproduced the same processes by erasing the existence of other 
linguistic, ethnic, and cultural identities for Tunisians. The idea that Tunisia is crossroads of 
many civilizations and languages gets a pass in their discourse only if it does not reinforce the 




Narratives reinforcing pluralistic identities in Tunisia are seen as a threat to the ―Amazigh-
resistance identity‖. For Imazighen activists, such narratives undervalue the importance and 
effectiveness of their struggle against assimilation across history. Seeing Imazighen as receptive 
to the influence of other identities implies they were weak and should be taken accountable of 
letting the ―others‖, or the ―outsider invaders‖ affect or even ‗taint‘ their Amazigheity. Therefore, 
promoting a mixed or hybrid identities in the context of Tunisia is particularly subject to 
denaturalization and illegitimation as long as it threatens the ideological expectation of Tunisian 
Imazighen (cf. Røyneland, 2018).  
While resisting the hegemonic ideologies of Arabization and Arabo-Islamization, 
Tunisian Imazighen reconstruct an ideology that evokes a strong assertion that Tunisians are, if 
not totally, mostly Amazigh or at least ―non-Arabic‖. This was demonstrated in the second part 
of Chapter 5 and reinforced in more metalinguistic commentary from the Facebook pages of the 
participants as in Figure 7.1 from Teziri‘s page below which features the photograph of the 
politician Mohsen Marzouq and an excerpt of one of his Facebook posts in which he describes 






Figure 7.1: Teziri_social_st_image 38 
―Arab-Amazigh Maghreb‖ 
Teziri‟s comment on top of the politician‟s text: The thing that I liked most [in the politician‘s 
comment] is ―the Arab-Amazigh Maghreb‖ [followed by the sarcastically laughing emoji] 
 
The politician‟s commenting: […] Today as I was leaving Tunisia towards Morocco and right 
before the takeoff, Bakhur scents, Andalusian, Guinewi and folkloric music, the arches, and the 
Zaafran tastes, all felt like they were entwining and blessing me from head to toe. It is about one 
culture and a shared destiny 
A united African-Arabic-Amazigh Maghreb is the dream of all of us and of our ancestors and we 
will continue working towards it.  
 
 
Tezeri‘s post in Figure 7.1 is a mix of semiotic signs including text, pictures and 
emoticons. She employs a sarcastic tone through the use of the emoticons to express rejection of 
considering the Maghreb Arabic and Amazigh at the same time. While Teziri counteracts erasure 
implicitly through discursive cues such as sarcasm and CMC affordances such as emoticons to 
infer her internalized ideological perspectives and point of view against considering an Arabic 
constituent in the Maghreb identity, Yuba engages himself in a more overt metalinguistic 




identity. The photo was taken in 2014 during a protest on Habiba Bourguiba Avenue following 
the adoption of the new Constitution. The states explicitly that those who connect to the Arabic 
identity belong to the Arabian Peninsula where the Arabs originally came from, not to Tunisia. 
As such, he held most Tunisians to be Imazighen even if only some associate themselves with 
Amazigh identity and even if there is still a vast majority of the Tunisian society who are 
unfamiliar with the language, ethnicity, and cultural proclivities of the Amazigh people. Yuba‘s 
posting was shared by most of the participants indicating that there is a counter-hegemonic 
discourse and a reverse erasure ideology at the heart of the newly developing Amazigh discourse 
in Tunisia.  
Following the analysis of semiotic multimodalities, the dissertation concludes that 
Tunisian Amazigh discourse on Facebook ―may contain ideological and practical features that 
defy and reverse the very essence of fragmentation, hybridization, destabilized identities‖ 





    
 
Figure 7.2: Yuba_Social_Image46 
Arabs do not belong in Tunisia 
 
(Translation of Yuba‟s description in Arabic above the photograph):  
This is not a racist discourse. Tunisia is for all, but this is our war against all the inadequate 
delusional ideas. Let‘s be Tunisians and let‘s not look to the Gulf except for prayers (referencing 
the fact that Muslims face east when they pray). 
 
(Translation of the sign):  
Arabs… belong to the Arabian Peninsula…. This is Tunisia! 
 
 
Other examples similar to the ones from Dihya and Yuba were examined in Chapter 5 to 
demonstrate how Tunisian Imazighen deploy different semiotic processes to make ideological 
representations that lead to linguistic erasure.  In this respect, I showed how participants have 
been constantly engaged in an intensive labor of identity performance on Facebook. 
Accumulating indexical signs to create ―a relevant context‖ (Silverstein 1992, 1993, Reyes   
Wortham 2015) of a surviving “Amazigheity‖ in Tunisia is the process through which most 




is featured on the Amazigh flag ⵣ and functions as an Amazigh identity sign, emblem, and a 
theme of metalinguistic comments which presupposes a specific affiliation with a specific 
indigenous identity. Indigenizing their identity sometimes requires an exaggerated yet crucial act 
of performativity in order to be recognized and be made visible as indigenous Imazighen of 
Tunisia. The dissertation argued that the indigenization of Amazigh Facebook, also called 
Facebook amizighicization serves as counter-hegemonic force to camouflage other 
ethnolinguistic identities that played a role in forming Tunisian identity. Tunisian Imazighen do 
not limit themselves to the work of accumulating of all these indexical signs, but also tend to re-
use them in the making of meaning of indigeneity for all Tunisians.  Linguistic anthropology 
calls such a discursive practice entextualization (Bauman & Briggs, 1990, 73; Blommaert, 2005, 
pp. 46-48; Silverstein & Urban, 1996).  
The yaz figure has been appropriated, reframed, and reinterpreted by being 
decontextualized from Amazigh textual and semiotic materials such as from the Amazigh flag or 
Tifinagh scripts and recontextualized in Tunisian textual and semiotic materials, such as the 
national flag, maps, etc. Through this recontextualization, participants construct a dominant 
group identity aimed principally at challenging ―the minority image‖ that  Arabism and Arabo-
Islamic ideologies have confined them to. In doing so, I show how Tunisian Imazighen present 
themselves as ―active agents‖ for whom entextualization is ‗act of control‘ (Bauman and Briggs, 
1990, p. 76) through which they claim a degree of social power. This power manifests in various 
ways: it appears in their access to the activity of entextualization, in the legitimizing act of 
reusing the texts, in their competence in such reuse, and in the differential values attached to 




not only reject the label ―minority‖, but they even modify and appropriate the dominant majority 
discourse.   
Such a discursive practice was further examined in Chapter 6 through the multilingual 
practices Imazighen engage themselves in. On Facebook, the findings suggest that Tunisian 
Imazighen‘s networked multilingualism (Androutsopoulos, 2013) is shaped by language 
functions and ideological motivations tied to Amazigh identity construction and contestation of 
Arabic language ideologies. Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), Ettounsi, and Tamazight represent 
the three most used languages on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook. Building on the ideology of 
linguistic differentiation (Irvine and Gal 2000), I explain that each of these linguistic resources 
carries competing social meanings and ideological associations that deconstruct and reproduce 
linguistic hegemony. This echoes Vigouroux‘ (2015, p. 244) and Røyneland‘s (2018, p. 153) 
understanding of heteroglossia as the simultaneous use of different chunks of ‗named languages‘ 
or registers that will often entail tensions and conflicts between different types of varieties or 
features, based on the historical associations they carry with them. Accordingly, despite the 
endangerment status of Tunisian Tamazight, the analysis demonstrated that it is constructed as 
not only a living language but also a very instrumental and functional language. This was 
exemplified in posts containing long texts in Tamazight in different genres, including poems, 
stories, and even analytical texts about Tamazight grammar.   
When sharing more than one linguistic repertoire, Tamazight is shown to have 
precedence over the dominant languages of MSA and Ettounsi.  Such Facebook display of 
Tamazight is most iconically associated with a set of language ideologies about its rootedness, 
localization, and nativeness which presupposes that other languages, MSA in particular, are 




and performing an Amazigh identity. Using their pragmatic knowledge of Tamazight pragmatic 
language such as greetings, thanking, and address terms such as ulma ‗brother‘, dadda ‗uncle‘, or 
mass ‗Mister‘ is sufficient not only to index someone‘s Amazigheity but also to signal 
disalignment with Arab identity. Hence, the use of Tamazight on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook 
does not only index identity affiliation and authenticity, but also acts as an exclusionary 
membership symbol. 
Respectively, the use of Ettounsi is also associated with issues of Amazigh identify and 
belonging. Findings of the dissertation suggested that ideologically for most Tunisian Imazighen, 
Ettounsi is a combination of numerous structural features originating essentially from Tamazight. 
By holding this belief, they adapt this code as a substitute identity marker for those who do not 
speak Tamazight. On the basis of this, I showed that there are some Imazighen who even view 
Ettounsi as simply a different version of Tamazight with some Arabic borrowings or influence. 
This led me to conclude that such views act as a nascent force on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook, 
erasing other sources of input in the make-up of Ettounsi. Despite the limited number of 
proficient Tamazight speakers in the context of Tunisia, Tunisian Imazighen reject being viewed 
as a ―linguistic minority‖. Ettounsi, according to many members of the community, is sufficient 
to safeguard their linguistic dominance because it is spoken by all Tunisians. As for MSA, 
despite its dominant status in society as the language of government and religion, on Facebook 
its role is symbolically reduced to metalinguistic and meta-pragmatic comments about Tamazight 
language and identity or to a medium of paraphrasing content posted in Tamazight language. 
Interestingly, MSA was largely viewed as tool to challenge its own ideologically hegemonic 
position and to construct a counter-hegemonic position for Tamazight.  I base this supposition on 









Figure 7.3: Takfirinas_Linguistic_st53 
MSA is a tool to assert an Amazigh identity  
 
Translation of the Arabic comment:  
I write in Arabic to tell the Arabs that I am not Arab.  
 
Tamazight is typically written using three different systems of writing: Tifinagh, Latin or 
Arabic. Investigation of script choices revealed that Tunisian Imazighen also tend to deploy 
indexical signs and harbor ideological associations with each of the writing systems they used on 
Facebook. Tamazight posts in Arabic orthography occurred mostly in religious contexts. This 
discursive practice was interpreted as an alignment strategy meant to establish and perpetuate an 
ideology that defines them as Muslims while simultaneously taking an oppositional stance to the 
Arab-Islamic ideology. Tifinagh script was found to present a major distinguishing feature of 
Tamazight. It was important for Tunisian Imazighen to highlight the fact that such a script exists 
even if only few may know how to use it. Tifinagh enregisters Tamazight as ―written‖ with its 
own orthographic system and counters oppressive language ideologies describing it as an 
essentially oral language. Writing in Tifinagh is deployed as a performative act through which 
ritual greetings, places, logos, actions, announcements and other cultural and linguistic forms are 
made more ―Tamazight‖. The use of such a script thereby elevates the symbolic value of 




write Tamazight was explained as a function of the symbolic power that languages which are 
written in this script have in the global economy (especially French and English). Even though 
there is no debate over the script choice for writing Tamazight among Tunisian Imazighen 
(unlike in Algeria and Morocco), the linguistic practices on Facebook suggest that Latin might 
be favored going forward. This echoes Jaffe (2000, p. 506) who observes that ―it is not only 
important to have an orthography, but it is also critical for the orthography to have prescriptive 
power-to be standardized and authoritative like orthographies of dominant languages‖.  
Overall, the multilingual and multi-orthographic choices that Imazighen make in their 
Facebook interactions play a critical role in their identity formation. Through these choices, they 
constantly engage in a discursive and semiotic making and remaking of what Tunisian Amazigh 
identity should look like. The case of Tunisian Tamazight provides an illustrative example of the 
complex interrelationship between language, ethnicity and other identity markers, such as 
nationality or religion. The exercise of choosing one language over another and one script over 
another on Facebook represents acts of resistance against hegemonic Arabization in North 
African while mobilizing Tamazight language as a discursive category. This works not to create 
group belonging and to oppose the idea that Tunisia is essentially an ethnically Arab and Arabic-
speaking country, but also to produce a counter hegemonic discourse or even counteract erasure 
ideology that defines Tunisia as an Amazigh Arabized country rather than an Arabic country in 
which Tamazight is a minority speaking- language or even a dying language.  
In this respect, Tunisian Tamazight language revitalization is not only about a successful 
or failed project, but also about mobilizing new categories or redefining old ones in order to 




other types of social actors or other social processes. It is, in other words, a constant rapport de 
force or power struggle (Costa 2015).  
The dissertation concludes that Tunisian Amazigh Facebook is an arena where 
hegemonic discourses and erasure ideologies can be defied or reversed. In this sense, knowing 
about the Tamazight language revitalization project may not be sufficient without understanding 
the discourse that accompanies this project. Through the analysis of linguistic and semiotic 
practices on Facebook, this study demonstrates that Tunisian Tamazight revitalization is not 
limited to reclaiming linguistic and cultural rights, but also aims at recreating and reconfiguring 
the semiotic connection between common Tunisian cultural materials, linguistic materials, and 
semiotic signs and various Amazigh iconic, indexical and symbolic links. According to 
Feliciano-Santos (2011) these recreations and reconfigurations are ―persuasive due to their 
ability to be entextualized, emblematized and taken on by others‖ (p. 86).  
In view of this, it is possible to attribute the change of attitudes towards Tunisian 
Tamazight observed in this study to precisely these discursive practices where ideologies of 
erasure are disclosed and contested then reproduced and reversed in what is called counter-
erasure process. Tunisian Imazighen do not claim minority status during the process of 
reclaiming their rights or calling for recognition. Rather, they present themselves as the dominant 
group that constitutes a linguistic, ethnic, and cultural majority. I argue in Chapter 6 that it is 
through this discourse that Tunisian Imazighen are simultaneously engaged in a heterogeneous 
language practice in attempting to over-amazighify everything in Tunisia. ―I don‟t remember 
who said scratch a Tunisian and you will find an Amazigh person‖ said Yughurtha during my 




Moroccan, find a Berber‖. Implicit in this saying is a tacit assertion that Tunisians are Imazighen 
in essence despite Arabization.  
7.2. Dissertation contribution 
To sum up what I believe this dissertation has contributed, I start with the mythological 
aspect. Analysis of the discursive and linguistic practices on Tunisian Amazigh Facebook 
contributes to the study of indigenous languages revitalization in online digital spaces through a 
combination of methodology of ethnography, sociolinguistics, and the field of language focused 
CMC studies. With regard to the impact of Facebook in ongoing political and social change in 
Tunisia since the 2011 Revolution, the dissertation showed that this online platform has been a 
major catalyst not only of the revitalization movement of Tunisian Tamazight, but also of the 
future sociolinguistic situation in the country.  
Despite the continuing lack of any comprehensive documentation efforts along with the 
lack of systematic efforts to teach the language at the national level, there is no doubt that 
Tamazight status has been elevated and more awareness of its impact on the forging of the 
current Tunisian identity. Even if Tamazight revitalization efforts are more focused on 
challenging or counteracting erasure ideologies through the online discourse, these efforts have 
raised awareness of the language and its link to identity and also provided the means by which 
such affiliation is possible (such as using Facebook to inform visitors that the language has a 
writing system, using pragmatic expressions, or instructing the etymology of the toponomy in the 
country).  
 The deployment of ideologies through Facebook discursive practices such as 
indigenizing or Amazighicizing everything that is Tunisian or defining Tunisians as 




language (Ettounsi) that was influenced by Tamazight, is viewed as one of the factors that has 
raised the visibility of Tamazight. Seeing Tamazight written on Tunisian Facebook and as the 
main theme of metalinguistic and meta-pragmatic comments and discussions or in use as 
pragmatic language, in events flyers, in names of Facebook pages, pictures of places, in signs 
and other revitalization materials become a part of a mobilizing discourse that has created a new 
linguistic landscape in Tunisia. With that said, this dissertation is ground-breaking as the first 
sociolinguistic study of Tunisian Imazighen‘s cultural and linguistic awaking following the 2011 
Revolution.  
What I hope to have accomplished in this dissertation is to shed light on the emergence of 
Tunisian Tamazight consciousness, the efforts going on in its revitalization, the significant role 
of Facebook in providing a space for the construction and reconstruction of this language and 
identity, and more broadly, the complex relationality between Tamazight language and identity, 
and being Tunisian. This dissertation is the first to analyze erasure and counter erasure strategies 
from the perspectives of Tunisian Imazighen themselves. While countering erasure is the 
framework that is framing Imazighen‘s activism, it is evidently reinforcing Tamazight visibility.  
On a more general level, this study contributes to our understanding of the how language 
revitalization takes place in digital spaces. The presence of Tunisian Tamazight on Facebook 
provides an example of an endangered and indigenous language that has gained attention for 
potential maintenance and revitalization. It is shown in this study, that the introduction of these 
languages in digital media may not only promote their functional use, but also provide 
possibilities for transformation of their ―ideological valuation‖ (Eisenlohr, 2004), a goal that all 
minoritized and endangered language activists aim to achieve. Nonetheless, as much of this 




endangered languages, the researcher is aware of the possible risks that placing too much 
reliance on these sites may entail. One of these risks is related to the unknown future of the 
social media outlets. While Facebook continues to be the most visited site in the context of 
Tunisia, for example, there are talks about a growing use of Instagram as well.  This being so, it 
is important to stay alert to the fact that sociolinguistic research on social media, like any other 
field of research, is ongoing and dynamic (Barton & Lee 2013:183).  
7.3. Limitations and future research  
There are limitations to the research presented in this dissertation that I would like to 
state while hoping to address them in future research. Most of the findings in this study are based 
on online ethnography rather than traditional fieldwork in the community. I did not have the 
opportunity to engage in fieldwork in Tunisia and interacted with my participants through skype. 
While realities between online and offline contexts are often connected and the interplay 
between online and offline communication suggests that these different aspects of social life 
should not be investigated as distinct from other areas of everyday life (Saehr 2013), I still think 
that a better grasp of the Tamazight revitalization project requires more immersion within the 
community through an extensive fieldwork in the local community.  
Clearly, then, my plan for future research will focus on documenting as many aspects of 
Tunisian Tamazight as possible, and eventually write a grammar of the language. I intend to start 
by building a corpus of visual, oral, and written texts through an extensive fieldwork within the 
community.  My goal is to produce a grammar out of this research experience for and with the 
assistance of the speakers. Writing a Tunisian Tamazight Grammar will help to preserve the 
language for future generations, but also encourage its present functionality. Currently, numerous 




import language materials from Morocco, Algeria, and Libya when Tamazight varieties spoken 
in these countries differ to large extent form the varieties spoken in Tunisia. While revitalization 
efforts on Facebook are important for shifting people‘s language ideologies, they do not involve 
any language documentation. This situation may change if both efforts are combined. To this 
end, I aim to create teaching materials and documentary corpus of Tamazight where the 
community can participate actively instead of relying on outsider linguists. Throughout this 
study I tried to adopt an emic approach where most of analysis depended on the perspectives of 
the participants. I aim to follow the same approach during my future field work where the speech 
community will be involved as partners rather than consultants in the teaching and 
documentation project.  
The use of Tifinagh in public space is highly discouraged by the so-called authorities in 
Tunisia. Based on a recent incident that occurred sometime in October 2018, a pharmacy owner 
in the town of Matamata received order to change the sign in front of his business because it 
contained Tifinagh writing. The Amazigh community was outraged over this incident and 
engaged in a campaign of writing Tifinagh on various public spaces, such as houses front sides, 
street signs, advertising billboards, walls graffiti. Studying this changing linguistic landscape in 
the Tunisian public sphere is another potentially rich area for future research. I believe that 
investigating the effects of the increasing presence of Tifinagh in bilingual and multilingual 
locales in Tunisia will change the way Tunisians think about linguistic diversity in the country.  
Examining how the new symbolism, social meanings, and layers of signification of this new 
linguistic landscape will affect the Tunisian sociocultural and linguistic matrix will undoubtedly 
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Sociolinguistics Interview Questions  
 
Title of Research Study:  Semiotic and discursive displays of Tamazight identity on Facebook: 
a sociolinguistic analysis of revitalization efforts in post-revolutionary Tunisia. 
 
 
Principal Investigator: Soubeika Bahri 
        PhD candidate 
 
Faculty Advisor:  Cecelia Cutler, PhD 
      PhD faculty  
Lehman College 
Interdisciplinary Program in Linguistics 
 





1) Do you identify yourself as Amazigh? 
2) Do you speak any Tamazight?  
3) If yes   
a) Are you fluent? 
b) Did you speak it since childhood? 
4) If no 
a) Why not? 
b) Is it important to speak Tamazight? 
5) What are other languages you speak? 
6) Do you understand all other Tamazight varieties, such as those spoken in Morocco and 
Algeria? 




8) What do you think about the hypothesis that Tamazight is nothing but another dialect of 
Arabic? 
9)  Are there purely Amazigh people in Tunisia?  
10) Why is that people didn‘t seem to know much about Tamazight until after the 2011-
revolution? 
11) What do you think about the current status of Tamazight in Tunisia? 
12) Why is Tamazight surviving in Algeria and Morocco, but not in Tunisia? 
13) How does Tamazight language relate to Tunisian language? 
14) What remains of Arabic origin in Tunisia? 
15) Do you accept to be called ―Berber‖? Why or why not? 
16) Did Tamazight influence Tunisian language? 
17) Can you give example of words or semantic usages that are Tamazight, and yet viewed as 
Arabic? 
18) Tamazight is considered an oral language though it has a writing system, the Tifinagh. 
How do you explain this? 
19) Do you think most Tunisians are Amazigh? How do you comment on those who don‘t 
like to be identified so? 
20) Do you recall an anecdote or case where you and someone else where you were 
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Sociolinguistics Online Survey  
 
Title of Research Study: Semiotic and discursive displays of Tamazight identity on 




Principal Investigator: Soubeika Bahri 
        PhD candidate 
 
Faculty Advisor:  Cecelia Cutler, PhD 
      PhD faculty  
Lehman College 
Interdisciplinary Program in Linguistics 
 
Research Sponsor:  None 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study. Your participation is voluntary. You must be 
18 years or older, and you must be a Tunisian residing in Tunisia.  You are may ask for help 
from anyone who speaks and understands English including the investigator of the research (see 
contact information below), if you find difficulty with the language.   
 
I am conducting research on language attitudes in Tunisia. The survey takes about 10 minutes. 
 
Your voluntary participation in this study will provide you with an opportunity to share your 
experiences with Tamazight language and identity.  You may choose not to participate or you 
may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty to you, but I hope you will help 
this research project gather this information by participating. There are no right or wrong 
answers, and you will not be scored or assessed in any way.  There are no anticipated risks 
beyond those encountered in everyday life. 
 
Your answers will be kept anonymous. No personally identifying information is collected or 
encouraged in this survey. 
 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the Graduate Center of the City University of New 




If you have any questions or concerns about this research, you may contact the Principal 
Investigator, Soubeika Bahri, at wafafedy31@gmail.com. 
 
Consent Statement and Signature 
 
I have read this consent form and have had the opportunity to have my questions answered. I 
voluntarily agree to participate in this study, by clicking "I agree" below: 
 
  I agree 
 
 I disagree 
 
 
1) What is your age?  _________________________ 
2) What is your gender?     ☐Male       ☐Female  
3) Which state are you from? __________________ 
 
4) What is your level of education? 





5) What are the languages that you speak? 
☐Darija (Tunisian Arabic) 



















☐Others, please mention the variety. 
____________________ 
 
7) How do you evaluate your fluency if you are a Tamazight speaker? 









8) How do you evaluate your writing proficiency in Tamazight Tifinagh?  






9) Do you know of any Tamazight language, other than the one(s) spoken in Tunisia? 
 
If yes, please name three: 
___________________  _____________________ 
 ___________________ 
 
10) Do you know of any Amazigh historical figure?  
 
 
11) If yes, please name at least one 
__________________ ____________________  _____________________ 
 
12) Do you know of any Tunisian word in Tunisian dialect? 
 
If yes, please list 
13) Do you know of any Tunisian cultural aspect that is Tamazight? 
 
If yes, please list 
 
14) Is Tunisian identity 
☐Tamazight only? 
☐A mixture of several identities? 








15) Tamazight is part of Tunisian heritage  
 
☐Strongly agree                                    ☐ Agree to an extent  
☐ Disagree                                            ☐ Strongly disagree 
☐ I do not care  
 
16) The death of Tamazight language is unimportant 
☐Strongly agree                                    ☐ Agree to an extent  
☐ Disagree                                            ☐ Strongly disagree 
☐ I do not care  
 
17) Tamazight language revitalization is a waste of time 
 
☐Strongly agree                                    ☐ Agree to an extent  
☐ Disagree                                            ☐ Strongly disagree 
☐ I do not care  
 
18) Tamazight is useless in modern Tunisia  
 
☐Strongly agree                                    ☐ Agree to an extent  
☐ Disagree                                            ☐ Strongly disagree 
☐ I do not care  
 
19) Tamazight should be taught 
 
☐Strongly agree                                    ☐ Agree to an extent  
☐ Disagree                                            ☐ Strongly disagree 
☐ I do not care  
 
20) Tamazight should be constitutionalized  
☐Strongly agree                                    ☐ Agree to an extent  
☐ Disagree                                            ☐ Strongly disagree 
☐ I do not care  
 
21) Tunisian Tamazight is an ugly language (you can choose more than one option). 
 





              
22) Tunisian Tamazight is a poor language.       
 




   Please justify in few sentences whatever option you will pick (you can write your answer 
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